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From 1941 to 1990, Malaysia was involved in violent conflicts against internal and 
external threats. Most military literature does not emphasize the role of special operations 
forces (SOF) during these five decades of conflicts. This thesis highlights some lessons 
learned that might be useful for countries with strategic and operational concerns similar 
to Malaysia, details the contributions of the SOF to Malaysia from World War II to the 
present, and examines their utility in supporting future Malaysian national security 
strategies. This research also outlines the development of and a way forward for 
Malaysian SOF. 
The author explores each conflict using the UK Defense Line of Development, 
which consists of training, equipment, personnel, information, doctrine, organization, 
infrastructure, and logistics (TEPID OIL). This is equivalent to the U.S. DoD’s doctrine, 
organization, training and education, materiel, leadership, people and facilities 
(DOTMLPF), for the set of generic elements that must be brought together to generate a 
defense capability. Due to the importance of leadership in a conflict, the author adds 
“leadership” to the UK DLoD. The new acronym, for the purpose of this thesis, is TEPID 
OIL + L. In short, this thesis proposes that fostering SOF benefits not only irregular 
warfare capabilities against internal threats, but also overall national security against 
external conventional and unconventional threats. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Malaysia, known as Malaya before 1963, was involved in violent conflicts against 
internal and external threats for five decades, from 1941 to 1990. These conflicts caused 
the killing and wounding of thousands of security forces and civilians, and terrorized 
many other citizens. Researchers have mainly focused on the Malayan Emergency from 
1948–1960, which the British declared ended on 31 July 1960. The actual history of 
irregular warfare in Malaysia is much longer than that. The Malayan Emergency has been 
studied for counterinsurgency (COIN) lessons, such as effective population control, 
persuasion, the winning of hearts and minds, political concession, social provision, 
command, unified and dynamic leadership, and the need for security forces to become 
effective learning organizations. Seldom discussed are the SOF and their achievements 
during that conflict. Yet the development of effective SOF units in countering insurgents 
and terrorists greatly enhanced the success of COIN in Malaysia. John Arquilla, a 
professor and chairman of the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, writes in his book From Troy to Entebbe that although they are most commonly 
associated with the period from World War II to the present, special operations have a 
long, rich tradition that reaches far back into history.1 With that in mind, this thesis 
provides a perspective on special operations during that half-century of armed conflict in 
Malaysia.  
B. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND RELEVANCE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the contributions of the Malaysian special 
operations forces (SOF) to Malaysia’s security against internal and external threats from 
World War II to the present, and their utility in supporting Malaysia’s national security 
strategy. There has been close interest in special operations and elite military units in 
recent years. For the U.S. administration, SOF has become the “force of choice” and has 
                                                 
1 John Arquilla, From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1996), xvi. 
 2 
grown considerably after 9/11.2 Malaysia, as a small nation with small security forces 
located at the center of Southeast Asia, should consider this tool regarding its future 
national security posture. This thesis will study the experience of the Malaysian SOF and 
will also examine Malaysian national security policy and crucial issues pertaining to the 
nature, course, and impact of SOF in the conflicts in Malaysia. 
The scope of this thesis includes the following periods: the establishment of 
guerrilla units to fight the Japanese occupation in Malaya (1941–1945); the incorporation 
of British and Malayan SOF in fighting terrorists in the Malayan Emergency (1948–
1960); the Malaysian–Indonesian Confrontation in Borneo (1962–1966); and the second 
Malaysian counterinsurgency operation against re-emergent communist terrorists (1968–
1989). This thesis will also look at the development of the modern Malaysian SOF and 
analyze the way forward. It will address a larger argument, that fostering SOF benefits 
not only irregular warfare capabilities against internal threats, but also overall national 
security against external conventional and unconventional threats.  
The relevance of this project stems from the observation that most military 
literature dealing with Malaysia does not emphasize the achievements of the various SOF 
units in action during four decades of conflict. This thesis is intended to benefit all 
military and government personnel interested in SOF operations and their development in 
Malaysia. As SOF may become their force of choice for engagement in future conflicts, 
this study highlights some lessons that might be useful to countries with strategic and 
operational concerns similar to those of Malaysia. 
 
 
                                                 
2 “In the emerging strategic environment, it is clear that U.S. military power will increasingly be 
exercised by SOF acting by, with and through partners around the world.”-- David Barno and Travis Sharp, 
“SOF Power,” Foreign Policy, February 14, 2012, http//www.foreignpolicy.com/articles 
/2012/02/12/sof_power (accessed February 2, 2012); Kristina Wong, “Special Operations Forces To Do 
More With Less,” The Washington Times, February 28, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com.news 
/2012/feb/28/special-operation (accessed on February 2, 2012). 
 3 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION  
This thesis asks why the Malaysian SOF developed from inception into its present 
form; and whether its present form is optimal to support future national security 
requirements. To answer these questions, this thesis also explores the following 
additional questions:  
Q1: Did the Malaysian irregular warfare experience in World War II and the 
Malayan Emergency contribute to success in subsequent conflicts in Malaysia?  
Q2: Will development of special operations capabilities improve Malaysian 
national security against conventional military competitors?  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis studies the actions of various SOF units during conflicts in Malaysia. 
From World War II to 1989, the British and then Malaysian governments utilized SOF to 
fight against the Japanese, communist terrorists, and the Indonesian armed forces. SOF 
were utilized more effectively and influenced outcomes more strongly during the 
Malayan Emergency and subsequent campaigns.3 The British and Malaysians succeeded 
in their counterinsurgencies after governmental and military leaders redesigned their 
comprehensive campaign plan and considered operational practices that included SOF 
units. According to John A. Nagl, director of the Center for New American Security, 
analysis indicates that the British emphasized decentralization and small-unit operations 
during the Malayan Emergency. Nagl also writes that the role of the special forces was 
limited during the initial stage of the Emergency, but showed a gradual increase in the 
fighting of communist terrorists as the campaign progressed.4 As an analyst and senior 
lecturer on irregular warfare and terrorism in the Department of Defense Analysis at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, Kalev I. Sepp summarizes the best practices in 
                                                 
3 “Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” Joint Publication 1–02. 2010 (as amended through 
February 15, 2012), 83, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
Counterinsurgency is a comprehensive civilian and military effort taken to defeat an insurgency and to 
address any core grievances. Also called COIN (JP 3–24).  
4 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 51. 
 4 
counterinsurgency (see Figure 1), based on more than 54 insurgencies in the 20th century, 
including the Malayan Emergency.5 Some of these practices highlight how a state or 
government could appropriately utilize special forces to gain success in a 
counterinsurgency or, on the other hand, to continue a protracted campaign that 
eventually failed.  
 
SUCCESSFUL COIN PRACTICES UNSUCCESSFUL COIN PRACTICES 
 
Emphasis on intelligence. 
Focus on populations, their needs, and 
security.  
Secure areas established, expanded.  
Insurgents isolated from population 
(population control).  
Single authority (charismatic/dynamic 
leader). 
Effective, pervasive psychological 
operations (PSYOPS) campaigns.  
Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents. 
Police in the lead; military supporting.  
Police force expanded, diversified. 
Conventional military forces reoriented for 
counterinsurgency. 
Special Forces, advisers embedded with 
indigenous forces. 
Insurgent sanctuaries denied. 
 
Primacy of military direction of 
counterinsurgency. 
Priority to “kill–capture” enemy, not on 
engaging population. 
Battalion-size operations as the norm. 
Military units concentrated on large bases 
for protection.  
Special Forces focused on raiding. 
Building, training indigenous army in 
image of U.S. Army. 
Peacetime government processes.  
Open borders, airspace, coastlines.  
Table 1.   Sepp’s successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency practices.6 
                                                 
5 Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May-June 2005, 8. 
6 Sepp, “Best Practices,”10. 
 5 
An appropriate definition of special operations is important for this thesis. 
Various studies indicate that it is necessary to define special operations broadly to include 
SOF units from World War II until the present. A broad definition of special operations 
will also allow this thesis to include various military or paramilitary actions that fell 
outside the scope of conventional warfare in their time. John Arquilla also places 
significant emphasis on the coup de main by small forces whose aim is to achieve 
substantial effects in the course of a war or international crisis.7 He uses a broad 
definition of SOF to allow the inclusion of protracted campaigns in which the 
government uses small forces, either independently or in concert with regular or other 
irregular forces, to achieve larger aims.8 
The literature defines special operations vaguely, because of the broad range of 
activities carried out by SOF. Currently, special operations are frequently associated with 
three core missions: special reconnaissance and surveillance, direct action and military 
assistance.9 A vague and under-inclusive definition of special operations will provide 
insufficient guidance in understanding the term. Conversely, if the definition is too rigid 
and narrowly focused, it unnecessarily hampers the imagination in conducting special 
operations. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has defined special operations 
broadly to avoid both pitfalls:  
Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or 
economic objectives employing military capabilities for which 
there is no broad conventional requirement. These operations often 
require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special 
operations are applicable across the range of military operations. 
They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with 
operations of conventional forces or other government agencies 
and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or 
surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional 
operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational 
techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly 
                                                 
7 Arquilla, From Troy to Entebbe, xvi. 
8 Arquilla, From Troy to Entebbe, xvi.  
9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, AJP-3.5, (NATO 
Standardization Agency, 2009), 2–3–2–5. 
 6 
support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and 
indigenous assets.10  
This definition is holistic and emphasizes the joint, multinational, and interagency 
nature of special operations and independent operations. 
According to British Brigadier General Maurice Tugwell and David Charters, a 
modern military historian, “special operations are small, clandestine, covert, or overt, 
operations of an unorthodox, frequently high-risk in nature, undertaken to achieve 
political or military objectives in support of foreign policy.”11 James D. Kiras, who 
teaches terrorism and insurgency at the U.S. Air Force Air University, defines special 
operations as: 
unconventional actions against enemy vulnerabilities in a sustained 
campaign, undertaken by specially designated units, to enable 
conventional operations and/or resolve economically politico-
military problems at the operational or strategic level that are 
difficult or impossible to accomplish with conventional forces 
alone.12  
Nevertheless, one must use caution with this definition, because as the capabilities 
of conventional forces improve, they may be able to perform missions that once were the 
responsibility of the SOF.13   
During the Malayan Emergency, British Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, 
Director of Operations in Malaya, introduced a counterinsurgency plan and established 
various SOF units to strengthen his plan, which directly or indirectly improved overall 
conditions in Malaya. The Briggs Plan had four objectives.14 First, to dominate the 
                                                 
10 Department of Defense, “Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” Joint Publication 1–02 
(2010; (as amended through February 15, 2012), 340–341, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
11 David A. Charters and Maurice Tugwell, “Special Operations and the Threats to United States 
Interests in 1980s,” in Colin S. Gray, ed., Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 145. 
12 James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism 
(New York: Routeledge, 2006), 5. 
13 Robert G. Spulak, Jr., “A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF,” 
JSOU Report 07–07 (2007), 2. 
14 J. Paul de B. Taillon, The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter-Terrorism: The British and 
American Experiences (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 15. 
 7 
populated areas and build up a feeling of complete security, which in time, would steadily 
increase the flow of information coming from all sources. The second objective was to 
break up communist organizations within the populated areas. The third was to isolate the 
bandits from their food and supply organizations in the populated areas, and fourth, to 
destroy the bandits by forcing them to attack the security forces on their own ground.15 
These objectives could be achieved through the coordination of the activities of the 
police, civil authorities, and conventional forces. With the establishment of a special 
intelligence unit, the Special Branch, to collect, analyze and disseminate “live” 
intelligence, and the role of psychological operations (psyops) units, the government 
effectively controlled not just the population within these areas, but also the space 
itself.16  
There were remote, lightly populated areas and disputed areas, including jungles 
and swamps, which were under insurgent control. Sir Robert Thompson, a British 
military officer and counterinsurgency expert, writes that without special units, winning-
hearts-and-minds operations could not reach everyone in these areas.17 He also states that 
the establishment of a small, elite, mobile, disciplined, lightly equipped, and aggressive 
army fulfilled the military’s role in support of civil government in accordance with his 
five basic principles of COIN:18 that the government must 1) have a clear political aim, 2) 
function in accordance with the law, 3) have an overall plan, 4) give priority to defeating 
political subversion, not guerrillas, and 5) must secure its base first in the guerrilla phase 
of an insurgency.19  
There is evidence that the success of security forces in various conflicts in 
Malaysia resulted from shared experiences and lessons learned. J. Paul de B. Taillon, a 
professor of war studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, is convinced that due to 
                                                 
15Taillon, Evolution of Special Forces, 15. 
16 Karl Hack, “Extracting Counterinsurgency lessons: The Malaya Emergency and Afghanistan,” 
RUSI Analysis (November 28, 2009), http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4B14E068758F1/ 
(accessed February 29, 2012). 
17 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 104. 
18 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 62. 
19 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 50–62. 
 8 
the frequency of British involvement in irregular warfare operations, they were able to 
acquire and maintain a high level of combat skill among all ranks.20 As a result, 
successful tactics and techniques evolved from earlier conflicts and grew in subsequent 
conflicts as well. In his study of the wars in Malaya and Vietnam, Nagl explains that the 
superior performance of the British army in learning and implementing successful COIN 
in Malaya was due to its capabilities as a learning institution, and its organizational 
culture.21 Most of their tactics and techniques were continued and could be observed in 
later conflicts such as the Confrontation and the 1968–1989 insurgency.22 Charters and 
Tugwell also write that armies do best in irregular warfare when they learn from 
experience, adapt their existing force structure and doctrine to the particular demands of a 
conflict, emphasize small-unit operations, and allowing initiative at the lowest levels.23 
To succeed in special operations, Admiral William H. McRaven, the 9th 
commander of the United States Special Operations Command, emphasizes that SOF 
need to achieve “relative superiority” against the enemy. He introduces six principles of 
special operations in this regard: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and 
purpose.24 According to Colin S. Gray, a strategic theorist and defense analyst who has 
worked in Britain, Canada, and the United States, a SOF will achieve success when there 
are certain favorable conditions that require a specific context—for example, in the type 
of conflict, character of missions, time, and adversaries. To promote success, Gray 
emphasis that SOF need to fit the policy demand, have a tolerant political and strategic 
culture, have political and military patrons who understand their strategic value, be 
assigned feasible objectives, be directed by a strategically functioning defense 
establishment, possess flexibility of mind, and especially, exhibit an unconventional 
mentality. SOF need to provide unique strategic services, find and exploit enemy 
                                                 
20 Taillon, Evolution of Special Forces, 8. 
21 Nagl, Soup with a Knife, 103–107. 
22 Nagl, Soup with a Knife, 103–107.  
23 David A. Charters and Maurice Tugwell, eds., Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict: A Comparative 
Analysis (McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1989), 252–253.  
24 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Studies in Special Operation Warfare Theory and Practice (New 
York: Presidio Press, 1996), 4–8.  
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vulnerabilities, have the benefit of technological assistance and tactical competence (or 
excellence), with a reputation for effectiveness.25 Gray also states that SOF need a 
willingness to learn from history.26  
In general, SOF have been assigned to operations in the past with confidence that 
success was fairly assured. However, SOF faced greater consequences for failure than a 
conventional unit. Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, a foreign service officer at the U.S. 
Department of State, points out that SOF operations will fail if key inputs such as 
intelligence, interagency and inter-service cooperation and coordination, information, and 
advice to decision makers is poor or neglected. He also writes that failure is unavoidable 
when leaders command by wishful thinking, and over-control mission execution from 
afar.27  
This study will also focus on the strategic utility of special operations and SOF in 
various conflicts in modern Malaysia, mainly during the Malaysian–Indonesian 
Confrontation, in which the use of SOF helped prevent a bigger conflict between 
Malaysia and Indonesia. SOF operations deterred the Indonesian army from attacking 
Malaysia and influenced the Indonesian government to end the escalation. This shows 
that developing SOF capabilities helped improve Malaysia’s security against its 
conventional competitors. Gray uses the term “strategic utility” to mean “the contribution 
of a particular kind of military activity to the course and outcome of an entire conflict.”28 
He categorizes several strategic utilities of special operations, among which are economy 
of force, expansion of choice, innovation, morale, reassurance, humiliation of the enemy, 
shaping the future, showcasing competence, and control of escalation.29 In this study, the 
first two categories, namely economy of force and expansion of choice, are regarded the 
most important. Economy of force pertains to the achievement of significant results with 
                                                 
25 Colin S. Gray, ed., Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 164–169. 
26 Colin S. Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operation Succeed?” 
Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Spring 1999, 2–24. 
27 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S Foreign 
Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3–7. 
28 Gray, Explorations, 163. 
29 Gray, Explorations, 168. 
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only a limited use of forces, and expansion of choice refers to the tendency of special 
operations to expand the options available to political and military leaders.  
David C. Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb argue that SOF’s strategic value rests 
in its ability to counter unconventional threats, both directly and indirectly, and take the 
lead in doing so. They also say SOF’s indirect role is more important than its direct 
role.30 Strategic effects are generated when SOF operates in conjunction with 
conventional forces’ campaigns of attrition, and not in the conduct of isolated raids.31 
With an understanding of the strategic uses of SOF, Malaysia could use SOF as an 
unconventional deterrence to other nations when threatened. Unconventional deterrence, 
through punishment or denial, could persuade the opponent not to attack, defeat an 
anticipated attack, deny the aggressor’s battlefield objectives, or prevent the targeted 
party from achieving its political objectives.32 
In conclusion, many histories could be used to relate the development of SOF and 
how SOF influenced the outcome of conflicts in Malaysia. SOF units extended the reach 
of the Briggs Plan to all geographic areas; intelligence became more effective with the 
establishment of the Special Branch; and terrorists and populations were influenced by 
the psyops campaign. SOF units that operated deep in disputed areas restricted terrorists’ 
freedom of movement and won the hearts and minds of rural people. Irregular warfare 
expertise was shared among commanders, and forces were trained based on this valuable 
experience. These tactics and techniques became shared doctrine and continued to be 
utilized in subsequent conflicts. The literature also indicates that SOF improved 
Malaysia’s national security against internal and external threats and contributed toward 
the improvement of the security force’s performances, directly and indirectly.  
 
                                                 
30 David C. Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, U.S. Special Operation Forces (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 153. 
31 James D. Kiras, Special Operations Strategy (New York: Routledge, 2006), 113. 
32 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983); 
Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (London: London University Press, 
1996). 
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E. METHODOLOGY  
This thesis will be conducted using historical research in various open-source 
documents on the topic areas. It will examine the historical evidence from the birth of the 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) and Force 136-Malaya in World War II, the 
Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), the Indonesian Confrontation (1962–1966), to the 
establishment of various Malaysian special operations forces to fight the CPM/MRLA in 
the Second Emergency (1968–1990). Additionally, this study will explore the 
development of Malaysian SOF units in the Post-Emergency (1990-present) and its 
future. By examining these histories, this thesis will identify the lessons and experiences 
of the previous SOF units that have left their stamp on the present-day SOF units.  
This thesis will also analyze each phase of the conflicts using the UK Defense 
Line of Development (UK DLoD), which consists of training, equipment, personnel, 
information, doctrine, organization, infrastructure, and logistics (TEPID OIL).33 This 
acronym is fairly equivalent to the U.S. DoD’s doctrine, organization, training and 
education, materiel, leadership, people and facilities (DOTMLPF) for the set of generic 
elements that have to be brought together to generate a defense capability.34  Due to the 
important role of leaders in a conflict, the author adds “leadership” to the UK DLoD, 
yielding a new acronym for the purposes of this thesis, TEPID OIL + L. Finally, this 
thesis introduces some recommendations for consideration by the Malaysian SOF in 
developing and exploiting SOF in future transformations.  
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II is about the British Special Operation Executive (SOE), which 
organized, trained and equipped volunteers to form Force 136-Malaya to fight against the 
Japanese in World War II (1941–1945). They also cooperated with the 
MPAJA/CPM/MRLA to form guerrilla units deep inside the jungles in preparation for 
British reoccupation. Chapter III is the history of the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), 
                                                 
33 Roger A. Foder, Operational Analysis: Historical Perspectives and Future Challenges (Portsdown 
West, UK: Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, 2010). 
34 Department of Army, “The Way Forward,” Field Manual 1 (FM 1), Chap. 4, June 2005¸ 
http://www.army.mil/fm1/chapter4.html (accessed March 24, 2012). 
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which saw the establishment of various special units to fight the CPM/MRLA, such as 
the Malayan Scouts of the Special Air Service. The British reorganized the Malayan 
intelligence organization, the Police Special Branch. The British also trained and 
equipped aborigines and Iban to perform as paramilitary forces, for example, the Senoi 
Praaq and Sarawak Rangers, to help the government effort. Chapter IV highlights SOF 
units in Operation Claret, a cross-border operation in Borneo during the Indonesian 
Confrontation (1962–1966). Chapter V is about the various SOF during the Malaysian 
Second Emergency (1968–1989), when the CPM/MRLA resurfaced and began its second 
armed struggled. With the legacy of British SOF units, the government of Malaysia 
continued to trust SOF capabilities, and commissioned a few other units such as 
Malaysian Special Service Unit (MSSU) and Police Commando Very Able Troopers 
(VAT) 69 to fight communist terrorists until their surrender on December 2, 1989. 
Chapter VI highlights some of the Malaysian SOF units’ development in the post-conflict 
era (1990–present) and follows with Chapter VII, a brief analysis of the present 
Malaysian SOF and future requirements. This thesis offers conclusions in Chapter VIII.   
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II. WORLD WAR II (1941–1945) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
World War II was the first time Malayans saw modern special operations forces 
(SOF) in action, fighting unconventionally behind enemy lines against a conventional 
force, the Japanese military. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the SOF 
experience during the Japanese occupation of Malaya and its impact on improving 
Malaysian security against threats. This chapter highlights Force 136’s historical 
background, operations, and various challenges faced by its agents. Force 136’s ability to 
conduct clandestine operations was critical in fighting the Japanese army effectively, 
though Force 136 were small in number. A well-extended capability management in one 
organization, such as Force 136, is vital for success. The Line of Development is a useful 
template for analyzing Force 136’s fighting capabilities.35 
B. THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION 
In 1941, the British, Dutch, French, and Americans felt the growing threat of 
Japanese invasion of their colonies in the Far East. Coinciding with the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, in the early morning of December 8, 1941, the Japanese army landed at the beach 
in Kota Baharu, Malaya (see Figure 1). Despite fierce resistance, Japanese troops 
successfully maneuvered to the south and captured Britain’s once-thought-impregnable 
fortress of Singapore on February 15, 1942. Notably, the attacking Japanese force was 
much smaller than the British defending force. This was a crucial victory for the 
Japanese. Besides undermining the British government, the capture of Malaya and 
Singapore provided the Japanese with a strategic base for its military campaigns in the 
region and control over the Malacca Strait. The Japanese had conquered the world’s 
leading producer of rubber and tin, resources that were vital during World War II.  
                                                 
35  The Line of Development acronym is TEPID OIL + L, which signifies Training, Equipment, 
People, Doctrine, Organization, Information, Logistics, and Leadership.  
 14 
 
Figure 1.  Japanese routes to Singapore.36  
C. FORCE 136 (MALAYA)  
Earlier, on January 24, 1941, the governor of the Straits settlement, Sir Shenton 
Thomas, was formally informed that the Special Operations Executive’s (SOE) Oriental 
Mission would be operating in his territories under the commander-in-chief of the Far 
East. By the end of January 1942, SOE Force 136 was in position to be the “left-behind 
parties” in Malaya. These groups of volunteers became the pioneer special operations 
forces in Malaya, active throughout the Japanese occupation from 1941 to 1945. It is 
                                                 
36 The Children & Families of the Far East POW, The Campaign in Malaya, 
http://www.cofepow.org.uk/pages/armedforces_m_campaign.html. 
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debated that, had the Force 136 Malaya Country Section been established well before the 
Japanese invasion—properly supported, and fully trained—it could have conducted 
special operations and posed serious threats to the enemy, were it given effective, clear, 
and timely direction from higher authority. Furthermore, if Force 136 had gained greater 
support, not only from the Chinese, but also from the Malays and other ethnic groups, 
their guerrilla warfare would have been more effective in thwarting the Japanese strategy 
in Malaya. 
The British established SOE for the European theater in July 1940.37 In Malaya, 
the British established Force 136, Malaya Country Section, in late 1940, with the 
responsibility to retaliate against the enemy by operating deep inside the Malayan jungle, 
behind Japanese forces, which were moving south toward Singapore. Their operations 
were similar to the European SOE, namely, guerrilla warfare to disrupt the enemy 
occupation. This was challenging for Force 136 agents, compared to their counterparts in 
Europe, because of their distance from bases and headquarters, difficult terrain, tropical 
weather, and enduring wet and damp jungles unfriendly to man. 
On November 26, 1940, SOE headquarters issued a term of reference for the SOE 
group in Singapore. In May 1941, under cover of carrying out a study of economic and 
industrial trends, the British launched SOE’s mission in the Far East, named Oriental 
Mission (OM) and spearheaded by a civilian, Valentine St. J. Killery, with Basil 
Goodfellow as deputy and F. Chapman Spencer and Lim Bo Seng setting up the Oriental 
Mission in Singapore.38 Initially, there was some misunderstanding about the SOE’s 
chain of command among senior officers in the armed services, and the OM men were 
considered disruptive to the organization. After that initial friction, SOE Force 136 
moved ahead to cooperate with and organize Malayan resistance, subversion, sabotage, 
propaganda, and supplying of food, finance, arms, and munitions. Their field operatives 
                                                 
37 Richard Gough, The Jungle Was Red: SOE’s Force 136, Sumatra and Malaya (Singapore: SNP 
Panpac, 2003), 5. Gough was a WWII veteran of Malaya and author of The Escape from Singapore, SOE 
Singapore 1941–42 and Outposts of the Empire.  
38 Charles G. Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East (New York: Oxford University Press), 4. 
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wore military uniforms and were not primarily involved in the collection of 
intelligence.39 
There was distrust of irregular warfare among the Malayan command. A proposal 
from the Oriental Mission to train guerrilla parties in Malaya was turned down in October 
1941 by Air Chief Marshall Brooke-Popham and Major General A. E. Percival, general-
in-command, Malaya. They imagined that if the British began to train guerrillas, the 
indigenous Malayan populations would assume the British were losing the war and would 
lose confidence in the government, and morale would suffer. Frederick Chapman 
Spencer, a Force 136 veteran, in his book The Jungle is Neutral, said that higher authority 
considered the idea of stay-behind parties, consisting of Europeans and Asiatics, to be 
extravagant and impracticable. Furthermore, they said that the defense of Malaya was the 
sole responsibility of the military and well under control. Nonetheless, Major General R. 
H. Dewing, chief of staff for ACM Brooke-Popham, urged the war office to consider this 
matter. The war office sent Alan Warren from the Royal Marines to Singapore to 
consider the viability of special operations in the Far East in November 1941.40 
During the Japanese occupation, Force 136 planned and conducted at least twelve 
major operations, including Operations Gustavus, Jaywick/Rimau, Hebrides, and 
Oatmeal, and many others.41 Though these operations did not alter the history of Malaya, 
they saw courage and dedication from the people involved. Force 136 did not achieve 
strategic utility because of various problems, such as lack of logistical support, poor 
communications, a harsh environment, and many others. The history of Force 136 in 
Malaya shows the requirements in the Malaysian Armed Forces for preparing such a 
clandestine paramilitary organization for any eventuality or crisis in the future. Force 136 
operations involved the infiltration of agents and their resupply in Malaya in order to 
conduct such principal missions as intelligence gathering, sabotage, and espionage. These 
operations were launched as a stepping-stone for Operation Zipper, the liberation of 
                                                 
39 Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East, 13–14. 
40 Margaret Shennan, Our Man in Malaya (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2007), 7–8.  
41 Michael Bryant, “Special Operations Executive WWII Documentary,” The BBC, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dz4HqoMd6Iw&feature=plcp (accessed May 18, 2012): Gough, The 
Jungle was Red, 173.  
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Malaya from the Japanese. Force 136 used either the Allies’ small number of submarines 
or flew in Catalina amphibious aircraft, which were limited in endurance and range. It 
was almost a twenty-four hours’ flight from Colombo, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) to Malaya and 
back on the Catalinas, before the arrival of the Liberator Mark VI bombers in 1945.42 
Force 136’s first operation was Operation Gustavus. Basil Goodfellow, who was 
the OM second-in-command in Singapore, together with Richard Broome, John Davis, 
and Lim Bo Seng launched Operation Gustavus on 23 May 1943. This was a series of 
small-team insertions into Malaya by submarine and amphibious aircraft. It took two 
weeks after sailing from Colombo, Ceylon for John Davis and five others to land at 
Tanjung Hantu, Perak, between Penang Island and Kuala Lumpur. Force 136 infiltrated a 
few other teams utilizing this method.43  The security and safety of all men and 
submarines in this operation were vulnerable to discovery by Japanese patrols, which 
presented the possibility of capture.44  
Another important operation was Operation Jaywick, or Rimau, with Captain 
Lyon Ivon leading this daring seaborne raid in the Malayan campaign.45  He recruited 
and trained specially selected volunteers at the “Z” experimental station outside Cairns, 
Australia. After nine months of training, the Jaywick party sailed from Exmouth Gulf, 
Western Australia, on 2 September 1943. Two weeks later, they reached the Riau 
Archipelago and moved close to St. Johns Island (Southern Islands, Singapore) on three 
two-man kayaks called ‘folboats,’ jam-packed with explosives, limpet mines, supplies for 
two weeks, and personal weapons. They sunk approximately 50,000 tons of enemy 
shipping using limpet mines. The Japanese responded sharply, and interrogated and 
tortured to death many Malays suspected of involvement with the sea raiders. The 
                                                 
42 Ian Trennowden, Operation Most Secret: SOE: The Malayan Theatre (London: William Kimber & 
Co. Ltd., 1978), 172–173. 
43 Gough, The Jungle was Red, 49–64. 
44 Gough, The Jungle was Red, 53. 
45 Lisa Lim, 1944 Operation RIMAU, 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/history/world_war2/v08n10_history.html. 
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Japanese also established three counterespionage units -- Nami Kikan, Ushio Kikan, and 
In Ibaragi Kikan -- as a result of this operation.46 
Force 136 launched Operation Oatmeal on October 23, 1944. This was the first 
operation for the Malay teams, led by a determined native Malay officer, Captain Ibrahim 
bin Ismail. Together with two other Malayan agents, they were inserted by Catalina 
amphibious aircraft on the east coast of Malaya, near Besut, Terengganu. They estimated 
this area could accommodate their maneuver, since the majority of the population were 
Malays. Force 136 wished to avoid the risk of failing to receive mutual support if the 
agents were sent into the area occupied by Chinese guerrillas from the Malayan People’s 
Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). On the first attempt, Oatmeal was postponed due to bad 
weather. Monsoons, especially on the east coast of Malaya, and other environmental 
factors frequently foiled flights to Malaya. The team flew for the second time on October 
31, 1944. After a long journey, they landed near Pulau Perhentian Kecil and moved to the 
mainland. Luck was not with them. The pro-Japanese Malay Volunteer Corps, Giyu Tai, 
captured them as soon as they established themselves on the mainland.47 
Operation Hebrides was a second attempt by Major P. J. G. Dobree and Captain 
Ibrahim bin Ismail to land on the near coast of Kedah Peak, northeast of Penang Island in 
August 1944, after an attempt by submarine failed. Hebrides was the first airborne 
operation launched by Force 136 in the region. Dobree and five other Malays, excepting 
Ibrahim, successfully parachuted at night from Liberator Mark VIs on December 16, 
1944, landing at Padang Cermin in northern Perak. They raised many Malay volunteers 
in this area for Askar Melayu Setia (AMS). Subsequently, Force 136 organized a few 
other airborne landings in Kedah, one in Raub and one in Kuala Lipis, in central 
Pahang.48 
 
                                                 
46 Gough, The Jungle was Red, 61–62. 
47 Mohd Zamberi A. Malek, Harimau Malaya: Biografi Tengku Mahmood Mahyiddeen (Bangi: 
Penerbitan Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1999), 73; Shennan, Our Man, 100; Gough, The Jungle was 
Red, 82. 
48 Shennan, Our Man, 100; Mohd Zamberi, Harimau, 77. 
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D. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES  
Force 136 had engaged with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) from the 
beginning of their establishment in Singapore. Most of the British officers predicted that 
cooperation with the CPM might lead to unintended consequences. After the Japanese 
surrender in 1945, while the British military administration slowly began to assume 
administration from the Japanese, there was a power vacuum in Malaya. The CPM took 
this opportunity to expand their control, continuing with insurrection and mobilization. 
Since 1939, John Davis, a British Special Branch officer, had been in contact with a 
Chinese from Singapore, Lai Tek. During the war, Lai Tek, or Chang Hung, rose to 
become the CPM secretary general. He was a triple agent to the British and Japanese 
during World War II. Spencer Chapman and John Davis, representing the British 
government, organized a meeting with Lai Tek on December 18, 1941. The British 
agreed to release Chinese communists from prison, and in return, the MCP promised to 
provide suitable recruits to be trained as guerrillas at 101 STS, Singapore. The first 
twenty-five MCP youths reported on December 20, 1941 and begin their secret training at 
Tanjung Balai, in Singapore.49  In the north, Allan Warren, who was in charge of 
clandestine and intelligence matters in Kuala Lumpur, took over a Chinese school on 
Batu Road in Perak as a SOE training school for local communist recruits, and named it 
STS 102. It trained only one cohort of CPM recruits, and closed before the Japanese 
arrived. Besides that instruction, Spencer Chapman later confessed that he taught 
guerrilla warfare techniques to CPM guerrillas before joining Force 136 in Perak, in 
return for his protection. Other British officers did the same, staying behind with the 
CPM and training them.50 
The British officially supported the CPM after what became known as Blantan’s 
Agreement. On November 1943, Lim Bo Seng arrived from Colombo with a document 
that confirmed John Davis’s authority and provided a clear mandate to negotiate a 
military treaty with the CPM on behalf of the Southeast Asian Commander (SEAC). The 
British agreed to aid and strengthen all resistant elements that could be counted on to 
                                                 
49 Shennan, Our Man, 7 
50 Shennan, Our Man, 81. 
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assist in final preparations to eject the Japanese from Malaya.51  On December 1, 1943, 
Force 136, on behalf of the British SEAC, and the CPM signed Blantan’s Agreement at 
Camp Blantan. The British made it clear they expected the CPM to sustain anti-Japanese 
sentiments in the population, conduct limited fifth-column activity, and emphasize in 
their information operations the need for complete cooperation with Allied forces.52  In 
response, Lai Tek requested British arms, ammunition, medical supplies, including 
doctors, military training, and financial assistance to the tune of 50,000–70,000 Malayan 
dollars per month. In short, the communists drew valuable benefits from the training and 
equipping of their guerrillas.53 The CPM had collected a considerably supply of 
weapons, ammunition, and explosives left by the retreating British forces, but had little 
idea how to use them.54  As Shennan writes, “the legacy of Blantan’s Agreement lingered 
beyond Japan’s surrender, adding to the postwar economic confusion in Malaya and the 
separation of British and CPM interests. The end game was the communist insurgency 
against colonial Britain.”   
E. LINE OF DEVELOPMENT  
1. Training 
 As a special operations unit, Force 136 emphasized training. In July 1941, initial 
training was conducted at STS 101 in Tanjung Balai, Singapore, and Lieutenant Colonel 
J. M. L. Gavin was the first commandant. Tanjung Balai is an isolated headland on the 
south coast of Singapore Island, appropriate for Force 136’s clandestine operations 
training.55 Force 136 evacuated and established their new training center in Calcutta 
when the Japanese drew close to Singapore. Force 136 Malaya Section training continued 
at the British Far East Military School or Camp Kharakvasla, within the Mahratta Fort in 
Poona near Mount Singrah, British India. The dilapidated building was converted to 
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53 Shennan, Our Man, 76. 
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barracks, offices, halls, classrooms, a mess, conference rooms, and parade grounds. The 
course mainly covered shooting skills, assassinations, raids, canoeing, explosives and 
bombing, clandestine communications, intelligence gathering, camouflage, map reading, 
and guerrilla warfare. Practical lessons were taught almost every day. Originally, the 
schedule for training recruits lasted a month, but was soon extended to two months.56  
The training focused and prepared the recruits in sabotage and espionage roles. However, 
when they were deployed in the field, their chief role was gathering intelligence. There 
had been feedback from agents on the ground that Force 136 should emphasize training 
in intelligence gathering. Agents also practiced the essential maneuvers for debarking 
from submarines and managing ‘folboats.’  Force 136 emphasized training until their 
departure date.57 
Training was conducted in English. Lim Bo Seng translated instructions for the 
Chinese “Dragon” groups. During that period, Tan Choon Tee, a Malayan student 
recruited in China, and Lim Bo Seng wrote every note, copied maps, translated 
confidential documents, and wrote reports for Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist 
headquarters in Chungking.58  During training, Chinese trainees were divided into pro-
Chinese, who were sent by the Chinese government and regarded the British as 
comrades-in-arms for the war, and pro-British, who were recruited directly by the British. 
The pro-British Chinese were overseas Chinese workers or former employees in the 
British service. These two groups were not trained together, to avoid mutual suspicion 
and jealousy. Trainees were kept a distance from one another to keep up the spirit and 
strength of Force 136.59  
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2. Equipment  
Guerrilla warfare requires not only capable recruits, but also the viable and 
effective support. Guerrillas are lightly armed groups, and require only simple 
equipment.60 Force 136 received supplies from the British such as weapons, ammunition, 
clothes, food, and medicine. Force 136 standard supply deliveries were sufficient for 
three months.61 Only limited numbers of wireless telegraphs, or WTs, were issued to 
patrol teams.62 During the early period of war, the WT was heavy and at least six 
extremely able persons were required to carry a set. This made carrying a WT into a 
dense jungle exceedingly difficult. On 11 December 1943, during Operation Gustavus II, 
Lim Bo Seng brought two new lightweight Mark-II WT sets, which were well received. 
Under Blantan’s Agreement, the CPM asked for guns, ammunition, money, and 
medicine. It was estimated that more than 5,000 weapons were delivered to the guerrillas 
by air or sea. CPM did not hand over all of the weapons, ammunition, and other 
equipment to the British after the Japanese surrender in 1945, but kept it in their arsenals, 
later to be used against the British during the Malayan Emergency.  
3. Personnel  
British officers, not all of who had a military background, led the majority of 
Force 136. Some were police officers, estate managers, and civil servants who 
volunteered. Force 136 did search for high-caliber recruits among Asian Malayans, 
young men who were fit and strong and could face the rigors and dangers of working in 
the field. Able recruits had to assimilate various skills needed for survival and successful 
sabotage and intelligence work. Attempts to recruit Malays in Britain failed. A principal 
reason for this failure was that many Malays were in a dilemma about who was the real 
invader in Malaya:  the British or the Japanese. Some Malays did join Force 136 and 
performed well, such as Captain Ibrahim and Major Tengku M. Mahyiddeen. 
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Force 136 headquarters therefore turned to a KMT organization of Chinese 
seamen in Calcutta. Initially, a pool of around 5,000 potential candidates was interviewed 
in the selection process. Good recruits were hard to find, because the majority were 
illiterate, unprepared to volunteer, or otherwise unsuitable. Lim Bo Seng, Chuan Hui 
Tsuan and a few others passed the selection process and became wholly dedicated to the 
service. As Chinese patriots and nationalists, they were involved in anti-Japanese 
activities and the raising of relief funds for China. Force 136’s search for potential 
recruits was broadened to 400 Chinese exiles from Malaya, studying in Chunking, China. 
They were younger, and more intelligent, motivated, and resilient than those available to 
SOE in the initial recruitment attempts.  
4. Information  
Communication was important for the survival of Force 136 units. Morse code 
over WT was the means of communication with headquarters in Ceylon. During this 
period, WT was generally ineffective. Besides being too heavy for mobile operation, 
especially in the primitive jungles of Malaya, their range was insufficient to reach 
Ceylon. The distance was too far for the technology of the time.63 
Besides the technical issue of the WT, there was a serious problem regarding 
operations security (OPSEC). In the second half of 1944, Force 136 suffered a series of 
critical and apparently bizarre security breakdowns. In addition to successful Japanese 
aerial reconnaissance, the near-destruction of Force 136 was due to information received 
from a Malay informant. Due to the lack of a secure system of autonomous networks or 
cells, they were too dependent on single sources, and over-frequent visits by agents 
exposed their sources to a high risk of compromise and capture.64  
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5. Doctrine  
Force 136 agents were trained in and used unconventional warfare tactics against 
the Japanese, such as the “one-minute hit-and-run” tactic. Force 136 patrols engaged their 
enemy for only one minute and fled the area well before the enemy sent for 
reinforcements. Overall, Force 136 did not have a strategic impact in the battle for 
Malaya, but they did have tactical effects. The Malayan population did not give full 
support to Force 136 because both the British and Japanese were seen as foreign 
invaders. Japanese propagandists promised independence to the Malay peoples, provided 
them work, and established security forces and police. However, the Chinese in Malaya 
faced racial oppression by the Japanese. Conversely, the Chinese were more hostile 
toward the Japanese out of sympathy to the Chinese under Japanese occupation in China. 
6. Organization  
From the beginning, Force 136 Malaya was a “stepson” to British higher 
authority, and was burdened by many constraints. Furthermore, officers from the 
Malayan Section observed that the SOE Far East headquarters was disorganized. They 
understood the need for a good organization. Basil Goodfellow observed that SOE India 
Mission Headquarters had “too many bosses, and too much attempted control from 
Headquarters but no compensating improvement in communications.” John Davis also 
complained, “reorganization is the key word everywhere and so of course everything is a 
balls-up. An imperial balls-up—the threat of interference in the running of the Malayan 
Section.”65  Talented, experienced, and dedicated personnel were also important for the 
success of Force 136. Force 136 officers witnessed various positions being filled by 
unfriendly newcomers with inflated functions and dismissive attitudes. They said the 
proliferation of offices and sections, with the unstoppable drive to centralize operations, 
brought increased paperwork.66 
Richard Broome also commented about the headquarters. He came across a 
worrying amount of fraud and “bull” involving public money, because a businessman 
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rather than a professional administrator ran India Mission (IM). The Malayan Section 
arguably was the most cost-effective operation under the India Mission, due to the 
collective efforts of Goofellow, Broome, Davis, and Lim Bo Seng. They believed that 
their individual talents, mutual respect, and trust eventually brought about the successful 
landings of Force 136 personnel on the Malayan peninsula.67 
There was rivalry between Far East wing of the Secret Intelligence Service (which 
used the cover name Inter-Service Liaison Department, ISLD) and Force 136, which 
affected the progress of the Malayan Resistance.68  Both were carrying out intelligence 
work, simultaneously and in the same area. This was bound to create tension, especially 
when the sharing of transportation, specialist personnel, and signal staffs was added into 
the equation. John Davis said that there was a lack of trust on both sides. To protect their 
common security, senior officers in Colombo and Calcutta reached an agreement that 
when joint submarine transport could not be avoided, a procedure would be established 
so that one party would not compromise the other’s activities. In early 1945, joint action 
took place in Operation Mint, in Johor and Perak. When the buildup for Malaya’s 
liberation began, Force 136 cooperated fully in helping the existing and future ISLD 
parties. Both agreed to work in complete coordination and abide by the principle of “one 
war, one effort.”  ISLD units came under the tactical command of the group liaison 
officer (GLO) of Force 136, and all negotiations with Anti-Japanese Union Force (AJUF) 
were to be made by these GLOs. In order to safeguard all participants in amphibious 
operations, a principle was developed to avoid compromising special operations. The 
submarine involved would refrain from any offensive combat action during the twenty-
four hours before and after its completion.69  
 
                                                 
67 Shennan, Our Man, 53. 
68 ISLD–Inter-Services Liaison Department. Their role was intelligence gathering. Its members were 
taken from all three services. The ISLD was a cover name for clandestine intelligence, which was 
independent of, but often operated with, the British paramilitary intelligence organization SOE. 
69 Shennan, Our Man, 60. 
 26 
7. Infrastructure 
Force 136 used a bungalow as their training camp in Singapore. In October 1942, 
Colin H. Mackenzie, the overall commander of the India Mission, believed the numbers 
of enlisted troops would not warrant establishing a new school for primary training. A 
special wing equipped as a guerrilla-training unit, was renamed the India Mission Eastern 
Warfare School, and set up in the rocky Western Ghats near Poona. This complex had all 
the necessary facilities: barracks, mess, offices, classrooms, conference rooms, training 
field, and parade ground. Major Mike Kendall, who had served in China and attended one 
of the first courses at No. 101 STS, Singapore, commanded this school.70 
Force 136 selected Ceylon as the location for an advanced operations school and 
final training and holding camp for Malayan agents. Ceylon was a good choice, since its 
climate and vegetation were similar to that of Malaya. The island was a natural base for 
submarine operations, and in the absence of aircraft capable of making the round-trip 
from the Indian subcontinent to and from Malaya, submarines were the most feasible 
form of clandestine transport. Brigadier General G. H. Beyts, the senior officer of 
operations suggested that the holding camp be in Trincomallee. From the middle of 1943, 
Ceylon became home to Force 136, Group B, which included the Malayan Country 
Section, under the command of Colonel Christopher Hudson.71  In Malaya, Force 136’s 
operational camps were collocated with the CPM’s camps, such as in Blantan, Perak. All 
these camps were located deep in the jungle, lacked even basic amenities, and were 
susceptible to monsoon weather. 
8. Logistics  
Sustenance was critical for Force 136, so resupply was important to their survival. 
Jungles can provide food, but food gathering is time- and energy-consuming. Force 136 
personnel carried their own initial three-month supply of provisions and equipment, the 
group’s supplies, and a WT, if available. Resupply was one of the biggest challenges for 
Force 136, because of distance from headquarters, adverse weather, and the jungle 
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environment. Limited numbers of resupply means, such as aircraft, ships, and 
submarines, further complicated the mission in Malaya. In the second half of 1942, the 
British set their strategic focus on North Africa. Consequently, eight submarines in the 
Mediterranean command that had been promised by the admiralty as Far Eastern 
reinforcements had not yet arrived. Therefore, Oriental Mission depended on Dutch 
submarine availability to launch their operations. Only from December 1943 onwards did 
Force 136 begin to sail using a British T-class submarine, HMS Tally Ho.72  Overland 
transportation was hazardous due to Japanese ground and air patrols, roadblocks, and 
informants. Foot movement was arduous because of the geographical conditions and 
density of the jungles. Moving heavy equipment such as a WT from one site to another 
was strenuous labor. 
9. Leadership  
Besides the British volunteers, many outstanding Force 136 leaders were born 
among the local Malayans. These included Lim Bo Seng, Captain Ibrahim, and Major 
Tengku Mahmood Mahyiddeen. Lim Bo Seng was courageous, loyal, and devoted to 
liberating Malaya, and an excellent leader. He was a dedicated and committed leader of 
the KMT Chinese Dragons, and gave his life serving with Force 136. He died in Batu 
Gajah, the Japanese prison in Perak, on June 29, 1944. While many British officers 
admired the Chinese Dragons group, there were Malay agents who proved to be adept 
special operations soldiers. Captain Ibrahim was one of them. Although the Japanese 
captured him once he landed in Malaya, he managed to transmit an message to SOE 
headquarters while he was held captive. Many Force 136 agents owed their lives to 
Captain Ibrahim. Another Malay agent was Tengku Mahmood Mahyideen. He was a 
sergeant in the Kelantan Volunteer Force and fought the Japanese in the Battle of Kota 
Baharu. On January 1, 1943, he was tasked with organizing Malay Section Radio, or 
Suara Harimau Malaya, at All India Radio, New Delhi, with another Malay, Suffian 
Hashim (who became chief justice of Malaya). They began to broadcast various 
psychological operations and propaganda messages for the Malaya peoples to rise against 
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the Japanese. In October 1943, he was invited to join Force 136. Afterward, Lord 
Mountbatten gave him a commission as a major in the British Army, and he worked in 
the Far East intelligence and training department in New Delhi. 
Among British volunteers, histories mention John Davis most. He was a Police 
Special Branch officer, well educated, in good health, psychologically strong, and with 
no desire for office work. Besides his bullheadedness and tenacity of purpose, he brought 
to Force 136 eleven years of experience in police work in all parts of Malaya’s 
countryside and jungle. He volunteered because he was single with no dependents. 
Languages and cultural awareness give him a notable advantage in special operations. 
John Davis was fluent in Malay and Cantonese, and learned Mandarin while residing in 
Canton for two years, so he was well exposed to Chinese culture and civilization. Davis 
volunteered ahead of the rest to lead the initial mission, because the first would have to 
land “blind” and face innumerable risks. He felt he was mentally and physically fitter 
than the rest, single, expendable, and most familiar with the Malayan jungle.73 
Force 136 could not achieve what was planned were it not for the organizing 
ability and facility for dealing with high-level VIPs of Basil Goodfellow. John Davis said 
that without Richard Broome’s help and Basil Goodfellow’s support, Force 136 could not 
have begun within such a short time.74 Richard Broome, a civil servant in Malaya, was 
also one of the outstanding pioneers in Force 136. Captain Ivan Lyon was a superb sailor 
and brave man who persuaded the India Mission controller Colin MacKenzie to mount a 
sabotage raid against Japanese shipping in Singapore. 
F. CONCLUSION  
Force 136 could have had a significant impact in the fight against the Japanese if 
they had been allowed to organize left-behind parties well ahead of the invasion. 
Commanders today need to understand how to utilize special operations forces such as 
Force 136 in this kind of scenario. In this case, many British higher commands did not 
initially appreciate what irregular paramilitary forces such as Force 136 could contribute 
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towards the war. Cooperation with the CPM and KMT was beneficial at first, but became 
a burden later. These ethnic Chinese units were highly motivated to fight, out of 
sympathy with the Chinese people in Japanese-occupied areas. The Chinese guerrillas 
were well trained and sufficiently armed for their later insurrection, an unintended 
consequence after the Japanese surrender in 1945. The CPM decided to fight against their 
former ally for the sake of their communist agenda of establishing a communist state. 
In conclusion, Force 136, like all SOF units, emphasized selection and training. 
They always gave priority to the training of their recruits. However, training needs to be 
aligned with the roles or operations of the units. Force 136 faced many difficulties due to 
the unsuitability of their equipment to the jungle environment. Force 136 handpicked 
their recruits so that they would have the best possible teams for their operations. They 
had significant problems with communications due to ineffective WT sets and poor 
operational security, which led to many agents’ capture by the enemy. A clear doctrine 
would have given an understandable direction to the agents in executing their missions 
and saving valuable resources and lives. Force 136 agents had a clear view about the type 
of organization they wished to work with. They had awareness about the consequences of 
a failed organization. 
The selection of suitable facilities also was a critical factor when Force 136 was 
established. Logistics was a challenge to Force 136, due to lack of appropriate 
transportation, vast distances from their bases to their target areas, weather, and 
geography. Nevertheless, Force 136 had many talented and dedicated leaders determined 
to enable this special unit to overcome all challenges, and execute their mission. 
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III. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948–1960) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Malayan Emergency was Britain’s first fight against the Communist Party of 
Malaya (CPM) and its armed wing, the Malayan Races Liberation Army, and lasted for 
about 12 years. This chapter examines the SOF experience during the Malayan 
Emergency and its impact on improving Malaysian security against threats. To achieve 
that, this thesis will answer questions such as why and how the British used SOF during 
the confrontation. Besides highlighting historical data, this thesis will use a modified 
model of the UK’s Defense Lines of Development (DLoD) to look for ideas for the 
Malaysian SOF to exploit in the future.75 
B. THE MALAYA EMERGENCY: “WAR IN ALL BUT NAME” 
On September 2, 1945, the Japanese officially surrendered to the Allies, marking 
the end of World War II. American atomic bombs made Operation Zipper, the liberation 
of Malaya by British forces, unnecessary. In the aftermath, British officials immediately 
instructed the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army, or MPAJA, to hand over their 
weapons and disband, but this was taken halfheartedly. The Communist Party of Malaya 
(CPM) took this opportunity to eliminate those whom they considered Japanese 
collaborators, and atrocities increased across Malaya from that period.76 The British 
government seemed ill prepared and lost it credibility to rule postwar Malaya. 
In 1947, unstable conditions continued, and social unrest increased, especially 
within the Chinese community and the communist-dominated labor unions. The British 
Military Administration (BMA) introduced martial law to grapple with this insecure 
                                                 
75 Clive Kerr, Robert Phaal and David Probert, “A Framework for Strategic Military Capabilities in 
Defense Transformation,” an article for the 11th International Command and Control Research and 
Technology Symposium, 2006, http://www.dodccrp.org/events/11th_ICCRTS/html/papers/061.pdf 
(accessed February 29, 2012). 
UK Defense Line of Development (Training, Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure, Doctrine and 
Concepts, Organization, Information, Logistic) with an additional point, Leadership, taken from the U.S. 
construct. The acronym is TEPID OIL + L.  
76 Fredrick Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (Chatto and Windus: London, 1949; reprint by 
Time-Life Books:  Virginia, 1989), 420–423. 
 32 
development, with no significant effects. By 1948, the Malay Races Liberation Army 
(MRLA) or CPM military wings continued attacking police stations, terrorizing civilians, 
and sabotaging properties. On June 16, 1948, they murdered three British planters in 
Sungei Siput, Perak. Sir Edward Gent, the British High Commissioner in Malaya, 
immediately declared an emergency in parts of Perak, which was extended to the whole 
country the next day. This was the beginning of the Malayan Emergency.77 
The CPM mobilized MPAJA ex-members to rally in the jungle and fight against 
the British using tactics they learned from Force 136 during WWII. They wanted to 
create a Communist People’s Democratic Republic of Malaya.78 Mao Tse-tung inspired 
their armed revolution to cripple the economy through guerrilla action, force the British 
army out of the countryside, and establish safe or liberated areas. These areas would be 
used as MRLA bases, where recruits would be trained for an offensive to oust the British, 
backed by China if necessary.79 More than 7,000 MRLA guerrillas and thousands more 
Min Yuen were made ready for action. The MRLA was organized along lines similar to 
the MPAJA and relied on the jungles for protection. From the security of camps in the 
jungles of Perak, Selangor, and Johor, they could launch surprise attacks on estates, 
mines, and communications in the cities, withdrawing over the mountain spine, if 
necessary, to take cover in the jungles of Kelantan or Pahang (see Figure 2).80  
                                                 
77 Alastair Mackenzie, Special Force (I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd: London, 2011), 52–53. 
78 Leon Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police 1945–60: The Role of the Malayan Special Branch in the 
Malayan Emergency (Institute of South East Asian Studies: Singapore, 2008), xix. Dr. Leon Comber, a 
former Malayan Special Branch officer during the Emergency, fluent in Chinese language is also a fellow 
at Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, Australia.  
79 Pennell J. Hickey, Counter Insurgency Operations in Malaya, 1948–1960: The Role of Regular 
Force (U.S. War College: Pennsylvania, 1971), 9; Noel Barber, The War of The Running Dogs: the 
Malayan Emergency 1948–1960 (William Collins: London, 1971(Reprint Cassell: London, 2004)), 38. 
80 Shennan, Our Man, 155–156. Min Yuen is CPM sympathizers or mass peasant organization. 
 33 
 
Figure 2.  Principal areas of activity.81  
The government imposed emergency regulations, which authorized the heavy-
handed use of detention, deportation, and collective punishment of entire towns or 
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villages, but these measures did not deter the communist terrorist (CT) from perpetrating 
more attacks.82 Security forces were unprepared and inadequate to combat the MRLA. 
Regular military units were undermanned and inexperienced in jungle operations. The 
rank-and-file rural police were too open to intimidation.83  
For two years, security forces attempted to fight the MRLA using conventional 
tactics: large sweep, cordon, and search for the CTs, with insignificant progress. 
Realizing those actions were useless, the government began to introduce special 
operations forces to fight the CTs, such as the Ferret Forces and Malayan Scouts (Special 
Air Service, or SAS). Besides that, the government reorganized its intelligence agency 
and saw the inception of the Special Branch (SB). The aborigines or Orang Asli and Iban 
were recruited to become special paramilitary forces, known as the Senoi Praaq and 
Sarawak Rangers, to fight the enemy.  
C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
1. Ferret Forces 
On July 6, 1948, during a meeting at the Malayan district office in Kuala Lumpur, 
a proposal regarding the formation of a special jungle-guerrilla force for anti-insurgent 
operations in Malaya was tabled. John Davis, the former Force 136 commander, was 
named responsible for convincing, promoting, and leading the Ferret Force. This was the 
first tactical initiative launched against the CTs. The Ferret Force was organized as a 
combined civil–military initiative, with approval for five operational groups. A 
headquarters group, two patrols of the Malay regiment and two from the Gurkhas—
twenty men total—were to be available in each group. Richard Broome, another Force 
136 veteran, joined John Davis, believing the Ferret Force was the cheapest method of 
coping with the Emergency as well as the “best and perhaps the only method of coping 
with the CTs once they get through the jungle.”84  
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The Ferret Force was composed of military and police personnel, Europeans with 
special operations experience and handpicked Asians. Working in teams, they penetrated 
the jungle to target and eliminate CTs on their own or in collaboration with conventional 
forces. Their intention was to emulate the terrorists, operating in mobile squads with local 
knowledge, led by officers who had already proven themselves in irregular warfare. 
Unfortunately, the Ferret Force was disbanded in November 1948. Though brief in 
duration, the Ferret Force demonstrated that the most effective military operations were 
by small units undertaking deep-penetration patrols into the jungle.85  
The Ferret Force’s first contact came when nine men of Group 1, Malay Patrol 
tracked a party of forty CTs through the night as they returned from a tin mine attack near 
Chemor, the primary tin mining region north of Ipoh, Perak. Before the alarm was given, 
Ferret’s troopers crept to within ten yards of a sentry post. The CTs managed to flee into 
the darkness, leaving behind, however, a substantial quantity of ammunition and 
equipment. Davis really admired the Malayan’s patrol capabilities. Another serious 
engagement was in September 1948. Three patrols from Group 1, searching for the CT 
camp near Kampong Jalong, north of Ipoh, discovered four CTs hiding in a hut, whom 
they arrested for questioning. Later, the patrols tracked through the jungle until they 
reached a clearing where they came under heavy fire, which lasted for at least forty-five 
minutes and again, the CTs abandoned their camp. The Ferrets confiscated a quantity of 
equipment, clothing, guns, propaganda leaflets, and other documents giving a clue as to 
the CTs’ modus operandi. On November 1948, Richard Broome and his patrols 
discovered a major training camp capable of accommodating 100 insurgents and a rifle 
range. After two days of intermittent contact, resulting in casualties on both sides, the 
CTs were finally routed. The Ferret Forces received huge coverage in the news.86   
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2. The Malayan Scouts (SAS)  
“Control yourself and you control all”– Brigadier “Mad Mike” 
Calvert 
The history of the Malayan Scouts (known as the 22nd SAS Regiment after 1958) 
started when General Sir John Harding, commander-in-chief of the Far East Land Forces, 
seeking ways to counter the insurgency in Malaya as conditions worsened, began looking 
for officers experienced in jungle warfare. Major Mike Calvert a veteran of the Chindits 
(a British India special force that served in Burma and India in 1943 and 1944, during the 
Burma Campaign in World War II) came forward and volunteered for a six-month fact-
finding mission in Malaya to assess the situation. According to memoirist Alastair 
Mackenzie, who studied politics and was a former 22nd SAS troop commander, Major 
Mike Calvert provided a number of significant observations and gave the results directly 
to the director of operations in Malaya, General Sir Harold Briggs, but received little or 
no acknowledgement. He recommended separating the terrorists from their support 
element, training a deep-penetration patrol unit to locate CT encampments and either 
destroy them or lead conventional forces to the area, and separating the CTs from the 
jungle aborigines, who, it was believed, were assisting the CTs. The task was to interdict 
the CTs’ food and intelligence supplies by denying them support and freedom of 
movement. He also recommended that the police stop sending large patrols into the 
jungle and concentrate on protection of civilians and expansion of the Special Branch. 
This included moving Chinese squatters into new villages where they could be 
concentrated and protected. From then on, Calvert worked to launch a fresh unit, which 
he called the Malayan Scouts, a special force to operate in the deep jungle.87  
The SAS contributed significant experience to the Jungle Warfare School in Johor 
and antiterrorist operations in the Malayan manual.88 From 1955 to 1956, the SAS had 
five squadrons totaling 560 men, and in these two years, the SAS was keen to 
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experiment, gaining valuable experience.89 After nine years and 108 kills, the SAS left 
Malaya.90 A few years later, in Borneo, the SAS played a much more dramatic and 
fulfilling role. The rebirth of the SAS in Malaya was the catalyst that enabled the British 
SAS to gain a permanent position in the UK forces’ order of battle.91 
Operation Sword in January 1954 was the first parachute drop by the SAS into the 
jungle in Kedah, northern Malaya, where they suffered three casualties. In July 1954, 
SAS troopers led Operation Termite, the largest combined operation in the Emergency. 
For General Sir Gerald Templer, the High Commissioner of Malaya, this was his first 
major all-military endeavor. The objective was to strike the Temiar tribes and CTs in the 
Korbu area and Raia Valley, due east of Kinta and Ipoh, Perak. These areas were one of 
the “blackest” areas in Malaya. The action involved a dawn airstrike on CT hideouts and 
a parachute-drop mission of 200 troopers drawn from two squadrons of Malayan Scouts, 
using Valetta aircraft. They were dropped close to the target. Again, many troopers 
suffered injuries while parachuting into trees.92  They achieved the element of surprise, 
but the Temiar were hostile and elusive. This operation killed fifteen CTs, and many 
camps and supply dumps were located. This operation saw the work of the Asal 
organization begin to bear fruit.93 
3. Senoi Praaq  
In July 1954, General Templer proposed a second SAS squadron to the war 
office, but the London-based director of operations rejected his request. This led to the 
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formation of a small experimental unit in late 1956 named Senoi Praaq, or “war people” 
in the Semai tribe’s language.94  Senoi Praaq was a crack unit organized to fight the 
communists, an efficient military and intelligence machine resembling SAS troopers, 
whom they eventually replaced after Malayan independence, according to an analysis by 
Roy Jumper, an expert in Southeast Asian political affairs and Malayan tribal politics. 
Initially, this was a military intelligence project to win the support of the aboriginal 
population. The SAS began to train a number of Orang Asli and former Asal members to 
become a paramilitary force. As a result, the Senoi Praaq’s deep-jungle operations proved 
extremely successful in the suppression of CTs.95 In 1958, the Senoi Praaq held the 
highest number of kills on record among any security force’s units in Malaya. By 1959–
1960, their kill ratio stood at 16 to 1 for killed or wounded enemy personnel.96 The 
MRLA quickly spread the news about the Senoi Praaq’s success among them. Their 
reputation as ruthless killers forced the CT to abandon its activities and withdraw rather 
than engage this foe.  
After the Emergency, a small group of Senoi Praaq helped establish the 
Montagnard Scouts in March 1963. This program was in response to a request from 
South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem in early 1960. The Senoi Praaq mission was 
to teach the South Vietnamese forces what they knew, and establish an intelligence 
network among the Montagnards. These activities were keep secret to preserve the 
mission’s integrity, and were considered delicate from a political and diplomatic 
standpoint. The Senoi Praaq withdrew from Pleiku province as the situation in Vietnam 
became worse and the confrontation with Indonesia began to roll in.97 The Senoi Praaq 
continued to serve in the Malaysian Insurgency, and today is an essential pillar in support 
of Malaysia’s national security arrangements.  
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4. Sarawak Rangers 
On April 1953, the Malayan government announced the inception of the Sarawak 
Rangers. These Iban volunteers, who were initially attached to military units, were 
officially formed into an excellent independent fighting element. The SAS selected, 
trained, and equipped some of them to become professional soldiers. The Sarawak 
Rangers evolved and made enthusiastic contributions to all conflicts in Malaya (and later 
Malaysia).98 Earlier, in the 1930s, the Sarawak Rangers were disbanded, despite their 
achievements as a highly skilled paramilitary force in jungle warfare and general policing 
duties. In 1946, the Rangers were reunited and fought the Japanese in Borneo with 
Commonwealth forces. The Iban trackers were drawn from North Borneo headhunter 
tribes and had been serving six-month engagements with the British Civil Liaison Corps 
as trackers since August 1948. The original trackers’ strength grew to 200 men. 
There were many brave and courageous fighters among the Sarawak Rangers. 
Among others was Awang anak Raweng, the only Malayan recipient of the British 
George Cross medal during the Emergency. In an operation near Kluang, Johor on May 
27, 1951, some fifty well-armed CTs ambushed Awang and his patrol. During a fierce 
firefight that killed many of his friends, although injured, he continued to fight and killed 
several terrorists. The Sarawak Rangers still keep their old Iban war cry, “Agi Idup Agi 
Ngelaban” (As Long As I Live, I Shall Fight) that was used by their predecessors. In all, 
twenty-one Iban trackers and Sarawak Rangers were killed during the Malayan 
Emergency.99 They also saw action in the Indonesian Confrontation and Second 
Insurgency. They continue to share their excellent jungle skills with other soldiers from 
around the world the Jungle Warfare Center in Ulu Tiram, Johor.100  The Royal Rangers 
regiment of the Malaysian army became the Sarawak Rangers’ successor in 1963. 
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5. The Special Branch (SB)  
Next on the list is the Malayan Police Special Branch. It may be debatable to 
group the Special Branch as a SOF unit, but what justifies it are the unconventional 
actions taken by the Special Branch against the CTs in the Emergency, which enabled 
other operations to succeed. The leadership in the Malayan government became aware of 
the problem faced by the intelligence services from the beginning of the Emergency, and 
determined to improve it. Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner in Malaya in 1948, 
recognized the importance of an efficient intelligence service in fighting communist 
insurrection and civil unrest, based upon his experience as chief secretary in Palestine. He 
said the insurrection would not be subdued by the sheer weight of security forces arrayed 
against it, but by reliable operational intelligence provided by the Special Branch, on 
which successful military operation could be mounted.101 Sir Harold Briggs, in the 1950s, 
complained about the shortage of operational intelligence coming from the Special 
Branch. As a result, the army had to assume operations with little or no operational 
intelligence.102 Anthony Short, the author of the Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 
1948–60, says Briggs’ Plan not only emphasized a comprehensive approach but also 
recognized intelligence as being of supreme importance.103 Sir Gerald Templer, circa 
1952 said, “Malaya is an intelligence war; you can never beat communism with troops 
alone.”104 
Initially, the Special Branch was not ready to take over intelligence responsibility 
from its predecessor, the Malayan Security Service (MSS). The Special Branch was 
under strength, ill equipped, and not organized to provide the army with the right sort of 
operational intelligence, according to a Chinese-speaking officer in the Special Branch 
during the Emergency, Leon Comber.105 In his book Malaya’s Secret Police 1945–60, 
Comber also quotes a RAND analyst, Robert W. Komer, that the Special Branch in 
                                                 
101 Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police, 71. 
102 Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police, 72. 
103 Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police, 1x. 
104 Smith, Counter-insurgency, 22.  
105 Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police, 286.  
 41 
1948–49 was not adequately trained and prepared to deal with the communist uprising.106 
From the 1950s onward, after restructuring and retraining of Special Branch operatives 
began, their effectiveness in the counterinsurgency showed drastic improvement. The 
Special Branch as an organization became better with collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of intelligence on the CPM organization. Comber says the Special Branch 
now found itself standing in the first rank of national defense, with primary responsibility 
for providing combat intelligence to the army, as well as safeguarding the integrity of the 
country.107 In sum, Comber concludes that the Special Branch success was not only 
because it knew its enemy—could speak and understand the “political language” of the 
CPM—but also because its members spoke the actual languages of the different races in 
Malaya, and employed a set of skills that included familiarity with Malayan history, 
culture, religion, society, and politics.108 
One of the Special Branch’s operations was Operation Jaya in Northern Malaya, 
from October 1959 to March 1960. The aim was to extend Special Branch coverage of 
target areas. Operation Jaya required arduous skill in clandestine operations to penetrate 
the CPM organization. Despite success in locating several old, small CT camps and other 
guerrilla activities, it created some difficulties in the relationship between the Special 
Branch and the military—i.e., the military had to carry out futile operations as covers for 
their cherished projects. This caused a lack of faith in the Special Branch (sometimes 
known as the mata-mata [“eyes”] in the Malay language) among the military, for which 
there was no compensation in the form of any results of which they were aware. In 
February 1958 to April 1959, the Special Branch conducted two joint operations, 
Operation Ginger and Operation Bintang, in central Perak. These operations were the 
final key counterinsurgency operations during the Emergency. The aim was to eliminate 
CT remnants that were believed to be hiding in Perak. It covered approximately 1,200 
square miles, and an estimated population of 125,000 people. By the time the operations 
concluded, the government declared the whole of central Perak free from CTs. The 
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Special Branch’s officers were responsible for providing intelligence to the security 
forces and ensured success. Special Branch also conducted another “most secret” project 
called “Q” operations, supported by small groups of Special Branch agents disguised as 
CTs to persuade their erstwhile comrades to surrender. The Special Branch, with 
assistance from the leader of five surrendered enemy personnel, was able to persuade 90 
MRLA guerrillas to surrender in less than a month.109 In mid-1953, the Special Branch 
developed secretly the Special Operation Volunteer Force (SOVF). The SOVF was 
composed of surrendered enemy personnel (SEP) and other selected volunteers. 
Approximately 180 ex-CTs were divided into twelve platoons of fifteen men each, led by 
Special Branch officers. They volunteered for eighteen months and lived in police 
compounds, receiving salaries similar to those of regular, rank-and-file policemen. The 
SOVF went back into the jungle to persuade their former colleagues to surrender, using 
“black” propaganda,—or assassinated them.110  
D. LINE OF DEVELOPMENT  
1. Training  
During the Emergency, all the SOF units emphasized training, and their 
commanders played an essential role in ensuring the success of unit training. From the 
inauguration of these units, they focused on the same skills, such as deep-jungle 
penetration patrols, small-unit tactics, immediate action drills, ambushes, marksmanship, 
and many others. Frequent and repetitive training ensured that SOF units became 
efficient in their operations. The Ferret Force’s success in hunting down CTs, as John 
Davis knew, depended on a number of skills and tactics, and intelligence, patience, 
alertness, and rapid response. To attain those qualities, Ferret’s volunteers went through a 
two-week special training to ensure “considerable efficiency.” The training was short 
because only exceptional men would be selected as Ferrets.111 
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The Malayan Scouts began its selection course in 1952. Major Calvert himself 
and one NCO trained new troopers for three weeks before operation. Calvert designed his 
training to enhance confidence and group cohesion while retaining the ability to act 
effectively individually. He ensured that troopers had the ability to track, move secretly 
and silently, and react immediately. Training included grenade practice, immediate action 
drills, and live ammunition practice that sometimes disregarded the normal safety rules 
for field firing ranges.112 The concept of individualism was advanced by pitting one man 
against another to increase the efficiency of both. This ‘hunter/finder” game (see Figure 3 
below) was routine as a nonlethal duel, a method of nurturing mutual regard and 
preparing men with jungle warfare skills.113 Troopers also learned the use of explosives, 
setting booby traps, and communications. Since there are many rivers in Malaya, boating 
was one of the most useful skills taught. First aid training was important and helped 
everyone in deep jungle operations, including the aborigines. It was essential that every 
man in operations understand not only the basics of first aid to the injured, but also 
general health.114 The medical assistance of the troopers and other security forces 
attracted the aborigines closer to the government.   
In all, the purpose of the training was to make every man adept at surviving in 
jungle warfare, quick to act and react, and capable of getting a shot off a split second 
earlier than an opponent. All these skills were instilled and mastered through repetition. 
A squadron’s cycle was two months in the jungle, two weeks’ leave, two weeks’ 
retraining, and back to the jungle.115  
The SAS did parachute training at RAF Changi Airfield in Singapore and were 
trained by RAF instructors for the hazardous “tree-jumping,” parachuting into the jungle 
canopy and descending to the ground by a rope. Their most unpopular exercise was 
jumping from the back of a truck traveling at about twenty miles per hour, according to 
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Corporal Russell, a Malayan Scouts veteran. Regarding basic discipline, Russell also 
notes that the Rhodesian men arrived to form a B Squadron and were not impressed with 
A Squadron. They began back-to-basics training, introducing parades, training, and 
discipline, and from then on things noticeably improved.116 
 
Figure 3.  Malayan Scouts (SAS) training, “hunter/finder” game.117  
The Senoi Praaq induction training began in 1955. The initial ten men from the 
Temiar tribes and former Asal members became the subjects of a SAS experiment, and 
would later form the nucleus of the Senoi Praaq. The recruits were attached to D 
Squadron for their basic training, which lasted a mere three months. The focus was on the 
use of weapons and various killing techniques. These recruits already possessed other 
SAS requirements for success in jungle warfare, instilled in them since birth. The results 
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were promising, and they decided to continue with the formation of the Senoi Praaq.118 
The synergy of their jungle skills and SAS combat experiences allowed a unit on the stalk 
to pick the time and place to confront the enemy and thereby stack the odds in its 
favor.119 
Training for the Special Branch started two years after the Emergency was 
declared. Once professional training in intelligence techniques was available in the 
1950s, it became necessary for all Special Branch operatives. Two Special Branch 
training schools were built in Kuala Lumpur to accommodate this effort. Trainees 
analyzed various lessons and valuable intelligence experiences from others in the school. 
Some of the outstanding officers went for courses arranged in London by MI5 and the 
London Metropolitan Police Special Branch.120 
2. Equipment  
Long-range jungle penetration operations required all SOF units to ensure their 
equipment was suitable for the harsh jungle environment. Many issues such as 
communication, insufficient personnel stores, and others encountered by Force 136 
during World War II still arose during the Emergency. Nevertheless, the SOF units 
maintained flexibility and adaptability to mitigate these issues.  
The Ferret Forces chose to travel light. Only essential rations were parachuted to 
them as they tried to live off the land, minimizing the possibility of their presence being 
exposed.121 Individuals had to prepare to live in jungle conditions on a basic rice diet.122 
The Malayan Scouts, Senoi Praaq, and Sarawak Rangers were flexible in their personal 
equipment and weapons, too (see Figure 4). Most popular were the American M1 and M2 
carbines, Owen machine guns, and shotguns, which were effective in close quarters in the 
jungle. The most rigid standard was the practice of bringing one change of clothing and 
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socks, to ensure they slept dry. Troopers put on again their wet and dirty clothes in the 
morning before leaving base. Their clothes, some said, rotted on them. Besides the 
difficulty of getting correct sizes, jungle boots lasted only about three months because of 
the harsh, wet, damp, and humid jungle and swamp environment. The other problem in 
this category was insufficient maps and charts with incomplete data, making navigation 
in the jungle more difficult.123 
 
Figure 4.  Malayan Scouts (SAS) trooper with his shotgun and equipment.124 
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The Senoi Praaq were known for being able to carry more weight than the British 
troopers in the jungles. They could carry three week’s rations and stretch them into a 
month if need be. The ability to take along a fair supply of food was critical to deep-
jungle patrolling. A special pack was designed exclusively for them to facilitate this 
purpose, allowing patrols to go deeper and stay longer in the jungle. The Senoi Praaq 
sometimes used traditional weapons, blowguns and poisonous darts made from the Ipoh 
tree, to pick off CTs one at a time in a leisurely hunt that lasted for days. This shows that 
the Senoi Praaq were excellent stalkers and hunters, because this sort of killing was best 
accomplished when the stalker was safely concealed behind thick foliage. They were free 
to flee if contact became too heavy.  
To explore deeper and longer in the jungle, all units needed to have good 
communication. The problem was frequent technical difficulties with wireless telegraph 
or radio transmission from the jungles. Some preferred to use Morse telegraphy, which 
was both silent in operation and often much more effective, being more clearly received 
than verbal communication, although time consuming under the difficult wireless 
conditions in Malaya.125  
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Figure 5.  SAS radio operator, Trooper Tella and his radio.126 
 
Figure 6.  Better radio.127  
Throughout the Emergency, the Special Branch depended heavily on human 
intelligence, planting agents in the min yuen, detention camps, and new villages, and 
penetrating the communist courier system. Still, they were unable to penetrate the MNLA 
in the jungle because the CTs were extremely suspicious of outsiders. Later, the Special 
Branch used homing devices taped to radio receivers of the type known to be used by the 
CTs. The Special Branch ensured some radio sets bugged in this way were made 
available at attractively cheap prices to Chinese shops identified as covertly supplying 
goods to the CTs. When they operated the radio, it transmitted a signal, allowing spotter 
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aircraft flying overhead with a receiver to fix the location of the CT camp. These gadgets 
were issued by the British army research team that was attached to the director of 
operations’ staff in Kuala Lumpur. This team developed new techniques and weapons. Its 
personnel often accompanied police and army patrols on operations and participated in 
ambushes to experience the actual effects of Malaya’s climatic conditions and jungle on 
both men and equipment.128  
3. People  
The government’s failure to support initial recruitment was in some ways the 
biggest drawback of the SOF units during the Malayan Emergency. Faced with this issue, 
the units did manage to gather volunteers to join and performed well eventually. They 
showed those in higher authority that they deserved to be in these special groups. The 
Ferret Force obtained troopers from select military and police personnel, Europeans with 
special operations experience, and handpicked Asians. They were also joined by at least 
ten former Forces 136 men in mid-July 1948. In September 1948, another twelve British 
men came forward, including Chinese and Dayak Liaison Officers from Borneo. The 
army was willing to grant officers temporary military status for the three months, 
provided that their civilian employers paid their salaries. Group commanders were 
brevetted as acting lieutenant colonels. The major pitfalls were the civil–military 
bureaucracy with the civil volunteers and that the secondment of men to the Ferret Force 
left the rifle companies with less manpower, as claimed by some commanding officers.129  
The Malayan Scouts were filled by a limited choice of soldiers who came from 
the Far East Land Forces (FARELF). Getting approval was difficult because of an anti-
Chindit sentiment dating back to the Burma campaign among former British and Indian 
army officers.130 Many commanding officers used this chance to remove their real 
troublemakers. Regularly, they sent the most unfavorable men in their units to join the 
Malayan Scouts. Initially, Major Calvert had to accept many unsuitable volunteers, 
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including a group of French Foreign Legionnaires that had deserted from a ship going to 
Vietnam. In his first search, he managed to get 100 volunteers.131 Later, Major Calvert 
gathered credible volunteers from Force 136 veterans and intelligence personnel who 
were in Burma with him—a Chinese interpreter and a linguist. The second source was 
from the former SAS, formed to fight in Korea to fill B Squadron. Calvert also selected 
some 120 wartime-experienced Rhodesians to form C Squadron, who proved to be the 
most professional of the SAS squadron, serving in Malaya from 1951 to 1953.132 To 
ensure quality and suitability, Calvert personally interviewed all officers and recruits.133 
The majority of them were volunteers and older than their army counterparts. This gave 
the SAS fewer administrative problems and greater flexibility.134  
Senoi Praaq troopers came from aborigine volunteers who met certain physical 
requirements and passed extensive screening and vetting procedures before acceptance 
(because of their prior association with the CTs). Despite the security, requirements for 
admission were basic, such as being able to carry a 60-plus pound pack over hills, which 
were passed almost without question. Jumper said that most of the Orang Asli’s recruits 
were already good at what they later became famous for, and not without prior 
experience. They came from unstable areas along the range, in which the inhabitants 
were conditioned to warfare, and many had performed a combat function for the 
MRLA.135 Nevertheless, some British officers viewed them with a degree of suspicion, 
given their past involvement with the communists, and some considered them a potential 
liability—incapable cowards inclined towards deceit. Because of this misperception, 
certain people resisted the expansion of the Senoi Praaq from the Department of 
Aborigines into the paramilitary domain, but this inflexibility was soon overcome.136 
Sarawak Ranger recruitment was similar to the Senoi Praaq’s. Iban’s youth received 
acknowledgement not only by the commanders, but also by the people on the ground, 
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such as Corporal Russell from the Malayan Scouts. He said that aborigine and Iban 
trackers’ abilities were exceptional and they did an excellent job in fighting terrorists.  
Special Branch personnel inherited the pre-WWII Malayan Security Services 
problem, namely, a lack of Chinese linguists and professional men with expertise in 
intelligence and equipment. When restructuring began, the Special Branch recruited 
many locals and British fluent in Chinese. The government took the risky step of 
abolishing the MSS at the outbreak of the Emergency and rebuilding, virtually from 
scratch, an entirely new organization for intelligence gathering.137 
4. Information  
Information mostly came from Special Branch collaboration and joint operations 
with security forces on the ground, especially SOF units, focusing on the general 
population and Orang Asli. The Special Branch was responsible for acquiring, analyzing, 
and disseminating information, and did so with the aid of army unit intelligence officers. 
The success of the Special Branch was due to its contact with the population, knowledge 
of the language, and ability to infiltrate the CPM. They used various methods such as 
anonymous letters, secret ballots, rewards, agents, captured or surrendered enemy 
personnel, enemy documents, and aerial reconnaissance. By the 1950s, the Special 
Branch had succeeded in constructing a good model of the MNLA’s order of battle and 
obtained a better understanding of the close relationship between the CPM and MNLA 
from information taken from the interrogation of captured and surrendered guerrillas, as 
well as analysis of captured communist documents. Captured and surrendered enemy 
personnel (CEP and SEP) provided valuable information on the core of the CPM/MNLA 
that was not available from any other source for the intelligence war.138  
5. Organization  
The majority of SOF units discussed here practiced a decentralized and 
independent command and control at the operational and tactical levels, which ensured 
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timely actions in pursuing the CTs. Their organizations begin with small numbers of 
personnel and most of the time were understaffed. Although a few units had a short 
lifespan, based on their excellent records of accomplishment, higher authorities gradually 
allowed some SOF units to expand to suit operational requirements.   
According to Mackenzie, the Ferret Force was initiated to relieve the burden on 
infantry battalions. The Ferret Force made its headquarters in Ipoh, Perak, with six 
operational groups. Its peak strength was 300 men from various backgrounds. A group 
consisted of four sections, or twenty tactical units of fifteen or more men, who were 
placed in selected areas, each commanded by a former Force 136 or Chindit veteran. For 
instance, Ferret Group 1, led by John Davis, comprised about 67 men (military and 
civilian personnel) from the Malay Regiment, Chinese liaison officers, and signals, 
transport, and medical orderlies. Group commanders were vested with maximum 
independence and freedom of action. In September 1948, a party of Ibans from Borneo 
and their liaison officer joined the forces, enhancing their capabilities further.139  
The Malayan Emergency witnessed the largest numbers of SAS troopers deployed 
in a conflict since 1945 and influenced most of the SOF units during the Emergency.140 
In late 1955, it was reinforced by the arrival from Britain of a parachute regiment, and 
133 men from the New Zealand SAS replaced the Rhodesian Squadron. They were 
carefully selected personnel, a third of them Maoris.141 They grew to become five 
squadrons, four troops of sixteen men, with headquarters element and attached 
specialists.142 The SAS organization became the basic framework for the Senoi Praaq. 
It is interesting to study the Senoi Praaq, an organization that turned to be a 
decisive factor in the successful counterinsurgency operations in the Malayan hinterlands. 
What British intelligence operatives engineered as an extensive program for winning 
Orang Asli hearts and minds gradually became a bureaucratic entity known as the 
Department of Aborigines (DOA). This agency was disguised as a welfare organization 
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devoted to protecting Orang Asli interests. The Senoi Praaq became the military arm of 
the DOA, designed to extract intelligence among tribal peoples in return for the 
distribution of material subsidies and medical attention.143 After the “experiment,” the 
SAS trained another 160 men to form two Senoi Praaq squadrons as potential 
surrogates.144 The SAS organized Senoi Praaq identical to their force -- a squadron of 
four troops consisting of four patrols or twelve five-man sections. Any one squadron 
thereby received a good reading of numerous map squares within a few days’ time while 
subjecting itself to minimal exposure. As their special missions with the Special Branch 
intensified, the Senoi Praaq obtained an additional 80 troopers. After 1956, the Senoi 
Praaq had three squadrons, which could operate independently.145 Senoi Praaq made its 
way into the Malaysian Police on February 8, 1968. During the Second Insurgency 
(1968–90), the Senoi Praaq, already under the Malaysian Police, expanded to two 
battalions, with a strength of approximately 1,000 men.146 
According to Robert Rizal, a former Ranger and a recipient of Malaysia’s second-
highest gallantry award, on August 8, 1948, Sarawak Ranger’s first group of forty-nine 
Iban trackers was sent to Malaya to fight the MRLA. Initially, their term of service was 
three months only, but some chose to stay longer. Twenty-four of this original group of 
forty-nine was attached to the newly formed Ferret Force, Group 4. The remaining 
twenty-five were attached to the various Gurkha, British, and Malay battalions.147 
The Special Branch had expanded considerably by the end of 1952, with 93 
officers, mostly British, and 195 inspectors and police lieutenants serving. In 1953, 
Special Branch strength increased further to 126 officers and 279 inspectors and police 
lieutenants.148The Special Branch separated from the criminal investigation department 
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(CID) in 1952, fully accomplished by Colonel Young, commissioner of police. This 
enhanced the Special Branch’s status and enabled it to develop professionally along its 
own lines. This move also gave a strong organizational identity, so that staff increasingly 
took pride in their work. Federal Special Branch headquarters was structured into seven 
functional areas, which included three ethnic sections (Malay, Chinese, and Indian 
political movements) and liaison and operations, security, trade unionism/societies, and 
communism sections.149  
6. Doctrine 
From the Ferret Force to the Malayan Scouts, the Senoi Praaq, and the Rangers, 
all followed Force 136 lines, setting out to demonstrate appropriate jungle tactics and 
break down the CTs’ feeling of ownership of the jungle by ferreting them out from cover. 
They worked in teams and penetrated the jungle to eliminate CTs on their own or in 
collaboration with regular forces. Their aim was to imitate the CTs, operating in mobile 
cadres with local knowledge, led by officers who had already proven themselves in 
resistance or irregular warfare. The Ferret Force set precedents in the creation of other 
jungle penetration squads. The employment of trackers and small infantry patrols became 
standard practice in jungle warfare from the 1950s onwards.150  
The MRLA gained a reputation for dealing effectively and empathically with the 
Orang Asli. They manipulated the aborigines for secure bases, providing food and early 
warning of the security force’s arrival. The Malayan Scouts’ task was to disrupt this 
arrangement: to gain intelligence; to deny areas for CTs to rest and retrain in; to protect 
and to bring administration to the aborigines and isolate them from the CTs. This 
indirectly exerted pressure on the CTs, even if it was only to ensure that they move 
elsewhere, thus disrupting established supply lines and communications.151 The Scouts 
accomplished this by patrols of three- or four-man sections, exploring the jungle for three 
months or more. As time passed, they became more efficient at carrying out deep-
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penetration patrolling, and the introduction of the helicopter made the insertion of patrols 
more secure and efficient.  
All units emphasized jungle ambush techniques. Ambushes required all the tricks 
of the soldier’s trade: an eye for country, track discipline, concealment, camouflage, 
silence, alertness, fire discipline, marksmanship, guile, cunning, and above all self-
discipline. It demanded constant training and rehearsal.152 In intelligence roles, the SAS 
work with aborigines and the Special Branch to investigate the CTs’ modus operandi. 
This close cooperation lasted not only during the Emergency, but also in subsequent 
conflicts.153 Although the Malayan Scouts inspired deep-penetration operations and 
enhanced routine jungle patrolling techniques,154 based on records, they had fewer CTs 
killed or captured than other exceptional conventional units. The lack of success of some 
of the operations was not due to any lack of determination or will, but because of 
prolonged failure to contact the enemy, which led to a slackening of battle procedures. 
Mackenzie says troopers became extremely careless, noisy, and rather bored, going 
around the jungle in a slaphappy way with big fires at night, dropping trash, or ration tins 
around the place and not hiding them.155 Nevertheless, after hard lessons, they gained a 
wealth of experience, which played an effective role in the collection of intelligence, 
harassment of the CTs’ lines of communications, and ruining the CTs’ investment in their 
safe areas.156 Their deep-jungle penetrations were still a better option than the large 
sweep, cordon, and search tactics used by the conventional infantry. 
The Senoi Praaq emulated SAS doctrine and tactics. Unlike the SAS, the Senoi 
Praaq operated exclusively in the jungle and did not experiment in other areas of irregular 
warfare.157  Initially, they were attached to regular infantry units in area of operations 
referred to as Bamboo Operations Areas (BOA), between Malaya’s mountain ranges. 
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According to Jumper, the Senoi Praaq proved more proficient in jungle craft that the 
SAS/Iban troopers they were intended to replace, so much so that they were truly 
hampered by restrictions placed upon their movements during joint operations. 
Eventually, the Senoi Praaq was given the green light to operate alone, thanks to the 
persistence of their commander, R.O. Noone. The Senoi Praaq also collaborated with 
Special Branch in the establishment of an extensive intelligence network. Usually, two 
troopers accompanied an officer to a location where Orang Asli were known to live, to 
remain within the vicinity for a protracted period of time in hopes of gathering 
intelligence about the MRLA and Asal. The troopers posed as innocent members of 
neighboring settlements and secured information through displays of friendship. This 
cooperation led to the formation of a third squadron, making its size more akin to that 
SAS regiment.158  
7. Infrastructure  
It was important to have various infrastructures that were conducive, suitable, and 
strategically located close to the area of operations during this period. By September 
1950, the Malayan Scouts moved from Johor Bahru, in the south, to Dusun Tua, nine 
miles southeast of Kuala Lumpur, a strategic location in the center of Malaya. This was 
the Scout’s headquarters and base camp combined, closer to the area of operations. 
Nevertheless, both were dilapidated, gloomy camps with inadequate training facilities.159 
They were neither provided with neither a suitable administrative infrastructure nor 
administrative and quartermaster staff to support the new unit. Since there was neither the 
time nor facilities for training, much of it had to take place on football pitches and other 
clear spaces around the camp.160  
In 1952, security forces began to build a series of jungle forts in selected 
aboriginal areas to win their support and establish legitimacy for the 
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government.161During operations, jungle forts were of the essence in deep jungle patrols, 
for the food denial program and for quarantining Orang Asli from the CTs. The SAS and 
other security forces built and operated from these forts, which later became the 
permanent Police Field Force’s garrisons. Several forts had a short airstrip for light 
aircraft, and most had helicopter landing pads for resupply and other administrative and 
logistics matters. Some considered jungle forts as of little value for the military, but 
useful for the civic action programs they provided, such as medical, educational and 
trading facilities, and they did win the aborigines over to the government side. The jungle 
forts, therefore, provided the best link between the security forces, the government, and 
the aborigines.162 
 
Figure 7.  Fort Brookes: One of the jungle forts in the Malayan jungles.163  
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In moving towards excellence, the Special Branch concentrated on training, and 
established two training schools in Sentul and Salak South, Selangor, in January 1951. 
The Special Branch training school assumed greater importance, and not only to local 
officers. Indeed, later it became a regional training center and earned for itself a 
reputation outside Malaya as a center of excellence for the training of intelligence 
officers. Officers from neighboring countries and as far afield as Hong Kong and 
Australia attended the courses.164 The Special Branch also established joint police and 
military operation intelligence rooms and ensured that army intelligence and Police 
Special Branch were trained together to avoid frictions. Special Branch took over a top 
secret interrogation center, the “White House,” that had been established by the British 
Army Research Team, to handle the reception, interrogation and the aftercare of enemy 
personnel. This house, located at Kuala Lumpur Police Training Depot, was well-
concealed and patrolled by armed guards. Auster aircraft used a short landing strip that 
ran alongside the center to fly in high-level captured or surrendered guerrillas for 
interrogation and communist documents for translation.165 
8. Logistics 
Logistical support was not a major problem for the SOF units because of their 
small size. Because the SAS adopted the deep-jungle penetration method, they spent 
considerable time and energy on actually walking into the operational area. To mitigate 
this problem, the SAS tried a new, hazardous, tree-jumping technique, although there 
were frequent casualties.166  This was before the regular availability of troop-carrying 
helicopters. The arrival of Sikorsky S-55 helicopters in 1953 in larger numbers in Malaya 
changed matters dramatically (see Figure 8). Initially, all helicopters flew from 
Singapore, but for the sake of efficiency, all of them were repositioned in Kuala Lumpur. 
Helicopters were used for a multitude of purposes. Besides carrying troops and supplies, 
they flew captured CTs and documents that were urgently requested by the Special 
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Branch, evacuated SOF personnel, and performed many other missions.167 Clearing a 
landing area in the jungles with machetes and explosives was a tough, risky, but fun, job. 
Most of the time, the only way to secure resupplies was through airdrops and helicopters, 
but receiving one announced a unit’s presence in the area to the MRLA. These SOF 
troopers also used traditional transportation during patrols, such as bamboo rafts and 
mules (see Figure 9).168 
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Figure 8.  SAS helicopter insertion.169   
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Figure 9.  The Malayan Scouts using bamboo raft.170  
9. Leadership  
There were many outstanding leaders born during the Emergency. The SOF units 
would not have outclassed others without dedicated and enthusiastic leaders. The Ferret 
Force saw the leadership of John Davis and Richard Broome, who were well known as 
steadfast leaders since their tour of duty with Force 136. Another example is Lieutenant 
Colonel Walter Walker, who later became the first commandant of the new FARELF’s 
Jungle Warfare Training Center in Johor. Walker, who was a Chindit veteran, became the 
administrative commandant, responsible for the training and assessment of Ferret Force 
requirements and for issuing arms and equipment, and was a strong supporter of the 
Ferrets. 
Major Michael Calvert showed enthusiasm in regenerating the SAS, sharing his 
knowledge and experience in irregular warfare. He was one of the principal contributors 
to the Briggs plan. He showed determined leadership, creative thinking, and good 
analytical assessment on the Malayan situation. He introduced the three-man jungle 
patrol, which some said would fail. He wanted his officers to develop creative ideas and 
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adapt to new challenges. He was loyal to his subordinates but not afraid of risking 
casualties. However, his volcanic eruptions of temper made many fear him, and he was 
reported to be a binge drinker. Colonel Woodhouse said, “Calvert’s weakness was that he 
did not seem to appreciate the importance of good discipline.”171 
Other outstanding SAS leaders were John Sloane and John Woodhouse. Sloane 
took over in autumn 1951, when Calvert had to leave Malaya because of illnesses and 
stress after several years of continuous warfare. Sloane had no special forces experience, 
but brought a strong measure of discipline and normal military order to the regiment. He 
was a formidable leader, and tackled problems which affected the Scouts. They began to 
rebuild their reputation, and once again, the Malayan Scouts became an efficient and 
formidable jungle fighting unit. Woodhouse was one of the Malayan Scouts’ intelligence 
officers, not only loyal to his leader, but to his unit. He once said, “I could never leave 
this regiment or desert the man who made it.” He was brave enough to challenge Calvert, 
his superior, when he worried about the breakdown of discipline within the unit and 
could not understand why Calvert failed to take action. Under his leadership, the A 
Squadron improved considerably, and became highly efficient, fit, and tougher. This laid 
the foundation of later SAS successes in Malaya, Borneo, and elsewhere.172  
For the Senoi Praaq, R. O. D. Noone, with his intelligence background in his 
pocket, aggressively lobbied for the Senoi Praaq in military and civilian political circles. 
He designed a strategy to win over the aborigines and achieve good relations with them 
and worked tirelessly towards his objectives.173 The other leader was Mohamed Ruslan 
Iskandar Abdullah, the last Anglo commander of the Senoi Praaq, who went native. He 
was a former SOVF leader before joining the Senoi Praaq, who wanted more action and 
was highly motivated, adventurous, and innovative, and brought many improvements to 
the Senoi Praaq.174 
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Sir William Jenkin was dedicated to improving the Special Branch. He had a 
distinguished career, and was the first trained professional intelligence officer to take 
over the Malayan Special Branch, in June 22, 1950. He emphasized the importance of 
recruiting more Chinese officers and reorganized and strengthened the Special Branch in 
the interest of efficiency. He established joint operation intelligence rooms, ensured that 
the police and army worked together, and established two Special Branch training 
schools. He introduced the first post-war systematic training in investigation, intelligence 
analysis, and dissemination techniques. He was also the one who demanded that security 
forces focus attention on the Malayan-Thai frontier.175 Another actor for the Special 
Branch was Mr. John H. Morton, the first director of intelligence. He analyzed the 
Special Branch’s problems and presented clearly his recommendations for changes to his 
superior, Templer, who supported him in all issues. During his tenure, he saw the lack of 
a clear division of effort in the field of intelligence between the police and military. The 
police were not producing intelligence that the military could use, and Morton took steps 
to improve the situation.176 
On the other hand, there is also an example of bad leader, Major General Sir 
Charles Boucher. John Davis described him as a “jack-in-the-box little general,” selfish 
and ignorant.177 He hardly took time to acquaint himself with the local situation and had 
countless disagreements with others. Having different opinions is acceptable, but 
Boucher was too arrogant and did not appreciate his subordinates in many ways. 
Fortunately, many matters resolved when Boucher left Malaya in 1950.178  
E. CONCLUSION  
During the first two years of the Emergency, government actions were blunt and 
inefficient. Fighting the guerrillas using conventional approaches showed insignificant 
results. Large forces, sweeping the jungle, cordoning, and searching for the CTs were 
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measures they could avoid by fleeing and ambushing the conventional forces in return, or 
just running to live another day. Thanks to the few who appreciated irregular warfare 
approaches in fighting bands of communist guerrillas in the thick jungles, the Ferret 
Force, Malayan Scouts (SAS), Senoi Praaq, Sarawak Rangers, and Special Branch were 
able to change the game, manipulating the strategy of the CTs in the same pitches. Their 
unconventional actions against CT vulnerabilities throughout the Emergency supported 
the master plan and helped win hearts and minds among the people, especially in rural 
areas and deep jungles.  
Most of the units’ lines of capabilities replicated each other or their predecessors. 
As an example, Force 136 inspired the SAS, who handed this knowledge down to the 
Senoi Praaq and Sarawak Rangers. These SOF units stayed strong, facing tough 
challenges, until the end of the Emergency, because they had excellent leaders who were 
keen and made good judgments from accurate and reliable information, emphasizing 
training and organization. With that in hand, they worked religiously at adapting doctrine 
to overwhelm the enemy, e.g., in deep-jungle penetration, emphasizing intelligence, 
winning hearts and minds, and applying comprehensive approaches to the right target 
audiences. Those strengths enabled them to face threats not only the CTs, but also from 
others who do not want to understand the situation and support their subordinates, and 
they faced a tough bureaucracy during recruiting. Nevertheless, they exhibited some 
weaknesses, especially due to equipment and technology that was unreliable and not 
robust enough for the harsh jungle environment. Additional challenges were inadequate 
transportation, depilated infrastructure, and the lack of training facilities. The majority of 
these issues were mitigated slowly as everyone accumulated more experience during the 
Emergency. On July 31, 1960, the Malayan Emergency officially ended after twelve 
years of struggle against the CPM and MRLA guerrillas. 
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IV. THE INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION (1963–1966) 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Malaysia (or Malaya before 1963) experienced ruthless conflicts from late 1941 
to 1989. Among these was the Malaysian Confrontation from 1963 to 1966. The 
Confrontation could have escalated and become a full-scale war between Malaysia and 
Indonesia were it not handled wisely by the British and the government of Malaysia. This 
thesis argues that during the Confrontation, the British used SOF appropriately in 
conjunction with conventional forces and succeeded in deterring the Indonesian 
aggressors from achieving their military and strategic objectives. The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine what the SOF experienced during the Confrontation and its impact 
on improving Malaysian security against its threats. To achieve that, this essay will 
answer questions such as why and how the British used SOF during the Confrontation. 
Besides highlighting historical experience, this chapter will use a modified model of the 
Lines of Development (DLoD) to look for ideas that the Malaysian SOF might exploit in 
the future.179 
B. THE CONFRONTATION 
Soon after the British declared the Malayan Emergency ended, another conflict 
began to arise on Malaysian soil. The conflict was an intermittent war waged by 
Indonesia to oppose the formation of Malaysia. President Sukarno of Indonesian opposed 
what he called a “British neocolonialist” project. He had his own ideas for a greater East 
Asian federation, or MAPHILINDO, under his leadership and hoped to prevent the 
formation of Malaysia by using diplomatic, ideological, and military means, if 
necessary.180 In January 1963, the Indonesian foreign minister announced a policy of 
confrontation towards Malaysia, and later, in July, President Sukarno declared the “crush 
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Malaysia” campaign following the signing of the London Agreement by the Malaysian 
prime minister.181 
The Brunei revolt in December 1962 was the beginning phase of the 
Confrontation.182 Armed incursions, bomb attacks, and acts of subversion and 
destabilization were the mark of this conflict. The initial threat was a small, lightly 
armed, indigenous, communist or Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara (TNKU)-inspired 
insurgency with limited popular support. The Brunei Revolt was short lived and ended in 
May 1963, when British and Sarawak irregulars hunted down the rebels.183 Sukarno was 
also surprised by the revolt in Brunei. Nevertheless, he managed to manipulate it to gain 
military support from the rebels and, eventually for intervention by Indonesian regular 
forces.  
The second stage (April 1963–April 1964) began when Indonesia sponsored raids 
into Borneo with the aim of raising guerrilla forces and establishing semi-permanent 
camps (see Figure 10). At this point, the enemy was the Indonesian-supported TNKU 
irregulars, Indonesian Border Terrorists (IBT) and some Indonesian volunteers. Their 
goal was to destabilize the border areas. Slowly, regular Indonesian units began to appear 
in the conflicts.184 The Indonesian army and Marine Corps began to conduct overt 
operations in northern Borneo and Malaysia in the third stage of the Confrontation (April 
1964–1966). There were reports that Indonesian troop strength grew as big as almost 
30,000 in 1965. The British and the government of Malaysia responded with four infantry 
brigades and commando battalions, four small Special Air Services (SAS) squadrons, the 
Royal Air Force, Fleet Air Arms, and a few navy ships, which totaled about 17,000 
personnel at the peak of the conflicts.185 
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Figure 10.  The Indonesian Confrontation186 
From the middle of 1964, the Director of Borneo Operation, Major General 
Walter Walker, introduced Operation Claret to stop Indonesian incursions by forcing 
them on the defensive. Elite and special units conducted these special operations with the 
utmost secrecy inside the Indonesian border. As time went on, these deep strikes 
increased in distance, beyond the borders, as retaliation for the Indonesian threats. 
Operation Claret proved to be an integral factor in the successful conclusion of the 
military campaign. The Confrontation started to lose its intensity as Indonesian domestic 
problems arose. Eventually, Indonesia and Malaysia signed a peace agreement on August 
11, 1966. Both nations accepted the agreement as a win–win situation.187  
General Walker, who commanded this campaign, was experienced in jungle 
warfare. A Burmese campaign veteran, he worked with the Ferret Force as the first 
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director of the Jungle Warfare School in Johor before he was appointed as the brigade 
commander of Gurkhas in the Malayan Emergency. His goals were to prevent the 
escalation of the Brunei Revolt and early Indonesian-sponsored raids into an open war, as 
in Vietnam, and to win the opening rounds and maintain dominance over a potentially 
long period. Walker’s plan was to meet each incursion with extreme violence, 
demonstrating that the smallest violation of the border would result in swift, merciless 
retaliation against enemy forces.188 Some considered his plan “the most offensively 
natured defensive strategy in military history.”189 In order to achieve his goals, Walker 
introduced his “ingredients for success,” which consisted of unified operations (joint); 
timely and accurate intelligence; speed, mobility, and flexibility of security forces; 
security of bases; domination of the jungle; and winning hearts and minds. These 
ingredients had the “taste” of the Malayan Emergency, as introduced by Briggs and 
Templer. 
C. OPERATION CLARET 
In the second half of 1964, security forces in Borneo were authorized to cross the 
Indonesian border in hot pursuit of the enemy, with strict procedures. This restriction was 
introduced to keep the conflict from escalating and to demonstrate clearly to the world 
that Indonesia was the aggressor.190 Operation Claret was part of Walker’s strategy to 
stop the Indonesian incursion by forcing them on the defensive. Walker gave the generic 
term, “special operation” to Operation Claret in order to maintain its secrecy. Operational 
security was at the highest level, and only the commanding officer and one select unit in 
each battalion were fully aware of the special operation’s planning and execution. 
Furthermore, British policymakers did not want the public to know about Claret. SOF 
units played roles in Claret, due to their capabilities and small size—they were in the best 
position to conduct cross-border reconnaissance when this operation was finally 
authorized. The SOF began reconnoitering enemy bases and their lines of 
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communication. Usually, SOF patrols led conventional forces in raiding or setting up 
ambush parties to enemy targets. They proved to be one of the winning elements of the 
military campaign in Borneo.   
Most of the time, the security forces denied the existence of Operation Claret and 
made up stories for every operation to show that the war was still being fought on the 
Malaysian side of the border. The Indonesians did the same thing. They purposefully said 
that they did not know about Claret and assumed it just an extension of routine ambushes 
carried out south of the ill-defined border by Malaysian security forces. The Indonesian 
military was not willing to disturb this fabrication, as it made them out to be more 
successful than they really were in the eyes of the people in Jakarta. Claret intensified in 
late 1965, when Major General George Lea, another SAS officer, took over from 
Walker.191 Until the end, Claret remained in secrecy and indirectly allowed the 
Indonesians to withdraw with respect when their military approach was ineffective.   
D. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES   
1. Special Air Services (SAS)  
I regard 70 troopers of the SAS as being as valuable to me as 700 
infantry in the role of hearts and minds, border surveillance, early 
warning, stay behind, and eyes and ears with a sting.192 
–Lt. Col. John Woodhouse 
After the Brunei Revolt, Lieutenant Colonel John Woodhouse, the 22nd SAS 
commander and a Malayan Emergency veteran, arrived in Borneo.193 Soon after, SAS 
troopers arrived after Woodhouse convinced Major General Walker that the SAS could 
become eyes and ears by establishing a forward-deployed intelligence/communication 
network right in the jungle, with the natives near the border. The SAS operated in patrols 
of four men and lived for four-month tours in a village or longhouse, building trust and 
exercising eyes-and-ears capability with the locals and Borneo Border Scouts (BBS). The 
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hearts-and-minds strategy and assurances of village security to the people paid substantial 
dividends in intelligence. Valuable information was transmitted to SAS headquarters 
using the Morse radio set, the only reliable method of communication in the jungle at that 
time. This arrangement meant that despite the scarcity of troops, the SAS were able to 
detect the majority of Indonesian incursions into Borneo. Armed with this border 
intelligence and with the skillful use of a limited number of helicopters, the security 
forces led by the SAS could ambush raiders on their return to Kalimantan.194 
In the early phase of the Confrontation, only one squadron of the 22nd SAS, that 
is, less than 100 troopers, was stretched thinly along the Borneo borders to conduct 
Operation Claret. Major General Walkers decided to train other units such as the Guards 
Independent Parachute Company, the Gurkha Independent Parachute Company, and ‘C’ 
Company, 2nd Battalion, of the parachute regiments, who were all converted to the SAS 
role.195 From February 1965, Australia and New Zealand started to deploy their SAS 
units together with other units into Borneo. The Australian SAS’s first patrols took place 
on the Malaysian side of the border and were mainly intended to obtain topographical 
information on tracks, rivers, and villages, as well as conducting surveillance of known 
border-crossing points and shadowing Indonesian infiltrators. Patrols were ordered to 
avoid contact, but if an incident took place a shoot-and-scoot policy was employed. 
Offensive action was to be avoided unless specifically ordered. Most patrols were instead 
engaged in hearts-and-minds operations.  [ A film showing an encounter between an SAS 
patrol and some villagers is on this site.196 ] 
2. Senoi Praaq 
The British tried to establish a paramilitary force called the Borneo Border Scouts 
(BBS), modeled after the Senoi Praaq during the Emergency. According to Jumper in his 
book Deaths waits in the Dark, the BBS were incapable of withstanding pressure, and 
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thus they were more of a liability than an asset. The BBS were poorly trained by the SAS, 
which were too busy at the time with operational matters, leaving this critical task to the 
Gurkhas. After a bloodbath at Long Jawi, near Belaga, in Sarawak, on September 28, 
1963, Richard O. D. Noone and his deputy, Norman Herbolt, were tasked to establish 
Sabah Border Scouts (SBS), and this new unit was set up in May 1964 using mainly 
Murut tribesmen based in Keningau, in Sabah. They conducted training based upon their 
experience during the Emergency and what they had learned from the SAS. Mentored by 
the Senoi Praaq, the BBS worked alongside the SAS, providing the scouts and trackers to 
lead a majority of the missions in the Claret operation.197  
In the peninsula of Malaya, numerous smaller raids by the Tentera Nasional 
Malaya—similar to the North Kalimantan National Army (NKNA)—served as an 
umbrella organization for disaffected Malays and Chinese opposed to the regime of 
Tungku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia’s Prime Minister. The Senoi Praaq troopers were 
employed at Pontian, Johor, and in the north of Singapore Island on a trial basis to gauge 
their utility in lowland areas, and they fell straight back into stride. The Senoi Praaq again 
showed their true colors and helped other security forces to retaliate, not only against the 
TNM, but also against Indonesian regular troops.  
One can argue about SOF units during the Malaysian Confrontation. This thesis 
highlights not only the SAS-conducted Operation Claret, but also other light infantry who 
became elite units and performed as the SAS did.198 They conducted counter-guerrilla 
actions, suppression of insurgencies, and raids on enemy positions behind their own lines, 
as Eliot Cohen notes in his Commandos and Politicians.199 In this conflict, small and 
discrete military actions were used to signal to the Indonesians the British and other 
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Commonwealth members’ commitments and intentions. They offered the governments a 
better chance of success in performing a sensitive operation like Operation Claret.  
E. LINE OF DEVELOPMENT 
1. Training  
Before the Confrontation, most of the SAS troopers had served in the Malayan 
Emergency a few years earlier. Nonetheless, Walker required the troops to acclimate to 
the jungle, and train on tactics at the Jungle Warfare School in Kota Tinggi Johor prior to 
deployment to Borneo. Medical skills were also essential knowledge to the SAS, since 
they were needed for winning the hearts and minds of the natives, as in the Malayan 
Emergency. Nevertheless, differences did exist between the tactical style of operations 
used in Borneo and in Malaya. The Indonesian army maneuvered in big numbers and 
rarely moved in groups smaller than a platoon in the jungle. On the other side, SAS 
training gave more attention to small-group tactics, conservation of ammunition during 
firefights, and the favoring of ambushes, especially at rivers, which might last for long 
periods. In theater, each operation followed months of reconnoitering, planning, and 
rehearsing of every possible detail, including fields of fire for machine guns, silent 
plotting for artillery and mortar fire, approach routes, etc. Non-commissioned officers 
had to be proficient in calling for ground-fire support, because the air force was not 
allowed to conduct bombing operations. 
2. Equipment   
Helicopters were of utmost importance to operations during the Confrontation. 
Helicopters helped implement Walker’s plan of forward deployment, contributed to 
tactical mobility, and provided relief or ambush forces. A SAS “setup drill” team could 
be emplaced quickly in several places, cutting off the enemy regardless of his direction of 
flight. Walker estimated that an infantry battalion with ten helicopters was worth more 
than a brigade on foot. With helicopters, security forces defeated the enemy even though 
they were outnumbered. The weather often restricted operations, and air navigation was 
difficult. The joint headquarters centrally controlled the helicopters, but deployed them 
widely throughout the area of operations.  
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The SAS troopers preferred the AR-15 rifle, which was short, lightweight, and 
demonstrated utility in close-range fighting in heavy vegetation, as compared to the self-
loading rifle. A belt-fed machine gun was too heavy and too susceptible to malfunctions. 
They also preferred the two-inch mortar, even though had limited utility in the jungle, 
because the 81mm mortar was too heavy. Walker complained that many items of 
equipment weighed too much for light infantry. He identified tactical radios, air–ground 
radios, jungle clothing, and rations as items that needed to be lighter.  
3. Personnel  
The SAS in Borneo was characterized by the highest standards of self-discipline 
and field craft, resistance to mental stress, relentless pursuit of excellence in operations, 
dogged perseverance in going to one step further than required, and great confidence in 
itself. Some approached the standards of the aborigines in jungle craft and tracking. 
Endurance was essential for the SAS troopers, due to the distance they covered during 
patrols, along with meticulous attention to detail. They were always isolated and exposed, 
under constant nervous stress from the danger of detection, and had to be keen observers, 
anticipating, making minute decisions, choosing the best route, and measuring options in 
event of emergency. Additionally, during the Malayan Emergency, the SAS experienced 
long-range reconnaissance, improved their language, hearts and minds, and raiding 
qualities, and trained in special operations, signaling, medicine, and linguistics. This 
made the regiment well suited to its assigned tasks in Borneo. 
4. Infrastructure 
Though the SAS operated deep in the jungle and close to the natives, there were 
jungle bases or border forts well forward that would deny the enemy access to northern 
Borneo and provide the British a variety of advantages (see Figure 11). Compared to the 
jungle forts in the jungles of Malaya during the Emergency, these encampments were 
bigger and stronger to defend from enemy intrusion. These bases were never meant to 
serve as static defense forts, but functioned as widely separated, secure havens for men 
conducting constant patrolling—a place for returning patrols to rest, relax, eat hot food, 
and take showers. The bases protected nearby villages, served as a focal point for 
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intelligence collection, and carried out civic action programs for the villagers. Jungle 
bases normally included an infantry company, a mortar detachment, a landing zone, an 
artillery section with one or two 105-mm guns, and living space for extra forces if 
needed. Occasionally, the base included a helicopter detachment, operated by one platoon 
on a rotational basis. They were constructed on high ground and fortified with trenches, 
sandbag bunkers, wire, punji stakes, Claymore mines, and overhead cover. Vegetation 
around the perimeter was cleared to improve fields of fire, and sentry dogs enhanced the 
early warning of enemy approach. SAS troopers usually help other units build jungle 
airstrips for light aircraft to transport troops and cargo. During the Confrontation, they 
built several hundred loading zones along the frontier, which allowed them easy entry to 
hot spots or possible ambush locations for friendly forces, as well as a place to pick up 
patrols and evacuate casualties.  
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Figure 11.  Border Fort during Confrontation.200  
5. Doctrine  
The SAS also emphasized winning hearts and minds in Borneo. They 
accomplished this through constant patrolling, deterring enemy attacks, immediate 
reaction, direct help, and assistance in village self-defense. They treated people with 
respect and offered kind treatment in all matters of mutual interest. SAS honored the 
headmen and did not dictate to the people directly. They consulted the headmen, 
explained their operations and policies, observed local customs, and adhered to rigorous 
guidelines for behavior when in contact with the natives. The most important service 
provided for the natives was medical aid.  
There was mild debate concerning who should conduct long-range reconnaissance 
patrols. These operations demonstrated that both the SOF and conventional forces could 
be successful. However, only the most experienced and able troops were employed for 
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this task. Nevertheless, the SAS still performed most of the deep patrolling. Lieutenant 
Colonel Woodhouse clearly understood the SOF’s roles, and their capabilities convinced 
Walker how to deploy them during the Confrontation. The SAS carried out and 
sometimes led others in raids and ambushes on enemy targets. There were many river 
ambushes conducted, due to the geography of Borneo, and the enemy used rivers as their 
line of communication frequently. SAS also conducted remote ambushes, but these were 
not effective against the enemy. Most of the time, the SAS were able to guess accurately 
the likely withdrawal routes of the raiders and ambush the enemy on the way back to the 
border using various helicopter landing zones and roping areas, which were cut at 1,000-
yard intervals along the frontier. The security forces and SAS used close air and artillery 
support widely in Borneo, because the Indonesians presented better targets than the 
terrorists in Malaya.  
6. Organization  
Walker established a joint headquarters in one building and set the pattern for all 
lower levels of operation.201 He insisted that naval and air force commanders support his 
operational concepts. He ordered the Fleet Air Arm to base its helicopters ashore and 
used commando ships to ferry personnel from Singapore and for local logistical support. 
He forced the RAF to relax its formal procedures and emphasis on centralized operations. 
He also brought police and civil authority onboard in this campaign. The SAS kept all the 
commanders informed and maintained a close relationship with the infantry by assigning 
liaison officers. Walker also introduced his “Golden Rules,” and these instructions 
assisted him in managing the operation effectively, ensuring success, and maintaining 
secrecy.202 
7. Information 
Operation CLARET emphasized early warning, and it was critical to success. 
Information regarding the enemy came from two primary sources: the border tribes and 
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the armed forces themselves. Police were few and there was no Police Special Branch in 
the forward locations. The border tribes were adept in the jungle, easily concealed, and 
their hunting activities often brought them into contacts with the enemy. Furthermore, 
they had relatives or trading partners in Kalimantan that gave them easy passage through 
the border. They would not help unless they were sure of protection, so the SAS 
maintained a frequent and visible presence, living in many isolated villages and patrolling 
to win the trust of the people. The SAS provided support and advice on the villagers’ 
self-defense and were careful in operations not to endanger the villagers. The Border 
Scouts also helped to create a fine intelligence network, collecting information about the 
enemy and giving it to the SAS.  
8. Logistics  
The security forces utilized commando amphibious ships to transport people, 
equipment, and the supplies to and from Singapore. They also used them within Borneo 
for the same reason. Due to the harshness of the terrain and lack of decent roads, the 
wider decentralization of forces and improvement in helicopter technology and 
techniques, the British provided 90 percent of their logistics effort during the 
Confrontation by air. The British also used hovercraft and other watercraft in resupplying 
units, especially at night. The SAS created food caches for emergency use. They also 
attempted to supplement light rations with jungle forage, but this consumed too much of 
their time. Every SAS trooper carried a two-week ration on patrol. 
9. Leadership  
Major General Walker was an infantry officer who understood and appreciated 
light infantry tactics and SOF deep-jungle operations. He applied his vast experience in 
jungle warfare effectively during the Confrontation. Woodhouse, who was an 
experienced SAS commander and a Malayan Emergency veteran, gave firm advice to his 
commander on how to use SOF and prevented it from being utilized as a conventional 
unit. George Lea, also an SAS officer, kept the operational tempo at the highest level. He 
followed the doctrine and concepts laid out by Walker, and understood the importance of 
the strategic use of SOF during the Confrontation. 
 78 
F. CONCLUSION 
Special Operations Forces are essential in conflicts such as the Confrontation, 
mainly as an unconventional deterrence against external threats. Walker designed 
Operation Claret to stop the Indonesian incursion by forcing them into a defensive 
posture. Walker and his successor used SOF units cautiously and covered them in full 
secrecy so that they could achieve their strategic utility. The SAS mastered their 
operating environment and, deployed in conjunction with conventional forces, succeeded 
in assisting the government to its political objectives. The British and other 
Commonwealth forces were able to deter Indonesia from achieving its military and 
strategic objectives, preventing the Confrontation from escalating and becoming a full-
scale war.  
In their future use of special operations, the Malaysian SOF should not neglect the 
various lessons learned during the Confrontation. The Defense Line of Development 
(TEPIDOIL + L) model could assist SOF commanders in developing the capabilities 
needed to meet future challenges. The Confrontation showed a need for helicopters, 
hovercraft, and other kinds of equipment suited for jungle operations. In the final 
analysis, however, personnel proved more important than equipment. Leaders must know 
how to deploy SOF, understanding their capabilities and limitations. Mastery of other 
elements, such as training, information, doctrine, infrastructure, and organization, would 
ensure that SOF operates at highest performance levels to achieve success. 
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V. THE MALAYSIAN INSURGENCY (1968–1989) 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter focuses on the development of Malaysian SOF units during the 
Second Emergency, sometimes referred to as the Malaysian Insurgency. The scenarios 
were almost the same as in the Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation in 
Borneo a few years before. At this time, Malaysia was progressing well economically and 
socially after almost a decade of independence from the British. Malaysian security 
forces were almost through with a “Malaysianization” process. SOF units and 
conventional forces slowly adapted the changes and continued keeping Malaysia a 
peaceful independent country, allowing further progress and development. However, the 
communists accused the government of Malaysia of being just another British–United 
States puppet, and challenged it with a renewed insurrection. This time, the security 
forces not only had to hunt the CTs in Peninsular Malaysia’s jungles, but also in 
Sarawak. This period was the testing ground for Malaysian SOF units fighting on their 
own, without extra hands from their colonial master, the British. While continuing to use 
available SOF units such as the Police Special Branch and Senoi Praaq to harass the CTs 
unconventionally, the government of Malaysia also formed new SOF units such as the 
Malaysian Special Service Regiments and Police 69 Commandos (VAT 69). This chapter 
will analyze these authentic Malaysian special forces units and highlight their line of 
capabilities. 
B. THE MALAYSIAN SECOND EMERGENCY  
Although the initial Emergency was declared ended by July 21, 1960, the 
remnants of the CPM and the MRLA guerrillas had not been eliminated, nor did they 
surrender to the security forces. The CTs took a strategic move and withdrew across the 
Malaysian–Thai border. Two years after the Indonesian Confrontation, the CPM 
resurfaced and began to raise the communists’ red flags on buildings in Kuala Lumpur, 
Penang, and many other places. Anti-government pamphlets were found pasted on walls 
of a flat in Loke Yew Street, and shop houses urged the people to continue the CPM’s 
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struggles to overthrow the government in Malaysia and Singapore. The Chinese 
Communist Party supported the CPM through Radio Peking to mark the 20th anniversary 
of the insurrection in Malaya in 1948 by the CPM.203  
The CPM perceived the withdrawal of the British and other Commonwealth 
forces as an excellent opportunity to take over and rule the country. On June 1, 1968, 
Chin Peng, the CPM secretary general, issued a directive for a renewed general MRLA 
offensive and began sending guerrillas south of Thailand’s border to reconnoiter their old 
“playgrounds,” especially in north Perak. A revamped MRLA, trained in new Viet Cong 
tactics, equipped with various American weapons from Vietnamese and Cambodian 
battlefields, began to emerge from the Betong Salient (near the Malaysian–Thai frontier) 
to establish bases in the northern states and take the fight to Malaysian soil once more.204 
On June 18, 1968, the CTs successfully ambushed a 1st Battalion Police Field Force 
convoy near the border town of Kroh, Perak. That brutal ambush left sixteen policemen 
dead, seventeen wounded, and three trucks severely damaged.205 The Malaysian 
government then declared the Second Emergency, which last for almost 21 years of 
agony for the Malaysians.  
Subsequently, the CTs managed to hit a variety of targets such as the east–west 
highway in northern Malaysia, destroy numerous trucks, and sabotage railway lines. 
Military installations and police posts were also struck with some frequency. The central 
headquarters for the Police Jungle Field Force and the Sungai Besi airbase, Kuala 
Lumpur, became their target. MRLA elite killer squads assimilated several high-profile 
security forces’ officers. The garrisons at the jungle forts reported frequent contacts with 
the CTs, who continued harassing and targeting the Orang Asli.206 Eventually, the CPM 
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surrendered on December 2, 1989, after unsuccessful battle with the Malaysian security 
forces.  
C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
1. The Malaysian Armed Forces 
a. The Malaysian Special Service Unit (MSSU) 
About three years before the Second Emergency was declared, the defense 
minister, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, and the chief of the armed forces, General Tungku 
Dato’ Osman Jiwa, discussed a plan to retaliate for Indonesian troop incursions into 
Malaysia. They agreed that the Tentera National Indonesia (TNI) must be eliminated 
before they could reach the Malaysian coast. The decision was made to organize a special 
raiding unit for conducting a surprise attack on TNI bases close to the Malaysian coast, 
such as in Riau and Sumatera. This new strategy was known as Counter Indonesian 
Confrontation (CIC) and was crucial as an action to be taken by the Malaysian Armed 
Forces.207 Tun Abdul Razak turned to the British once again to establish a special unit, 
later called the Malaysian Special Service Unit (MSSU). The forty Royal Marine (RM) 
commandos under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Tiffin from Burma Camp, in Ulu 
Tiram, Johore, were assigned this task. Tiffin then selected Major Bacons to lead a team 
of two officers and a staff sergeant to conduct the first training regime in January 1965. 
On February 19, 1965, after six weeks of challenging training that focused on physical 
and mental strength and various combat skills, four officers and eight enlisted graduated 
from the first Malaysian Commando Cadres course. Lieutenant Colonel Tiffin presented 
them with the Green Beret and the blue lanyard that are their symbols to this day. On 
February 25, 1965, Major Abu Hassan Abdullah became the first MSSU commanding 
officer and Warrant Officer II Ariffin Muhammad was selected as the first squadron 
sergeant major. This new unit was attached to the 4th Royal Malay Regiment in Majidee 
Camp, in Johor Bahru. Their primary mission was to train more commandos, and by May 
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1965, the MSSU pioneers and the RM team managed to train three more troops to 
become one squadron of 120 commandos.  
Immediately after came their first mission, to raid the TNI base in Pulau 
Djemor, a launching base for the TNI to cross the Straits of Malacca and infiltrate into 
Peninsular Malaysia. Once the intelligence was received, the MMSU was put on high 
alert. The mission was canceled at the last minute after the situation in Jakarta became 
more favorable to the Malaysian government. On another occasion, an MSSU platoon led 
by Lieutenant Zainuddin was covertly infiltrated into Kuala Mentadak in Pulau Sebatik, 
east of Sabah. Their tasks were to gather intelligence on the TNI, especially the 
Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO) activities in that island.208 Lieutenant 
Zainuddin split his men into smaller patrols of three men each. The MSSU troopers 
observed the TNI’s deception plan: they would change their uniforms each time they had 
parades to confuse Malaysian Security Forces and pretend that they had greater actual 
strength. This valuable information was passed to the army headquarters in Tawau, 
Sabah.  
The Indonesians slowly showed signs of ceasing their aggression towards 
Malaysia. On May 27, 1966, a group of twenty-six officers from the TNI led by First 
Admiral O. B. Syaaf, visited Kuala Lumpur for a friendship mission called “Misi 
Muhibbah.”  They met Tungku Abdul Rahman, the Malaysian prime minister, and 
handed him a declaration to end the Confrontation. Nevertheless, as the Indonesian 
Confrontation officially ended in mid-1966, some began to look at the MSSU as 
irrelevant and wanted to disband it. Major Borhan, the MSSU commander, received a 
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letter from headquarters ordering him to prepare to disband the MSSU. He went to the 
ministry of defense and appealed for the existence of the MSSU. While the decision-
makers were still undecided about the future, MSSU troopers were involved in a mission 
that elevated their status. Just before Malaysia’s tenth independence day, on August 31, 
1967, Trooper Maamor, one member of a six-man team, heroically fought and killed 
seven of Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara (PARAKU) guerrillas.209 This news 
immediately changed the perception of the MSSU and the idea to disband it vanished 
under the carpet in the ministry of defense. MMSU continued and became a permanent 
unit in the Malaysian army’s order of battle.210  
There were many operations accomplished by the MSSU before the 
Second Emergency. Among them was Operation Apas Balong, in April 1966, near Slim 
Pompon, Tawau, Sabah, and Operation Sabir (Sapu Bersih) in the jungle near Tebedu, in 
Serian, Sarawak. In the earlier event, MSSU carried out a search-and-destroy mission on 
a group of TKNU guerrillas led by Nordin from the CCO and Lieutenant Leous Legos. 
After a few days of tracking the guerrillas, they found various traces of TKNU activities 
in that area. The found the enemy resting in a palm oil worker’s hut and attacked them. A 
few days later, the enemy surrendered to the Tawau police due to serious injuries from 
the previous engagement. They agreed to show their training camp, which could 
accommodate twelve guerrillas, and their latest weapons, FAL FN 7.62mm rifles.211 
Operation Sabir (Sapu Bersih) was the first combined operation with the TNI after the 
Confrontation to eliminate the remnants of the 3rd Regiment, People of Sarawak 
Guerrillas (PGRS). The No. 2 Troops, a MSSU detachment led by Captain Hussin 
Awang Senik, was tasked to capture or kill Lai Pak Kah, the leaders of the PGRS, his 
deputy Loo Kong, and others in that organization. From January 19 until January 25, 
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1968, the No. 2 Troop managed to kill another eight PGRS guerrillas from several 
ambushes. During this operation, the MSSU began a trial with new camouflage 
uniforms.212  
In 1968, the MSSU moved from Johor to Sebatang Karah Camp, in Port 
Dickson. A year later, it moved again to Sungai Udang Camp, which became the “home 
of the green beret.” In 1970, the MSSU was rebranded with a more Malaysian title, as 1 
Rejimen Gerak Khas Malaysia (RGKM), and further expanded after the race riots of May 
13, 1969. During this restructuring process, in July 1972, RGKM invited a platoon of 
Indonesian special forces (Kopassandha) for three months of crosstraining on long-range 
patrols. Integration was easy because of their similar languages and most of the MSSU 
had trained in Batu Djajar, Indonesia, earlier. They also conducted the first combined 
operation to search and destroy the remnants of PARAKU guerrillas on the Sarawak 
frontier, called Operation Rajawali.213 
The RGKM continued to contribute its expertise in hunting down CTs in 
the Peninsula and the remnants of PARAKU guerrillas in the Sarawak jungles, with other 
security forces, until the end of the Second Emergency. Among major offensives that 
involved the RGKM were operations Gurun, Cengkau, Kelong Empat, Gubir, Selamat 
Sawaddee, Kijang, Asli, Indera and Gonzales. Although some troopers were killed in 
action and many were wounded, the RGKM were able to keep constant pressure on the 
CTs to split into smaller groups and be on the run most of the time. With the 
determination and the courage of the troopers of the RGKM: the CTs begun to reduce 
their activities and eventually decided to surrender to the security forces.  
                                                 
212 Ridzuan, Rejimen, 74–75. 
213 Ken Con Boy, Kopassus: Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2003), 
192.  
 85 
b. Pasukan Khas Laut (PASKAL)  
 
Figure 12.  PASKAL’s pioneers, circa November 1978. 
The PASKAL, or Naval Special Forces, belongs to the Royal Malaysian 
Navy. This maritime special force was trained by officers from the UK’s Special Boat 
Service (SBS) in the mid-1960s. In 1977, while still in Kapal Diraja Malaya (HMS or KD 
Malaya) in the Woodlands, Singapore, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) saw a need to 
maintain safety and security for all its bases and assets. The first cohorts of officers were 
sent to locations such as the Special Warfare Training Centre (SWTC) located at Sg 
Udang Camp, Melaka, or for Marine training in Surabaya, Indonesia, and with Royal 
Marine commandos in the UK. The Unit Komando TLDM was under the administration 
of the RMN Security Regiment (PORTELA). On 1 October 1982, the Royal Malaysian 
Navy (RMN) formed the Pasukan Khas Laut (PASKAL).  
The original cadre was trained by KOPASKA, the Indonesian Navy 
Combat Diver unit. PASKAL then consisted of eight officers and 87 enlisted men, and 
was officially established after the Malaysian government began to enforce its exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), which extends 200 nautical miles from Malaysia’s coastline. In 
1988, the unit took on responsibility for antipiracy and hostage rescue operations at sea. 
There was a requirement to protect Malaysian offshore stations called “Gugusan 
Semarang Peninjau” or GSP, near the disputed Spratly Islands.214 Since 1983, the 
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PASKAL’s personnel have been located in offshore stations, particularly in Layang-
Layang atoll, as well as in several RMN ships.215 The PASKAL’s new task under the 
National Security Directives (MKN) No. 18 was to prepare and be ready with maritime 
counterterrorism assault teams for the security of national interests offshore, and to 
handle any maritime crisis.216 
c. Pertahanan Darat Udara (HANDAU))  
The history of the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) special forces unit 
begins in the 1970s, after the attack on Sungai Besi Air Base by the CTs. The attackers 
fired a mortar fitted on a small lorry, and a high-explosive round hit a DHC-4 Caribou 
aircraft parked on the base’s dispersal area.217 The HANDAU, an acronym for 
Pertahanan Darat dan Udara (ground and air defense) was the descendant of the RAF 
Regiment (Malaya) during the Emergency, established with a strength of 1,054 all ranks 
(Figure 13). Its depot, which includes the training school, was established at Kuala 
Lumpur in 1947. The first two squadrons were named the 91st and 92nd Rifle Regiments, 
and were declared operational there in January and April 1948, respectively.218 At the 
beginning, the HANDAU’s role was identical to that of the RAF Regiments, which was 
to provide security to all RMAF bases and their valuable assets.219 
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Figure 13.  The RAF Regiment (Malaya) was also employed as infantry against the CTs 
during the Malayan Emergency. 
In late 1967, the RMAF received Nuri Sikorsky S61-A4 helicopters and 
the HANDAU took other roles besides providing force protection teams, becoming the 
air rescue operators’ door gunners and escorting the Nuris flying into forward locations. 
In April 17, 1976, the CTs shot down a Nuri in an operation near Gubir, close to the 
Malaysian–Thai border, where it crashed and killed all the crew and the two air rescue 
operators.220 On November 14, 1989, HANDAU was involved in a rescue operation after 
another Nuri helicopter crashed on the slopes of Gunung Gerah, near the Kelantan–Perak 
border.221 
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2. Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) 
a. 69 Commandos (Very Able Trooper or VAT 69)  
 
Figure 14.  69 Commandos, circa 1970s.222   
The history of the 69 Commandos began when the Tun Dr. Ismail, who 
was minister of home affairs and internal security, proposed the formation of a special 
unit trained in guerrilla warfare to combat communist terrorists. The responsibility for 
organizing this new unit was given to Dato’ Merican Sutan, the police director of public 
security. In their early days, the 69 Commandos were called by various names, such as 
Charlie Force and Special Project Unit (SPU). In 1972, the government officially 
accepted this unit as the Very Able Troopers, or VAT 69, which later took the title of the 
69 Commando (see Figure 14).223 
Initially, the Police Field Force sent 52 men to the MSSU camp in 
Sebatang Karah, near Port Dickson, in the state of Negri Sembilan. Only nine passed, and 
two died in accidents during the course, so this project was halted. Still determined to 
organize a special force on its own, the police turned to the British SAS for assistance. 
On October 1969, 1,600 PPH personnel from several battalions volunteered to join this 
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new unit. After the selection process, only 60 personnel qualified to undergo the basic 
commando training. As the formation of VAT 69 was highly classified, all training was 
conducted at Fort Kemar, deep in the jungle of Perak, where transportation was limited to 
helicopter and small aircraft only. A group of instructors from the British SAS (Special 
Air Service) who were already seasoned from the Malayan Emergency and the 
Indonesian Confrontation supervised the first training. On completion, only thirty-six 
personnel managed to get through. They actually formed the first troop of 69th 
Commando Battalion. The British SAS continued to train the 69 until 1976. In 1977, the 
New Zealand SAS was involved in training more commandos. As a result, three new 
squadrons were born. The NZ SAS also conducted a special course to train VAT 69’s 
own instructors.224 
The first troop of 69 Commandos started its initial operations in the 1970s 
and successfully deployed against the CTs. VAT 69 frequently conducted special 
operations to support the Special Branch in combating subversive organizations and 
terrorist activities. They also supported other Malaysian SOF units and other 
conventional forces in various joint operations. The 69 Commandos killed many CTs and 
seized numerous weapons, equipment, documents, and food dumps. Their reputation 
spread not only among security forces, but also to their adversaries, the CTs. The 
terrorists, when possible, avoided the 69’s commandos, who also were known as the lok 
kow (“69” in Chinese dialect). As a result, the Royal Malaysian Police expanded the unit 
and gave it its own employment warrant. VAT 69 was established, structured, and trained 
identically to the SAS, to execute special security services such as long-range patrols for 
collecting enemy information and identifying target and enemy locations in the deep 
jungle or rural areas. They also executed offensive operations using special weapons, 
equipment, and tactics against the enemy.  
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b. Unit Tindakan Khas (UTK) 
Unit Tindakan Khas (UTK) or the Special Action Unit, is the second 
special forces unit belonging to the RMP along with VAT 69 (see Figure 15). The UTK 
was formed after the Japanese Red Army (JRA) or Nihon Sekigun, laid siege to the U.S. 
consulate office and took 52 civilians hostage on August 4, 1975. Five JRA terrorists held 
members of the U.S. consulate and the Swedish chargé d’affaires as hostages within the 
American Insurance Agency building, which housed several embassies in Kuala 
Lumpur.225 Since then, UTK troopers have been trained and equipped primarily as a 
special weapons and tactics (SWAT)-style unit, but with a difference, in that UTK 
operatives operate mostly in plain clothes and also perform undercover missions that are 
categorized as high risk and critical situations.226 
 
Figure 15.  UTK ready for action, circa 1990s.227 
The UTK has approximately 300 members. The unit operates to execute 
special security services such as antiterrorism and counterterrorism in Malaysian urban 
areas, supporting the police on missions such as dealing with armed criminals and 
                                                 
225 Crime and Investigation Network, “KL Under siege,” History Channel Asia, citvasia.com, 
http://stardefense.blogspot.com/2012/05/pasukan-gerakan-khas-pgk.html; 
http://discoverelitepolice.com/2012/03/pasukan-gerakan-khas-pgk/. 
226 Polis Di Raja Malaysia, Laporan Tahunan PDRM 2009 (Bukit Aman: PDRM, 2009), 136.  
227Tuah, “Malaysian Police UTK,” Militaryphoto.net, Nov. 2006, 
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?108150-Malaysian-Armed-Forces-Pictures (under 
Malaysian Armed Forces pictures). 
 91 
escorting and protecting top leaders and VIPs.228 On October 1985, the UTK was 
involved in a hostage rescue operation involving two doctors who were held by a group 
of six armed convicts led by Jimmy Chua, a notorious criminal and former police 
inspector from Singapore, in Pudu jail, in Kuala Lumpur. After a six-day negotiation, the 
hostages were rescued, while the gang was recaptured.229  
D. LINE OF DEVELOPMENT  
1. Training 
In early 1965, only 15 volunteers qualified for the first batch of the Basic 
Commando Cadre course. They underwent training for six weeks, three phases of training 
at Mount Austin Estate, just outside of the Far East Land Forces Training Center, Ulu 
Tiram, Johor. First was the land phase, where the cadres did physical training and various 
obstacle courses such as a scramble and Tarzan course, and junam maut (death plunge), 
to boost their confidence and espirit de corps. The cadres also enhanced their various 
skills in unarmed combat and handling light and heavy weapons. Second was the 
maritime phase. All cadres had to be able to paddle the assault boat and canoe, perform 
river crossings, conduct insertions from the sea, attack on enemy’s camp, and execute 
extraction. They also learned to survive in the mangrove jungles and swamps. The third 
phase was the dark water phase, where they were divided into smaller groups to plan, 
infiltrate, sabotage, and exfiltrate without being discovered by the enemy. These training 
exercises encompassed their mission to conduct surprise attacks on the small Tentera 
National Indonesia (TNI) bases close to the Peninsular Malaysian coast, such as in Riau 
and Sumatera. As the Confrontation continued, another six similar courses were 
conducted in 1965. Major Abu Hassan, the first MSSU commanding officer primary, was 
tasked to continue recruiting and training the new cadres. Three more groups were 
organized and trained by the officers and trooper from the first group, who were trained 
by the Royal Marine Commandos. The MSSU began sending men for advanced training 
in order to prepare the commandos for future operations such as parachute training, 
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diving, sniping, and other courses in Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. Between 
1970 and 1973, a contingent of 400 commandos from 1 RGKM went to Batu Djajar, in 
Surabaya, for the Indonesian commando and basic parajump course.230  The 
Confrontation came to an end in 1966. 
For the Police Commandos 69, in October 1969, only 60 personnel were qualified 
after the selection process to undergo basic commando training at Fort Kemar, located 
deep in the jungle of Perak, where transportation was limited to helicopters and small 
aircraft. A group of instructors from British SAS supervised the first training. From the 
first day, these cadres were told to think and apply guerrilla tactics like the CTs. On 
completion, only thirty personnel managed to get through the grueling training and were 
allowed to wear the sand-brown beret, similar to the British SAS. They formed the first 
troop of the 69th Commando Squadron. In 1977, the New Zealand SAS was involved in 
training another three new squadrons and conducted a special course to train VAT 69’s 
own instructors.231 In 1978, 69 Commandos began to qualify its troopers in parachute 
jumping. About 65 men went for airborne training at Hua Hin, the Thailand Police 
Parajump School. Subsequently, some of them continued with the free-fall parachuting 
course in PULPAK.  69 Commandos also invited instructors from New Zealand for this 
purpose.232 The 69 Commando expansion program was completed in 1980, when it had 
four fully equipped special forces squadrons and its own logistics unit. Since its 
establishment, VAT 69 HQ and their special warfare training center remains in Ulu 
Kinta, Northern Brigade General Operation Forces (PGA) Camp, in Perak. 
2. Equipment  
The MSSU troopers were trained to use light and heavy weapons such as the 
heavy-barrel L1AI self-loading rifle (HBSLR), which weighs more than 4.3kg, and other 
machine guns, such as the Bren light machine gun, mortar, and 84mm Carl Gustav 
recoilless antitank rifles. MSSU’s latest personal weapon at the time was the 7.62mm 
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L1A1 SLR, but some were still using the Lee-Enfield MK1 rifles, M1 carbine and 
Sterling L2 (A3) Mark 4 machine gun. At the beginning, MSSU equipment was not much 
different from that of a conventional infantry battalion. Some exceptional equipment they 
used was the two-man Klepper kayak (known as a folboat during World War II), and 
speedboats for seaborne infiltration. Uniforms and jungle boots were important in the 
jungle environments and Malaysian climate. As a new unit, the MSSU also made a trial 
of new camouflage uniforms during Operation Sabir in 1968, in Tebedu, Sarawak.233 The 
MSSU began to receive their new M16A1 rifles in late 1969.   
The 69 Commandos were issued 7.62mm FN-FAL rifles, Barrettas, and the G33. 
Some used M16A1 rifles, as these were in wide use by the Americans in the Vietnam 
War. Radio communications with base and aircraft and helicopter improved. According 
to one of the former 69 troopers, some of the signal units used to improvise Claymore 
mine cables as their radio antennas, since it was functional and quick to set up and 
disassemble during patrols. 
3. People 
Many young soldiers and policemen showed their interest in these new special 
units that their organizations wanted to establish. Nevertheless, due to the high standard 
of physical and mental requirements, only few volunteers passed the first selection 
phase.234 In late 1964, some 1,000 volunteers from various units and backgrounds turned 
out for the initial MSSU selection and assessment process. Only 350 passed and 
continued to the second assessment phase in Sungai Besi, Kuala Lumpur. From that, only 
fifteen were qualified for the initial commando cadres training in Ulu Tiram, Johor. 
Among them were five officers and ten enlisted. The MSSU initial instructors were from 
the forty British Royal Marine Commandos led by Lieutenant Colonel Tiffin from Burma 
Camp, Ulu Tiram, Johor. Major Bacons was the chief instructor, and four others assisted 
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him. Only twelve passed the training, among them members of the Malay Regiment, 
military police, armor, and engineers.235  
 For the Police 69 Commandos, in October 1969, bigger crowds applied than for 
the MSSU in 1965, with about 1,600 policemen from various ranks and units, but they 
came mainly from several field force battalions. After the initial selection process, only 
60 personnel were qualified to undergo basic commando training. At the end, thirty-six 
personnel managed to get through the grueling training in the deep jungles at Fort Kemar, 
one of the jungle forts on the Perak frontier. Later, the New Zealand SAS that had 
replaced the British SAS also conducted a special course to train VAT 69’s own 
instructors.236  
4. Information  
At the peak of the Second Emergency, the RGKM and the Army Intelligence 
Corps formed the Special Combat Intelligence Team or Rejimen Khas Perisikan Tempur 
(RKPT). The RKPT had a close cooperation with the Special Branch, not only gathering 
enemy intelligence but able to kill or capture enemy high value targets. This move further 
increased the efficiency of the army in combating the CTs, and many operations were 
conducted by RKPT troopers. They were able to react quickly and covertly in suspected 
enemy locations, either to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance or lay an ambush. The 
69 Commandos also operated to support, or had been supported by, the Special Branch. 
Based on the information given them, the troopers conducted operations, and this 
intelligence cycle continued until the CPM and MRLA organizational structure was fully 
known. The Special Branch was now more knowledgeable and experienced and 
sufficiently manned by professional intelligence officers to face the Indonesian 
Confrontation, the PARAKU armed revolution in Sabah and Sarawak, and the Second 
Emergency.  
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5. Doctrine 
The Army’s MSSU and Police 69 Commandos adopted almost the same doctrine 
and tactics. Due to differences in intentions during their establishment, they had their 
own approaches and focus. The principal task for the MSSU (later RGKM) during the 
Indonesian Confrontation was to carry out seaborne infiltration across the Malacca Straits 
and then sabotage TNI bases. The commandos concentrated their training and tactics on 
small-unit operations and small-scale amphibious assaults by concentrating on small-boat 
and canoe delivery techniques. This later became the nucleus of the MSSU’s Special 
Boat Troops, which closely resembled the British Special Boat Services (SBS).237  
MSSU and the 69 Commandos quickly and effectively became experts in long-
range reconnaissance and surveillance missions and deep-jungle penetration tactics. The 
MSSU continued perfecting these tactics, and all troopers were required to master ronda 
kumpulan kecil, or RKK, which are similar to long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP). 
Most of the time, they laid ambushes at known “rat routes” in the jungles along the 
Sarawak-Kalimantan border and waited many days covertly to observe the TNI regulars 
and their guerrillas. Groups of three or four troopers operated independently to track the 
PARAKU guerrillas and engage them when the right opportunities arose. The difference 
from other units was that the MSSU’s RKK did not use trackers in their team. RKK also 
inspired all infantry units to form their own combat intelligence sections or UCIS, which 
operated in five-man teams. Everyone was either a trained signaler, combat medic, 
demolitions expert, or other specialist. This new unit showed high return-of-
investment.238 
During the Second Emergency, besides performing missions independently, the 
RGKM (previously known as the MSSU) also provided troopers to the Rejimen Khas 
Perisikan Tempur, a new intelligence-cum-strike force unit for the army. The RKPT not 
only gathered enemy combat intelligence, but was also able to conduct kill-or-capture 
missions on CPM or MRLA high-value targets. As told by a former trooper of this unit, 
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they usually operated as five or six troopers, sometimes with the Special Branch 
operatives. One of the RKPT operations was Operation Murai on August 6, 1976, near 
Sungai Chetang, in Pahang. The RKPT patrol was disguised as a government land 
surveyor authority. After laying in wait for two days in their ambush position, a rubber 
tapper’s house, they killed two CTs in close-quarter combat.239  Afterwards, the RKPT 
became the 91 Gerup Operasi Perisikan (GOP).240 
RGKM also adopted SAS jungle forts and hearts and minds projects in Operation 
Asli. Troopers from RGKM were tasked to organize the aborigine’s resettlement program 
or Rancangan Penempatan Semula (RPS), and they began with the establishment of a 
forward base in Brinchang, in Pahang, utilizing a former British Army camp. From that 
point, a patrol of five to six men was positioned close to the Orang Asli villages such as 
in Post Terisu, Brooke, Kuala Mensun, Telanok and Bertam.241 
6. Organization 
By late 1965, MSSU strength increased from fifteen to 268 officers and enlisted 
soldiers, representing various races and backgrounds in Malaysia. MSSU was organized 
into three combat troops, one administration troop, and one element of the boat troops. 
On January 1966, just after the separation of Singapore from Malaysia, some thirty-one 
members in the MSSU decided to return to the island of Singapore. Lieutenant Tan Khee 
Peng, Sergeant Ramdan, and Corporal Jeetram Singh led the group and become the 
pioneers of the 1st Singapore Commando Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Tan later became 
the first commanding officer of this new unit. From January 1970, the MSSU became the 
1 Rejimen Gerak Khas Malaysia (1 RGKM), or 1st Malaysian Special Forces Regiment 
and Lieutenant Colonel Borhan Ahmad became the first commanding officer after he 
came back from staff college in India.  
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Under the 3rd Malaysian Plan (1976–1980) in the Malaysia’s New Economy 
Policy, the Special Warfare Training Center was established on August 11, 1976, and a 
year later, 2 RGKM was formed. In 1981, due to the expansion of the armed forces and 
RGKM, Grup Gerak Khas Headquarters was established in Imphal Camp in Kuala 
Lumpur to act as the brigade headquarters for special forces regiments. The headquarters 
group also included combat support units and service support units.242 Once again, a 
decision to rename the organization was made and 1 RGKM became 21 Rejimen 
Komando and 2 RGKM became 22 Rejimen Komando. Two new units were also formed, 
Rejimen 11 Gerak Khas (11 RGK) and Rejimen 12 Gerak Khas (12 RGK), in later years.  
12 RGK was later disbanded because of Malaysian army restructuring and 
modernization, according to Brig. Gen. Ahmad Rodi Zakaria, the 21 GGK 
commander.243 
PASKAL in the 1980s consisted of only seven officers and 78 enlisted sailors. 
They were organized into squadrons, each with several platoons. The smallest unit was 
known as a boat troop, filled with seven commandos. Each boat troop has personnel 
trained in sabotage, underwater demolition, and naval gunfire support. PASKAL also had 
its own combat intelligence team, whose roles include maritime tactical intelligence, 
counter-intelligence, and psychological operations. Other capabilities included maritime 
hostage rescue, antiterrorism; sabotage, special intelligence, close protection, and 
underwater warfare. These skills were developed slowly as their strength increased. 
PASKAL headquarters remains at Lumut Navy Base, Perak, after its relocation from 
Woodlands, Singapore in the early 80s. PASKAL usually has had a small detachment at 
Terumbu Layang-Layang (Swallow Reef) in the disputed areas of the Spratly Islands, 
South China Sea, since 1983.  
From only thirty-six troopers who passed the arduous training in Fort Kemar, the 
69 Commando Unit continued to expand to four fully equipped infantry squadrons with 
their own logistics unit. This expansion program was finally completed in 1980. Since its 
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establishment, 69 Commando Headquarters has been located in the Northern Brigade, 
Police Field Force Camp, in Ulu Kinta, Perak. Once under the direct order of the northern 
brigade commander, VAT 69 is now responsible to the internal security/public order 
director (KDN/KA). The UTK also began to grow, and eventually the unit strength 
reached approximately 300 men. After their basic training in Ulu Kinta, the operators are 
transferred and continue their advanced training at the main base in Kuala Lumpur.  
7. Infrastructure  
At its beginning, the MSSU did not have its own camp. They occupied other 
units’ facilities, the first of which was in Majidee, in Johor Bahru. In December 1966, 
MSSU moved to Segenting Camp, near Port Dickson. In 1968, MSSU moved again to a 
new place at Sebatang Karah, also in Port Dickson.244 Finally, in October 1969, MSSU 
moved to Sungai Udang Camp, and this became the home of the Malaysian Special 
Forces. Aligned with the expansion of the armed forces, Pusat Latihan Peperangan Khas 
(PULPAK), or the Special Warfare Training Centre, was established on 1 August 1976 to 
fulfill the training requirements of MSSU personnel. After the establishment of 
PULPAK, the Second Regiment of Special Services was established on 1 January 1977. 
All three units were based in Sungai Udang, Melaka.  
After moving from Singapore, PASKAL headquarters has remained in Lumut 
Naval Base, in Perak. PASKAL continues to develop various infrastructures, which 
include headquarters, training areas, shooting ranges, and many others. Since 1983, 
PASKAL has positioned men, usually a small detachment at Swallow Reef, in the 
disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. They live in temporary cabins in the 
middle of the ocean to protect the Swallow Reefs from intrusions (see Figure 16).  
                                                 
244 Ridzuan, Rejimen, 49. 
 99 
 
Figure 16.  “The Last Frontier” Semarang Barat Atoll in South China Sea.245  
From 1980 onwards, the Air Force HANDAU began to establish their operational 
units in each air base. The first was the 102nd Squadron at Sungai Besi Air Base. In all, 
eleven HANDAU squadrons were established throughout Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, 
and Sarawak.246 
For the 69 Commandos, battalion headquarters has remained in Ulu Kinta, Perak, 
since its inception. They continue to develop the camp with various facilities to 
accommodate the needs of a special forces unit, which includes administration, 
operations, training facilities, health clinic, family quarters, and so on. Nevertheless, 69 
Commandos, from its inception, has conducted its commando courses in the actual 
environments that they are going to operate in: the dense jungles. For example, in Fort 
Kemar, the cadres get used to climbing and descending hills and navigating through the 
thick jungles most of the time, even to get a water supply. They quickly learn to master 
the jungles and life in that harsh environment. The UTK, since their roles are more 
orientated towards urban environments, have their base in the police headquarters in 
Bukit Aman and police depot in Kuala Lumpur.  
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8. Logistics  
There is little evidence to indicate that SOF units, either from the military or from 
the police, faced problems with logistics during the Second Emergency. Although there 
were issues, because of the nature of the SOF units, which operated in small groups, they 
managed to mitigate their problems in a timely fashion. Light aircraft and helicopters 
were still widely used by SOF units in this conflict, similar to the situation in the 
Malayan Emergency and the Confrontation.247 At the beginning of the Second 
Emergency, the Malaysian Air Force had just received about thirty brand new Nuri 
S61A-4 utility helicopters, which maintained the security forces’ momentum to combat 
the CTs. They not only became essential to operations, but also a morale booster to the 
SOF personnel deep in the jungles. Nuri helicopters served with distinction all over 
Malaysia, although some unfortunately were lost in the line of duty.  
 
Figure 17.   Nuri helicopter partially submerged during resupply mission at Swallow Reef 
(Terumbu Layang-Layang), South China Sea.248  
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As in previous conflicts, many heroes and leaders emerged during the Second 
Emergency. They showed charisma in leading their SOF units in combat missions in the 
jungles and in facing the bureaucracy in the higher echelons of their headquarters. 
Lieutenant Colonel Borhan Ahmad was the first administrator of MSSG, responsible for 
expanding the army RGKM. He began to explore various activities, including sports and 
other army activities for the RGKM to take part in. During his tenure, the RGKM saw 
many developments; for example, the PULPAK began organizing its own basic 
commando training and sending people for parajump courses in Indonesia, New Zealand, 
and Australia. He strengthened ties with Indonesian through combined trainings with 
Rejimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat TNI, or RPKAD, and also sent soldiers for 
Indonesian commando training, in phases from 1971–73.249 He initiated combined 
programs with other countries such as Indonesia, Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and 
the United States, in order to improve knowledge and get new experiences in special 
aspects of SOF operations. Colonel Borhan later rose to become the only chief of 
Malaysian armed forces from the RGK from 1994 to 1995.   
First Admiral Prof. Dr. Hj. Sutardi bin Kasmin was the first commanding officer 
of PASKAL. He was considered the ‘godfather’ of the unit. Adm. Sutardi was keen, 
hardworking, fit and always passionate about learning. He graduated from Britannia 
Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, England in 1971. He qualified not only in the PASKAL 
basic commando course but also the Indonesian Marine Commando course in Surabaya, 
the U.S. Navy SEAL/BUDS course and the riverine warfare course in Vallejo, California, 
U.S.A., in 1977. He presented a new policy for the PASKAL on September 24, 1984, in 
order to improve the administration and management of the PASKAL for his superiors. 
Various other improvements for the PASKAL were achieved during his tenure. His 
doctoral studies included research on integrated coastal zones management.250  
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Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) Mohd Zabri Abdul Hamid was the 
police officer who is most remembered among the members of the 69 Commando and the 
police in general. In July 1970, Zabri joined the 69 Commando and was appointed as a 
commando chief instructor from April to August 1971, to train new cadres for the 3rd 69 
Commando Platoon in Fort Legap, deep in the jungles of Perak. He led many missions, 
showed outstanding warrior spirit and excellent jungle warfare skills that were admired 
by everyone in the unit, including his superiors. Unfortunately, on September 3, 1975, 
ASP Zabri was killed when he stepped on a booby-trap set up by the CTs, while taking 
two wounded men to a helicopter extraction point. He was an inspiration to his men, up 
to the moment of his death.251  
E.  CONCLUSION  
During the Second Emergency, five Malaysian SOF units from all three military 
services and the Malaysian Police were established. The first and the largest was the 
Malaysian Special Service Unit (MSSU). Although it was established at the end of the 
Confrontation, the MSSU managed to participate in some operations against the TNI 
regulars and their proxy guerrillas in Sabah and Sarawak. This was a small digression 
from their objective, to cross the Straits of Malacca and create havoc on the Indonesian 
side. The navy and the air force also saw the importance of and need for their own special 
units, initially using them for force protection of bases and assets and then expanding 
their niche capabilities. Further, the Police took responsibility to counter the CTs 
wholeheartedly by organizing the 69 Commandos and the Special Action Unit, or UTK. 
The 69 Commandos become a legend and an outstanding unit that has been respected not 
only by friends, but by foes.  
All these developments proved that Malaysian soldiers and policemen could be 
trained, organized, and equipped as special forces in irregular warfare. They have 
achieved an exceptional record in counterinsurgency operations. Once again, these units’ 
strengths are based in their people and their leadership. They went through rigorous 
training and adopted doctrine and tactics that helped them repeatedly overcome their 
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enemies. Even though some still have some challenges with equipment, logistics and 
infrastructure, all SOF units punch well above their weight. 
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VI. POST-EMERGENCY (1990–PRESENT) 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter is about the development of Malaysian SOF units after the Second 
Emergency. The scenarios have changed, as Malaysians have been exposed to the greater 
world and connected to various kinds of people, thanks to globalization and the explosion 
of the Internet and computer technology (ICT). Malaysian security forces, especially the 
SOF units, have adapted to the changes and continued to keep Malaysia a peaceful and 
harmonious democratic country, so as to allow continuous progress and development. 
The Malaysian armed forces have extended their services outside Malaysian borders, 
becoming involved with other free countries to support United Nations missions. This 
chapter highlights the development of Malaysian SOF units after the end of the Second 
Emergency, and their capabilities.  
B. POST-EMERGENCY SCENARIO 
On December 2, 1989, the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM) agreed to end its 
armed struggle and signed an official peace treaty with the Malaysian government. This 
agreement influenced the North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP) guerrillas to lay 
down their arms as well, in 1990. Since then, Malaysian security forces have not been 
involved with any major conflicts. For future years, the government of Malaysia is 
concentrating on pursuing economic growth and industrialization. Malaysia has adopted 
an independent, non-aligned foreign policy and practices flexible policies of 
multiculturalism in education and culture.252 Malaysia continued its economic growth in 
the 1990s, successfully diversifying its economy from dependence on exports of raw 
materials to the development of manufacturing, services, and tourism, achieving a multi-
sector economy. Thus, Malaysia must protect its national interests outside its borders to 
enjoy this development.  
Nevertheless, this success comes with diverse new challenges to Malaysian peace 
and security. Immigrants have supplemented the labor force, and Malaysia has gradually 
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become a melting pot for immigrants, mainly from other countries with the potential to 
import with emigrants various illegal activities, organized crime, and even terrorism. 
According to a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment, Malaysia is still a 
source or transit country for humans, drugs, and other contraband trafficking activities. It 
is rated as Tier Two on the watch list, because Malaysia does not fully comply with the 
minimum standards for eliminating trafficking. The same source notes Malaysia is 
making significant efforts to curb these crimes.253 
Malaysia also faces many transnational issues with its neighbors. Although these 
disputes were well handled diplomatically and prevented from escalating into 
confrontation, it is worthwhile to be cautious. Besides issues with the Spratly Islands and 
China’s military action in the South China Sea, Malaysia has reasonable disagreements 
with Singapore. Issues over fresh water deliveries to Singapore, land reclamation, bridge 
construction, and maritime boundaries in the Johor and Singapore Straits are discussed at 
the highest level. Although in 2008, the International Court of Justice awarded 
sovereignty of Pulau Batu Putih to Singapore, it did not rule on maritime regimes, 
boundaries, or disposition of the South Ledge, an islet within that area (see Figure 18). 
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Figure 18.  Pulau Batu Putih in the southern portion of Johor.254  
Land and maritime disputes continue to complicate Malaysian–Indonesian 
relations. Issues continue with Indonesia on areas such as Tanjung Datu and Camar 
Bulan, near Sarawak, and the Ambalat oil block in the Celebes Sea, east of Sabah. In 
addition to these, the spillover of insurgency in southern Thailand, the Philippines’ latent 
claim on the Sabah state, and Mindanao’s insurgency, which inspired illegal cross-border 
activities and kidnapping on the east coast of Sabah, all require action. Piracy, especially 
in the Straits of Malacca, although reduced, is still one of the biggest concerns of the 
Malaysian government.255 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on America, Malaysia did not 
only observe and listen, but has taken proactive measures to combat terrorist groups such 
as Jemmah Islamiah (JI) and Abu Sayaff Group (ASG). The Malaysian government, 
indeed, took many drastic measures to train, equip, and organize dedicated 
counterterrorism forces and intelligence units to face eventualities. Although occasionally 
involved with actual crises, these units conduct numerous joint and combined 
counterterrorism exercises and training to ensure their readiness at the highest level.  
Furthermore, Malaysian security forces are also consistent with the national 
commitment to international peace and stability by actively supporting the efforts of the 
United Nations. The Malaysian armed forces (MAF) and Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) 
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have always maintained a proud tradition of excellence in all United Nations missions, 
and have participated in more than twenty countries since the Congo in 1960. On the 
other hand, Malaysia is also always willing to offer its help in humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief (HADR) efforts.  
In sum, after five decades of conflict, Malaysia is enjoying its economic growth in 
peace and harmony. Without a significant internal threat, Malaysian security forces, 
especially the military, are slowly driving towards becoming more conventional and 
giving less attention to counterinsurgency forces by focusing on external threats, piracy, 
United Nations peacekeeping operations, HADR, and counterterrorism. This is the 
scenario that Malaysian SOF units are facing after the end of the Second Emergency.   
C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
1. Malaysian Armed Forces  
a. Gerup Gerak Khas (GGK) 
After the end of the Second Emergency, the Malaysian army emerged as 
one of the foremost exponents of counterinsurgency in the world.256 The army continued 
expanding, aligning with the economic achievement that Malaysians accomplished in the 
post-conflict era. After several restructurings, GGK grew into approximately a brigade-
size formation, with three operational regiments: 11 RGK, 21 GGK and 22 GGK. GGK 
became the largest SOF unit in the Malaysian order of battle and the strategic forces for 
the chief of army, together with another elite force, the 10 Brigade (Para). Although the 
army in general has moved towards conventional forces, the GGK continuously trains its 
commandos in unconventional warfare, such as guerilla and anti-guerilla warfare, 
subversion, sabotage, espionage, counterterrorism, and their highly regarded jungle 
warfare skills. The commandos are also schooled in direct action operations, special 
reconnaissance, and other skills similar to most Special Forces in the world. The GGK 
saw action overseas under the United Nations’ flag in Cambodia, Somalia, Western 
Sahara, Namibia, Bosnia, Timor Leste, and in the southern Philippines, among others. 
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Currently, it has small contingents in Lebanon, and in the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf 
of Aden, Somalia.   
In this post-conflict era, some of the changes to GGK are the special skills 
and expertise that the GGK troopers acquire, besides being equipped with the latest 
modern equipment. The GGK organizes various small units that have their own niche 
capabilities to suit specific roles, such as the Unit Lawan Keganasan (ULK) or 
counterterrorism unit. All commandos must be trained to face any kind of conflict, and 
are thus required to have multiple skills, according to the 7th GGK commander, Brigadier 
Ahmad Rodi. Rodi also states that the GGK can pursue all these developments because, 
at present, GGK has sufficient commandos and Malaysia is facing a new kind of threat, 
compared to the early days.257 
b. Pasukan Khas Laut (PASKAL ) 
After the end of the Second Emergency, the PASKAL became a dedicated 
force to face any conflict that escalated within the Malaysian EEZ. In 1991, the PASKAL 
received a decree from the Malaysian Security Council, Order No. 18, that mandated it to 
take responsibility, as the maritime counterterrorism force, for conducting missions such 
as anti-piracy, anti-shipping, and anti-oil rig hijacking to protect Malaysian national 
interests.258 Although that is their primary mission, PASKAL commandos are also 
trained to conduct offensive operations in enemy territory, secure beachheads, conduct 
small-scale amphibious operations, perform deep-penetration reconnaissance, conduct in-
harbor sabotage, board ships, clear mines, and conduct many other tasks. For any given 
mission, PASKAL commandos are ready to be deployed to the area of operations via sea, 
land, or air. PASKAL insertions and extraction techniques extended to another stage and 
became stealthier with the arrival of the new Scorpene submarines. In that regard, the 
PASKAL keeps a detachment of its commandos on alert in Telok Sepanggar, Sabah, the 
Malaysian navy’s submarine headquarters. In 2003, the PASKAL restructured its 
organization to enhance its combat capabilities. The unit established a new headquarters 
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and formed a few more operational units in Sabah, Sarawak and in the peninsula, together 
with its special warfare school. In 2005, the PASKAL commissioned the first operational 
unit under this plan, KD Semporna, on the east coast of Sabah, and the second, KD 
Panglima Hitam, in Lumut Naval Base, in April 2009.259   
To maintain PASKAL readiness, many exercises have been conducted, 
whether in-house, joint, or combined, including exercises Naga Emas, Ular Emas, Jerong 
Emas, Wira Laut East, Balance Mint (with U.S. Navy SEALs), Malphi (with the 
Philippines Naval Special Operation Group), and many others. Most of these exercises 
focused on anti-piracy cum counterterrorism training in the narrow waterway of the 
Malacca Straits, in the South China Sea, Sulu Sea, and abroad. All PASKAL elements 
were involved in those exercises and were supported by other Malaysian navy units, the 
National Security Council and other private and government agencies. Such exercises 
were substantiated as important to the nation and to PASKAL readiness.260  
On December 18, 2008, the PASKAL saw its first action in the Gulf of 
Aden, near Somalia, during Operation Fajar. They saved a Chinese ship, Zhenhua 4, the 
same day the United Nations Security Council decided to be more assertive against 
Somali pirates.261 In January 2009, the PASKAL experienced another successful anti-
piracy mission in the same area when its commandos saved an Indian tanker, MT Abul 
Kalam Azad, from pirates.262 On January 20, 2011, PASKAL and other SOF units in the 
joint maritime counterterrorism assault teams successfully thwarted an attempted 
hijacking by Somali pirates on a Malaysian tanker, MT Bunga Laurel, in the Gulf of 
Aden and saved twenty-three crew members. Three pirates were wounded in the 
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shootout, four were captured on board, while eleven managed to flee away.263 Besides 
these operations, PASKAL sent its men to United Nations missions such as UN Malcon 
East in Lebanon, Timor Leste, Mindanao, and many other places.  
c. Pasukan Khas Udara (PASKAU) 
In 1996, the Royal Malaysian Air Force took initiative to reorganize and 
was renamed HANDAU as PASKAU, or Pasukan Khas Udara. Since then, PASKAU has 
continued to build strength, equipment, and infrastructure. It began to focus on special 
missions related to air operations, such as recovering downed aircrew, soldiers, or 
equipment in enemy territory, designating targets for fighter aircraft, force protection, 
counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and intelligence gathering. All PASKAU troopers either 
passed their basic commando qualification course conducted in RMAF Jugra in Selangor 
or at the GGK Special Warfare Training Centre in Malacca. PASKAU ensures it troopers 
are educated in various advanced trainings and equipped with modern equipment to 
execute missions effectively. Twelve years after its inception, PASKAU is capable of 
performing hostage rescue operations in most situations, including counter-hijacking of 
civil and military aircraft.264 A colonel leads the PASKAU Regiment in Jugra, Selangor, 
and commands three functional squadrons: force protection squadron, combat assault 
squadron and combat search and rescue.265 
d. 10 Briged (Para)  
The Army also established an elite airborne unit soon after the Second 
Emergency ended. In November 1988, Malaysia was unable to respond to a request by 
the Maldives government for assistance when Tamil mercenaries entered that country. 
This inability to render timely help prompted Malaysian leaders to form a rapid 
deployment force. On January 1, 1990, the Army established the 10th Brigade as a 
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strategic brigade and placed it under the command of the 11th Strategic Division. A few 
years later, the Army disbanded the division, but left the 10th Brigade intact. Later, a 
decision was made to transform this brigade within four years into an elite airborne 
brigade, and assign it under direct command of the army’s chief. On October 10, 1994, 
Mahathir Mohammad, the fourth prime minister of Malaysia, put the paratrooper’s 
maroon beret on Brigadier General Md. Hashim Hussein, the first 10th Brigade (Para) 
commander.266 Since then, 10th Para, which is composed of volunteers who have been 
selected and vigorously trained for specialized combat operations, has been ready for any 
rapid deployment to any destination, as tasked. At present, 10 Para comprises three elite 
infantry battalions: the 8 Royal Ranger Regiment (Para), which is the pioneer unit in this 
brigade, the 17 Royal Malay Regiment (Para), and the 9 Royal Malay Regiment (Para). 
To ensure operation at the most effective level, these units are supported by the 
participation of the 1st Royal Artillery Regiment (Para) with one Squadron Royal Armor 
Regiment (Para) and ten support units from other the Army branches. 
2. Royal Malaysian Police (RMP)   
a. 69 Commandos (VAT 69)  
The post-conflict era also saw changes in the roles of the Royal Malaysian 
Police commandos. The 69 Commandos experienced the same thing that happened to the 
Malaysia Special Service Unit (MSSU) after the Indonesian Confrontation. Some of the 
police leadership perceived the 69 Commando as irrelevant and urged it be disbanded. In 
1997, the 69 Commando was ordered to combine with the Unit Tindakan Khas (UTK) as 
a group, and it was named Pasukan Gerakan Khas (PGK). The 69 Commando realigned 
its core business into antiterrorism, antipiracy, and closing protection roles, and was 
placed under command and control of the UTK commander in the Bukit Aman police 
headquarters. This created uproar among some quarters in the 69 Commando, but they 
followed their orders. Nevertheless, in 2004, inspector general of police Tan Sri Mohd 
Bakri Omar issued a new directive that although the PGK entity remained, both the 69 
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and the UTK would be referred to by to their original names. On December 18, 2004, the 
men of the 69 Commando were given back their “symbol of honor,” the sand-brown 
beret, in an official ceremony.267 
Besides that, the 69 Commando continues to progress, adapting to new 
scenarios. In addition to emphasizing long-range patrols in jungles and rural areas for 
reconnaissance and surveillance, the 69 Commando has enhanced its counterterrorist 
team (CTT). It also continues to provide assistance to the Special Branch in countering 
subversive organizations and potential insurgents, providing paratroopers, divers, assault 
teams and others special skills during operations and special tasks. They can assist other 
counterterrorist units in urban settings, hostage situations, and search and rescue, which 
demand their specialized, niche capabilities.268  
b. Unit Tindakan Khas (UTK)  
From inception, the UTK role has remain almost the same, except for 
modernization of its equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures. As mentioned 
earlier, on October 20, 1997, the UTK merged with the 69 Commando to form the PGK, 
and the UTK commander was given command of that organization. Although 
amalgamated into one directorate, the UTK and 69 Commando are essentially still two 
separate entities operating in two distinct environments. The size of the UTK is around 
300 personnel and they are consistent in maintaining a strict regime in the selection 
process for its new members. Normally, only ten percent of volunteers complete the basic 
training and are absorbed into the unit.269 The UTK continues to function as it was 
intended to from the beginning, participating in combating dangerous criminals or 
terrorists in cases involving hostages or organized crime, especially in urban areas. They 
also provide personal protection to Malaysian and foreign VIPs who are assessed as high-
risk targets, either in country or abroad.270 In April 1, 2009, the UTK sent an assault team 
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to assist Special Branch agents in recapturing Mas Selamat, a JI militant leader who 
escaped from Whitley Detention Center, the tightest detention center in Singapore. The 
operation was successful—Mas Selamat and two other JI followers were captured. This is 
but one high-profile case accomplished by the UTK.  
c. Unit Gerakan Marin (UNGERIN)  
Unit Gempur Marin (UNGERIN) or the Marine Combat Unit is a Marine 
police special operation’s squad. UNGERIN was formed in March 2006 due to the 
pressing need to suppress pirate attacks, armed robbery, and illegal smuggling alongside 
the coastal area of Malaysia, despite various efforts done to overcome those crimes.271 
UNGERIN is believed to have approximately 100 men, divided into 3 detachments 
assigned to activities such as in Sitiawan, Perak and Lahad Datu, east of Sabah.272  
d. Unit Tindak Cepat (UTC)  
The Unit Tindakan Cepat (UTC), or quick action unit, is another 
Malaysian Police special unit. It was formed in the early 2000s as a quick-response unit 
for the state police, before any of the PGK commandos arrive at the scene. The formation 
of the UTC is to enhance the capabilities of the state’s criminal investigation division 
(CID), in facing dangerous criminals and initial hostage situations. UTK instructors train 
the UTC members in basic urban combat tactics, techniques, and procedures. UTC 
equipment is identical to the UTK’s for the most CQB situations. Since inception, this 
unit’s rapid responses have been effective in capturing many criminals.  
e. The Special Branch (SB) 
The Special Branch exists to this day, and functions under Section 3(3) of 
the Police Act of 1967, with the purpose of collecting security intelligence on any 
internal or external threats to the nation. Besides that, the Special Branch provides 
intelligence and liaison to government agencies and other departments in the RMP. The 
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Special Branch also takes great interest in trans-national organized crime. Many criminal 
cases involving human trafficking and fraudulent travel documents have been 
resolved.273  After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Special Branch was closely involved with 
the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in joint investigations, critical information 
sharing, and the development of new methods to prevent future terrorist attacks. The FBI 
acknowledged that the Malaysian Special Branch provided critical assistance that solved 
the present terrorism puzzle, not only on how the 9/11 hijackers and Al-Qaeda 
networked, but also on cases involving the Jemmaah Islamiah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaff 
Group (ASG).274 
The post-conflict era in Malaysia has seen a drastic change to the Senoi 
Praaq. The Senoi Praaq officially becomes another Police Field Force battalion, and its 
members were retrained in policing roles at the Police Field Force School in Ulu Kinta. 
Senoi Praaq was renamed as the 3rd Battalion General Operation Force (PGA), and the 
18th Battalion General Operation Force has remained in Bidor, Perak, since 1983.275 
3. Malaysian Maritime-Enforcement Agency Special Tasks and Rescue 
Team (MMEA STAR)  
On April 25, 2005, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) 
organized a nucleus team, which consisted of former PASKAU and PASKAL 
commandos, to plan its own elite unit to enhance its capabilities in special operations, 
The responsibility of this unit, the STAR is similar to the Marine Police UNGERIN but 
with additional emphasis on rescue operations. The STAR team plays the role of first 
responder on piracy, terrorism, and robbery threats on the seas surrounding Malaysia 
before arrival of reinforcements from the Royal Malaysian Police and Royal Malaysian 
Navy Special Forces.276 After sending its pioneers to train with PASKAU and PASKAL, 
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STAR began conducting its own commando orientation course. STAR continues to send 
cadres to join the basic PASKAL or PASKAU commando qualification course.   
D. LINE OF DEVELOPMENT  
1. Training  
Principally, all military SOF units and the MMEA STAR train new cadres under 
almost the same approach.277 Any candidate below thirty years old is eligible to volunteer 
for selection and assessment, popularly known as the “warm-up” phase. If they pass, they 
can volunteer to go on to the basic course. The basic commando course is divided into 
several phases: camp, jungle training, swamp training (which includes 130 kilometer 
marches), sea training, and escape and evasion.278 Only those who make it to the end and 
are recommended by the assessors pass the selection course and receive their coveted 
beret and commando dagger. In addition to that, as a maritime special forces unit, 
PASKAL emphasizes water confidence and swimming more than other units do. 
PASKAL cadres have to complete basic airborne courses, usually in PULPAK in Sungai 
Udang GGK Camp, Malacca, after which the candidates return to Lumut and continue 
with the basic ship-diving course in KD Duyong, Lumut.279 Normally, only a third of the 
student pass the basic course, and those who pass the grueling training will continue to 
withstand the advanced first-class training.  
For the 69 Commando, once a year, police officers and men from all formations 
gather at Northern Brigade Camp at Ulu Kinta, the home of the 69 Commando, in the 
state of Perak, for the commando selection process. All volunteers are required to have 
passed a medical checkup, shown themselves suitable and fit to work in small groups, 
passed a 100-meter swimming test and an IQ test. VAT 69 basic commando training is 
divided into three phases. In the first phase, trainees spend most of their time mastering 
patrol techniques. In the second phase, trainees learn skills and lessons such as tracking, 
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communication, field medicine, and explosives. This also involves making do-it-yourself 
booby traps and explosive and demolition techniques. The third is the final phase and is 
focused on special operations, where the trainees are tested in all aspects of the skills and 
lessons they have learned. At this time, special attention is given to trainees who have the 
potential to be a patrol leader. All successful commandos will have the chance to master 
skills and expertise such as guerrilla/jungle warfare, sniper marksmanship, search and 
rescue, parachuting, CQB, unarmed combat, communications, combat diving, medicine, 
close protection, and boat handling. VAT 69’s decision to adopt the cross-training policy 
has made all its personnel have more than one skill and expertise.280  
2. Equipment  
All the armed forces’ SOF units are equipped with up-to-date weapons systems. 
Nevertheless, the government of Malaysia’s trend of reducing its annual defense budget 
could affect SOF future requirements. Although SOF units have to face red tape, most of 
the operational equipment they require is received. For example, in 2010, the Malaysian 
army received anti-tank and man-portable air-defense systems from Pakistan to equip the 
GGK. The contract has an overall value of some USD $21.3 million for a quantity of 
Baktar Shikan anti-tank missile weapon systems and Anza Mk II shoulder-launched, low-
altitude, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.281 In the Ninth Malaysian Plan 2006–
2010, the Malaysian government gave the army a special allocation of USD 131.6 million 
for the purchase of tactical communications equipment for border posts along the 
Malaysian–Thai border.282 
Like other special forces units, PASKAL requires kit specifically designed for 
underwater combat weapons and equipment such as submachine guns and ammunition. 
PASKAL is expecting to receive a two-man, chariot-type Subsurface Delivery Vehicle 
subskimmer for use with Scorpene submarines. Besides that, PASKAL is looking for 
                                                 
280SOC, “VAT 69/UTK: History,” SOC.Com Blog, (entry n.d.) 
http://www.specialoperations.com/Foreign/Malaysia/VAT69/History.htm. 
281 “Royal Malaysian Army special forces to receive SAM systems,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 
7, 2002. 
282 “Malaysian army to be equipped with tactical comms,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 31, 2005.  
 118 
small, fast-attack craft.283 In 2010, PASKAL procured new HK416 assault rifles.284 As 
the newest of the military SOF units, some observers say that PASKAU has the latest 
weapons and equipment in their inventory, such as laser designators and secure 
communications systems. Nevertheless, as the new EC 725 helicopters come into service 
by 2013, PASKAU is still lacking in rescue equipment, rescue swimsuits, and other 
items.  
The Royal Malaysian Police PGK is armed with a variety of first-class weapons 
and combat support equipment commonly used for counterterrorism and jungle 
operations. Almost equal to the military SOF units, the PGK is equipped with a number 
of specialized vehicles to accomplish its tasks such as armored personnel carriers, mobile 
patrol vehicles, various assault vehicles for urban and jungle terrain, and a modified rapid 
intervention vehicle for vehicular assault. The police inventory includes rigid-hulled, 
inflatable boats (RHIBs), jet skies, and subskimmers for maritime operations. The PGK 
commandos have the luxury in airborne operations, due to the availability and suitability 
of the Police Air Wing’s platforms for special operations. They also have motorized 
paragliders if required for airborne insertion. Some of the SOF equipment was sponsored 
under certain bilateral programs with other governments, especially countries such as the 
United States of America and Japan. 
3. People 
All SOF units strongly emphasize quality of personnel. Each unit has its own 
strict regime of selection and assessment. Even though it is tough, there are soldiers or 
police personnel who make it through the selection process and pass the basic commando 
courses. Generally, all SOF units are at full strength, adequately trained, highly 
motivated, and ever ready to conduct any mission peculiar to its assigned roles. 
According to Brigadier General Datuk Ahmad Rodi Zakaria, the 7th 21 GGK commander, 
RGKM strength is sufficient. At the same time, it focuses on recruiting only high-quality 
personnel who possess the right attitude. The RGKM wants people who are professional, 
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knowledgeable, and have the appropriate skills to handle the modern and sophisticated 
equipment the RGKM procures.  
About 40 to 50 percent of the soldiers and policemen pass the basic commando 
course and qualify to join the Malaysian Special Forces. These units do not compromise 
their training standards. Only the determined and motivated will get through the tough 
and arduous training to become a special forces trooper. One of the reasons people fail in 
the selection and assessment phase may be lack of information about the training 
program and the role of the special forces. Candidates may not have made adequate 
physical and mental preparation prior to the course. Though it is demanding, Ahmad 
Rodi is proud to see many young men who are motivated to face the challenges of 
becoming a commando warrior.285 However, due to compulsory service retirement, many 
troopers with COIN experience are transitioning back into civilian life. Valuable 
experience will leave with them, even though there is a comprehensive program to record 
and maintain it.  
4. Information 
In this post-conflict era, the Malaysian security forces, whether the military or the 
police, give great emphasis to intelligence. Although the legacies from previous conflicts 
still remain strong within the organizations, some changes have been made to ensure 
intelligence operations are relevant and aligned with current and future threats. Even 
before the 9/11 attack, the Special Branch remained active in monitoring any subversive 
or potentially terrorist activity. According to the police annual report of 2010, the Special 
Branch is still the primary organization that collects security intelligence related to 
“subversive and extremist individuals or organizations.”286  
The Army, to which the Intelligence Corps belongs, also identifies and describes 
threats and requirements. While keeping a close relationship with the Police Special 
Branch, the Army reformed its two famous intelligence units during the Second 
Emergency. The first reform was to the 91 Rejimen Khas Perisikan Tempur (RKPT) 
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which became the 91 Grup Operasi Perisikan (GOP). This unit is a special combat unit in 
the Army Intelligence Corps, placed under the operational control of the Director of 
Defense Intelligence (DDI) to gather combat intelligence and destroy the enemy through 
special operations. The second is the 92 Anggota Tentera Cawangan Khas (ATCK). The 
92 ATCK is responsible for acquiring, processing, and disseminating intelligence 
information related to security operations within the state for the use of security forces, 
and it is a link with the Police Special Branch.287  Other intelligence units are Malaysia’s 
external intelligence organization, controlled by the Department of the Prime Minister, 
and the 2,000-strong joint service military intelligence corps under the Ministry of 
Defense.288 
5. Doctrine 
After the Second Emergency ended, the Malaysian Army emerged as one of the 
foremost proponents of COIN in the world. As time passed, however, some observers 
believed the army’s experience in counterinsurgency somewhat irrelevant to the current 
defense of the Malaysian national interests in the South China Sea. The army as a whole 
has shown a doctrinal shift towards conventional warfare in the post-conflict era and is 
reshaping into a more mobile force emphasizing combined arms operations. The air 
force’s close air support and COIN role are slowly disappeared from the RMAF 
profile.289 This wind of change is also felt by the Police 69 Commando.  
Nonetheless, nonconventional operations have not been neglected, as each 
infantry battalion and some elements from the GGK still conduct deep-jungle patrols 
along the Malaysian border in the peninsula, in Sabah and Sarawak. In addition to that, 
the GGK have been focused on training for asymmetrical threats to prepare for potential 
terrorist attacks inside Malaysia. The army designated the 11 RGK as the front-line unit 
for dealing with asymmetrical threats, supported by other commando regiments. The 69 
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http://army.mod.gov.my/krd/index.php/pasukan-kor-risik-diraja/91-gop: Tentera Darat Malaysia, 92 
Angota Tentera Cawangan Khas, http://army.mod.gov.my/krd/index.php/pasukan-kor-risik-diraja/92-atck.  
288 “Malaysian Intelligences Agencies,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, 
Octorber 16, 2012. 
289 Jane’s, “Malaysia-Air Force,” in Jane’s World Air Forces, November 1, 2012. 
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Commando and the UTK also sharpen their men continually to equip them in the full 
spectrum of counterterrorism, and the 10 Brigade Para is always in immediate readiness 
to assist. Besides this doctrinal shift, Malaysian security forces, especially the army, also 
conduct training for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations.  
6. Organization 
The army has the biggest contingent of special units among the Malaysian 
security forces. The 21 GGK is the headquarters, with operational command to 
coordinate and integrate the three GGK regiments’ activities. Highest in the hierarchy is 
the GGK commander, a brigadier general. GGK HQ is divided into three departments: 
administration/logistics, counterterrorism, and operations. Units under the 21 GGK HQ 
are the 21 Commando and 22 Commando, which consist of about 2,000 men configured 
for commando operations and forced-entry assaults. Another unit is the 11 RGK, which is 
small compared to the previous two, but specializes, with other special forces in the art of 
sabotage, hostage rescue team (HRTs), and counter-revolutionary warfare (CRW). Only 
those who have served more than eight years in the commando regiments are invited to 
undergo selection to join 11 RGK. This is the primary counterterrorism unit (Unit Lawan 
Keganasan, or ULK) under the GGK. Although similar to the Police UTK, the ULK 
teams have their own high points, because members come from various specialties and 
experiences before joining the unit.290 The last is PULPAK, or the Special Warfare 
Training Center (SWTC), located in Sungai Udang, Malacca. It was established on 
August 1, 1976, to provide basic commando courses and various specialized courses, 
generally divided into four categories (parachute, rigger, unconventional warfare, and 
diving) for all military and paramilitary personnel, in accordance with current needs.  
In 2009, PASKAL restructured its organization and received a new headquarters 
at RMN Naval Base Lumut, Perak. Since then, PASKAL’s commander is a navy captain 
or equivalent to a colonel. He coordinates and commands two operational units, based on 
their geographical locations, Unit 1 KD Panglima Hitam and Unit 2 KD Sri Semporna. 
Each operational unit has its own assault team, combat boats cell, and combat 
                                                 
290 “ULK cekap tangani keganasan,” Utusan Malaysia, August 2, 2003.  
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intelligence cell. Assault teams are divided into four squadrons, which are assigned roles 
that are more specific and consist of a mixture of specialists. PASKAL strength is 
believed to be around a thousand personnel, excluding its combat-support elements. The 
air force’s PASKAU’s headquarters is located in Jugra, Selangor, and commanded by a 
colonel. There are three squadrons, based on functions: combat assault, combat rescue, 
and force protection.291 Its strength is about 400 to 500 troopers, some of them attached 
to four helicopter squadrons at various air bases. 
There has been no significant change in the Police’s Pasukan Gerakan Khas 
(PGK), except in 1997. The leadership decided to combine the 69 Commando and the 
UTK. This created some dissatisfaction among the commandos. In 2004, the 69 
Commando regained its identity as a separate entity and continued its development. At 
present, the PGK is believed to have around 2,000 personnel, led by a senior assistant 
commissioner of police. PGK headquarters is in Bukit Aman, Kuala Lumpur, and is 
under the Police Internal and Public Security Department. The 69 Commando, since 
inception, have remained in Ulu Kinta, near Ipoh Perak, within the general operations 
force camp, and the UTK’s base is in the middle of the Kuala Lumpur city center.  
The youngest unit of all is the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Special 
Task and Rescue Team (MMEA STAR). The MMEA deputy chief of operation, First 
Admiral Datuk Noor Aziz Yunan, is currently recruiting more STAR members into his 
department and planning to achieve a total strength of 200 men. STAR is still in early 
development and awaiting approval from the Civil Service Department to officially 
establish its organization. Once approved, STAR teams will be based in various MMEA 
bases around the country.292  
7. Infrastructure 
Since its relocation in the 1970s, the GGK has continuously improved and 
modernized its facilities in Sungai Udang, Melaka. After three decades, the location was 
no longer suitable for further development. In June 27, 2005, the GGK officially 
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occupied its latest facility, Camp Iskandar. Located in Mersing, on the east coast of 
Johor, this camp is considered one of the most sophisticated in Southeast Asia. It is a self-
contained camp with various amenities for the commandos’ operational and training 
requirements, and for their families. The camp is located close to the South China Sea, 
surrounded by jungles, swamp, and rivers suitable for various kinds of GGK training.293 
The navy also developed new forward bases for the PASKAL, in various 
locations strategic to timely and effective action. Based on factors such as operational, 
administrative, and logistical requirements, the PASKAL built a forward base in 
Semporna, on the east coast of Sabah, in early 2000.294 PASKAL also reorganized its 
headquarters in Lumut, Perak, to coordinate two of its operational units, KD Panglima 
Hitam, in Lumut, Perak, and KD Sri Semporna, in Sabah.295 Air Force PASKAU also 
developed its own infrastructure in Jugra, Selangor, and became the home of the blue 
beret. This comprehensively designed complex consists of various facilities for PASKAU 
operational, basic, and advanced training. The Police have also continuously upgraded 
their infrastructure for the same purposes as other SOF units. On October 25, 2007, the 
U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force–West (JIATF-W) funded an RM 2 million state-of-
the-art “shooting house” for the 69 Commando in Ulu Kinta.296  
8. Logistics 
What remains permanent in the post-conflict period is the Malaysian geography—
terrain, vegetation, and weather. Most of the terrain in Malaysia is extremely difficult and 
poses many operational problems. SOF units require a highly maneuverable, light, high-
mobility vehicle that provides range and mobility without compromising firepower in 
jungle and rural operations. While most SOF equipment is modern and sophisticated, 
unfortunately, most of it is also fragile and susceptible to many problems under 
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Malaysia’s harsh conditions. The experience and wisdom of the men of the Malaysian 
SOF helps ameliorate the burden presents in performing actual operations under combat 
conditions. Another matter that needs immediate intervention is the controversial 
procurement process for GGK equipment. Recently, for example, the King of Johor 
complained to the Ministry of Defense regarding acquisition problems with GGK’s rapid 
intervention vehicle (RIV).297 
Air transportation remains an issue for two reasons. First, the SOF still relies on 
the conventional air force for its lifts, so the availability of transportation assets for 
operations depends on their prerogative. Second, because SOF unit operations must be 
small and stealthy, many assets are not really suitable or economical for use in some 
applications, to their size and capabilities. Furthermore, the air force is showing more 
interest in conventional and mobile operations, in parallel with the army. This means that 
ground support, such as light and short takeoff and landing and COIN capabilities, is 
slowly becoming extinct in the RMAF profile.298 
9. Leadership 
A few years after the Emergency ended, the Malaysian Armed Forces 
recommended the first GGK officer to become the 10th Malaysian chief of armed forces. 
General Tan Sri Borhan bin Ahmad took the job in early 1994 to 1995. General Borhan 
can be considered the father of the GGK, as he was responsible for expanding the unit, 
and made various forward-looking plans for its development. However, he was the only 
GGK commando that reached that level of command. The GGK should groom more 
officers to rise to the highest levels of the army, especially in this era, where 
unconventional warfare has become a favored approach to overcoming the enemy.  
Two other GGK leaders worth mentioning are Lieutenant General Dato’ Seri 
Zaini Mohamad Said, who retired as the Malaysian Army field commander in 2001, and  
Deputy Superintendent of Police Abdul Razak Mohd Yusoff. Both national heroes were 
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recipients of Malaysia’s highest gallantry award, the Seri Pahlawan Gagah Perkasa (SP) 
medal. They were involved in many operations, but Operation 304/Subuh in July 2000 
was of special note. This operation suppressed the Al-Ma’unah, a sectarian group known 
for their audacious raid on a Malaysian Army Reserve camp, in which they seized 
numerous weapons. The raiders subsequently encamped at Bukit Jenalik, Sauk, in 
Perak.299 Abdul Razak, as well as Zaini, negotiated with the group leader to surrender. 
Each handled the crisis differently. Zaini showed his aggressiveness, while Abdul Razak 
used his knowledge of Islam and theology to persuade Mohd Amin, the Al-Ma’unah 
leader. 
E. CONCLUSION 
After the end of the Second Emergency, Malaysia became peaceful and 
concentrated on industrialization, continuing its economic growth and diversifying its 
economy to become multi-sector—and this requires external resources. Malaysia must 
now secure its national interests in order to enjoy this wonderful development. Economic 
growth comes with challenges. The Malaysian security scenario has changed. There are 
no current counterinsurgency operations, and the Malaysian Armed Forces have shifted 
towards conventional doctrine and prepared their capabilities to align with that decision. 
Although a conventional force is the objective, all the armed services, including the 
Police, continue to develop SOF capabilities. All units are expanding and the majority 
has either built or is upgrading various facilities to accommodate present operational, 
training, administrative, logistics, and other requirements so that they will remain 
relevant and effective to accomplish any task. Most capabilities are well maintained. 
However, logistics still needs to be improved, especially regarding equipment 
procurement and air transportation.  
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F. AN ANALYSIS OF THE LINE OF DEVELOPMENT ACROSS TIME, 
FROM WWII–PRESENT 
For all SOF units in Malaysia from World War II to the present, a brief analysis 
of their line of development is illustrated in Table 2. The traffic light colors help 
categorize and highlight matters according to quality: green is good, yellow is 
satisfactory, and red indicates problems. 
One can see that all SOF units emphasize training and selection, which is 
important for all SOF units that conduct special missions. During World War II, 
volunteers were trained to conduct guerrilla war and sabotage. However, once deployed, 
they were ordered to gather intelligence, rather than carry out sabotage against Japanese 
forces. Many Force 136 operatives gave feedback that they were not trained for their 
missions. At present, although some primary training of Malaysian SOF units has 
improved significantly, their essence is still similar to that provided for the pioneers of 
the previous era.  
Problems with equipment suitability under harsh weather and tropical jungle 
environments still present a dilemma. Aside from suitability issues, all SOF units are well 
equipped with modern and sophisticated weapon systems and other equipment that helps 
them conduct missions more effectively and improve lethality in most combat scenarios. 
The shift of the Malaysian defense policy towards a conventional force did not affect 
SOF equipment, since it could be utilized in many ways and purposes. Since 9/11, SOF 
units specializing in counterterrorism have received more weapons and equipment for 
that mission.  
Across time, one of the factors that made the SOF units excel in their roles was 
their people. The same ‘SOF truth’ applied to the SOF units in Malaysia -- that humans 
are more important than hardware, and quality is better than quantity. All SOF operators 
showed an understanding performance in each conflict. Although those units faced with 
many difficulties and bureaucracies with various parties, units managed to gather many 
dedicated and reliable men to serve in the units. Nonetheless, at present, many 
experienced operators are leaving their units due to compulsory retirement ages, and this 
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could be avoided. SOF units, with their new generation of operators, are working hard to 
mitigate this issue.  
Based on excellent experience during both Emergencies, Malaysian intelligence 
agencies remain relevant and resilient with the changing threats’ scenario. Police Special 
Branch still remains active as one of the principal sources of information for the security 
forces and government. Others intelligence units work hand-in-hand to provide better 
situational awareness to policymakers and others.  
During WWII, Force 136 was organized to prepare for Operation Zipper. While 
gathering intelligence, they were ordered to conduct guerrilla war, sabotage, and 
espionage missions against the Japanese forces. The essence of Force 136 doctrine 
continued during the Emergency—that is, small groups operating in the deep jungles— 
however, their enemy was no longer a regular force, but MRLA guerrillas. Both 
antagonists used the same approach to outperform each other. The SOF units showed 
their superiority and continued to pressure and restrict the enemy’s freedom of 
movement, in addition to winning the people’s hearts and minds. At present, although the 
army has shifted doctrinally towards a conventional force, SOF units have adjusted to the 
changes well, since SOF is relevant in any scenario. They have increased joint and 
combined operations and exercises in order to evaluate their tactics, techniques, and 
procedures.  
Malaysian SOF units are better organized than in the previous era. Most of the 
units are positioned according to perceived threats and geographical locations. Although 
they remain small in size, all units are at optimum strength in order to focus on various 
niche capabilities and current roles and requirements. After 9/11, the Malaysian SOF also 
strengthened their counterterrorism special task forces for any eventuality. Besides being 
well organized, Malaysian SOF units are also well funded, which allows them to upgrade 
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From Table 2, it is evident that logistical support, although satisfactory during the 
Confrontation and in the Second Emergency, remains a serious issue, especially for SOF 
leaders, regarding maritime or air transport. Experience from previous conflicts showed 
that these modes of transportations are vital to the success of operations, especially to 
SOF units that operate away from their bases, such as in deep jungles. Dedicated 
helicopters and light STOL (short takeoff and landing) aircraft capabilities will enhance 
SOF capabilities. Another issue that should be improved is the procurement and 
acquisition process, which is complex and can be manipulated by pressure groups such as 
private companies and others. SOF units should be given better ways to equip themselves 
in order to be more efficient and lethal without compromising safety and mission success.  
Last in this brief analysis of line of development is the leadership. One can see the 
importance of leaders to guide the organization and to carry out its missions successfully. 
Their experience in special operations could help other leaders and policymakers make 
decisions or policy in the future. The SOF needs to train and prepare its officers, from the 
beginning of their tour in SOF units, to climb to the highest hierarchies in the military so 
that they can advise others regarding SOF capabilities, limitations, and risks. To do that, 
SOF units must ensure all its men are well-educated, unorthodox thinkers who excel in 
all respects.  
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VII. MALAYSIAN SOF AND ITS FUTURE  
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter focuses on the Malaysian SOF in general—its future development 
and requirements. Besides fighting internal threats, as in both Emergencies, the SOF 
mission could be one of the options for Malaysia in dealing with external threats such as 
the Indonesian Confrontation in Borneo. Malaysian security may be uncertain in the 
future. What will come is still unknown, but Malaysia cannot just face the present day, as 
far more complex scenarios may arise. This chapter briefly highlights Malaysia’s foreign 
and defense policy and assesses SOF unit strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats in the light of future requirements and roles aligned with those policies.  
B. MALAYSIAN FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY 
1. Malaysian Foreign Policy 
From Malaysia’s independence in 1957 until today, the vision of Malaysia’s 
foreign policy remains consistent: to safeguard Malaysia’s national interests and 
contribute towards a just and equitable community of nations, as summarized in Figure 
19. This is achieved through upholding Malaysia’s sovereignty and promoting peace, 
fostering friendly relations with foreign countries, and protecting national interests in the 
regional and international arena. Malaysia will continue to consolidate its relationships 
with other countries and international organizations at all levels. Malaysian foreign 
policy’s fundamental principles refer to sovereign equality and mutual respect for 
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in other’s internal affairs, 
peaceful dispute settlement, mutual benefit in relationships, and peaceful coexistence. 
Two other issues are of great concern to Malaysia for world peace:  Terrorism, which 
continues to threaten the lives and property of innocent victims, and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, which raises the prospect of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological warfare. The so-called “constructive intervention” policy advocated by some, 
involving loud criticism, adversarial posturing, and grandstanding, only brings more 
harm than good to the promotion of neighborly relations, according to the Malaysian 
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perspective. Nonetheless, Malaysia does make exceptions to the policy of non-
interference in certain situations, such as genocide and atrocities. Such situations call for 
both humanitarianism and pragmatism by Malaysia, while recognizing the central role of 
the United Nations in resolving these problems.300 
 
Figure 19.  Malaysia’s policies supporting Vision 2020.301 
2. The Malaysian Defense Policy (MDP) 
After the Second Emergency, Malaysia’s defense policy, approved in 1986, was 
reviewed several times. In 2010, the Malaysian Security Council (NSC) approved the 
latest Malaysian defense policy (Dasar Pertahanan Negara). The objective of this policy 
is to protect and defend Malaysia’s national interests, in which sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and economic wellbeing are at the core. Malaysia rejects the use of the threat of 
force to resolve international disputes, and practices peaceful solutions. The 2010 
national defense policy emphasizes defensive practices, in which the principle of defense 
diplomacy through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. This is the central strategy, along 
with regional and global cooperation and full support of the efforts of the United Nations 
                                                 
300 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy,” 
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301 Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia, “The way forward–Vision 2020,” 
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and the international community towards the maintenance of peace and universal security 
(see Figure 19). Major factors that have influenced Malaysia’s defense policy are national 
security, national interest, regional development, overlapping claims, piracy/armed 
robbery, illegal immigrants, the Anglo Military Defense Agreement (AMDA) and the 
Five-Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA). MDP’s principles are self-reliance, total 
defense, defense diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral relations, counterterrorism, and 
supporting the United Nations.302 
C. ANALYSIS OF MALAYSIAN SOF AND ITS FUTURE REQUIREMENTS 
1. Strength and Threats  
To support both policies, the Malaysian Armed Forces since the 90s began to shift 
towards a conventional force and emphasized combined arms operations. The advantage 
of SOF units is their suitability throughout the spectrum of conflict. Malaysian SOF units 
are small and limited, but they are well prepared groups that can deliver a bigger impact 
for Malaysia, in terms of conflict management and even humanitarian assistance, than the 
larger forces. This is due to the nature of these units, composed of select men, highly 
trained and skilled as soldiers. The small size of the Malaysian SOF units does not mean 
they are not a deterrent factor. The Malaysian Armed Forces, especially the GGK, are 
respected by other nations, especially during UN missions and other multinational 
missions, among them Bosnia and Somalia. They represent Malaysia to the world. In 
relation to Malaysia’s foreign policy, a mission that is more favored by the Malaysian 
leadership is peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks, which are likely to be the type of 
mission in the future because the SOF offers cheaper and more useful options.  
Malaysian SOF focus on improving each individual soldier’s potential 
capability.303 To enhance unit capabilities, various exercises such as Ex-Pahlawan, a joint 
CT exercise involving various Special Forces from the three services of MAF, are 
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held.304 Exercise Pasir Pandera, for example, is organized in preparation for any 
abduction of Malaysians or others in eastern Sabah, which is famous for tourism. This 
exercise raises the SOF readiness level for facing any eventuality and builds up civilians’ 
confidence that they can carry out their daily activities safely. From time to time, the 
Malaysian SOF are involved in bilateral exercises with other countries’ SOF — for 
example, the GGK and Komando Pasukan Khusus Indonesia (Kopassus).305 One of the 
objectives is to increase understanding and cooperation between Malaysia and Indonesia 
in SOF counterterrorism missions. Both countries also test their standard operating 
procedures in combined joint task force–counterterrorist (CJTF–CT) exercises on 
handling terrorist threats and managing the impact of a terrorist act, to test the 
interoperability, operations, and the psychology of both countries’ CT units. The 
Malaysian SOF has shown expertise and swiftness in anti-piracy operations, not only 
within Malaysian waters, but extending further into the areas most prone to pirate attacks, 
such as the Gulf of Aden, Somalia. A Malaysian support ship and its joint maritime anti-
piracy task forces foiled a hijacking attempt by Somali pirates. Malaysian special forces 
commandos captured several of them, and were unhurt in the shootout.  
One of the potential threats foreseen in this study to the Malaysian SOF as an 
organization is that of logistics and equipment development. Although Malaysian SOF 
units are mostly equipped with modern and sophisticated equipment, SOF commanders 
should pay attention to the manipulation of their acquisition and procurement. SOF 
commanders must maintain strong stands, based on their professionalism, knowledge and 
expertise in special operations, on the weapons systems or equipment that their units 
require. They must find ways in dealing with pressure from certain quarters among 
contractors and politicians.   
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2. Weakness and Opportunity  
One of the goals of Malaysian SOF units is retaining its expert and experienced 
members. According to the 8th 21 GGK commander, Brigadier General Datuk Ahmad 
Rozi Zakaria, in an interview with the media, SOF units are in dire need of capable 
second echelon personnel to replace existing commandos (who possess invaluable skills 
and honed experience in jungle warfare and COIN) once they reach the mandatory age 
limit. This issue will affect readiness in the future if not addressed soon. Zakaria also said 
that the GGK, like the Police PGK, is having trouble recruiting capable men to be 
groomed into elite soldiers capable of accomplishing any given task or assignment. It is 
easy to recruit any soldier into the GGK training program, but to find those with strong 
willpower and mental resilience is a challenge, as their numbers are scarce. With this 
problem in mind, and in recognition of SOF members’ services, a sum of RM107 million 
has been provided for salary adjustments for the Police, while the remuneration scheme 
and facilities for the PGK and Malaysian Armed Forces were reviewed in 2005. To 
attract and retain PGK personnel and ATM commandos, the government agreed to 
increase, as of 1 January 2005, the monthly incentive payments from RM375 to RM600 
for service between one to ten years, RM750 for eleven to fifteen years, and RM900 for 
sixteen years and up.306 What is still lacking is the chance for SOF officers to climb the 
hierarchy. Only a few SOF officers have reached the top, or come near. It is vital that 
they be represented within the upper echelons to ensure better awareness and accurate 
understanding about special operations, especially among high-level decision makers, 
politicians, and conventional force commanders. 
The Malaysian Armed Forces is continuously improving facilities, infrastructure, 
and capabilities for its commando units so as to be prepared for new threats posed by 
terrorist, militants, and pirates, according to Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak. 
While no longer facing communist terrorism, Malaysia is faced with a new breed of 
terrorist that is difficult to identify in the world, which is fast becoming borderless in 
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many ways.307 Najib told the media that the GGK would be restructured into more 
effective and sharper battle units to face these low-intensity threats, as they cannot be 
dealt with as in conventional warfare. The GGK is specially prepared for any act of 
terrorism, such as the use of militant force in kidnapping, piracy, and the hijacking of 
strategic assets, buildings, or locations. Najib asserted that the use of conventional 
military methods was unsuitable to dealing with such a situation, and the more effective 
way was to deploy a smaller and leaner unit like the well-trained and highly capable 
GGK. As a result, Najib recommends that the GGK be equipped with more and better 
weaponry, training, and members. By ensuring these actions, the GGK will turn into an 
effective unit to deal with specific threats by small groups of hijackers or terrorists. This 
will occur in stages, as the recruitment of more commandos cannot be simply made to 
materialize—the GGK must pick individuals who really have the character to become a 
commando.308 In reference to this reality, King Ibrahim, the sultan of Johor and a colonel 
commandant of the GGK, advises GGK leadership to develop its strengths, including 
combat capabilities, and equip themselves with modern tools to continue to be a 
respected, elite unit. Modernization must be supported by effective logistical support and 
high quality human resources management.309 
In relation to SOF unit manpower, selection and training, in 2008, the army’s 
GGK training techniques came under fire in parliament when a member exposed GGK’s 
shocking training treatment, alleging that the regiment was undertaking humiliating 
training techniques to train its commandos.310 This kind of issue could lead to negative 
perceptions in some quarters of Malaysia. Nevertheless, the majority still believe that 
tough training must be the norm if one wants to become a special forces member, because 
of the roles and responsibilities undertaken by special units. Leadership, either from the 
ruling party or the opposition, should be educated about SOF selection, assessment, 
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training regimes, roles, and capabilities. This familiarization could prevent wrong 
perceptions of the SOF units and make them better understood. Military leadership, 
especially within the SOF community, must educate politicians, foreign policy decision 
makers, and others.   
Malaysian SOF units, while expert in jungle warfare, need to explore techniques, 
tactics, and procedures for fighting in other environments, for example, in urban or built-
up areas, where most of today’s conflicts occur and may be expected to occur in the 
future. Although thick jungles still cover most of Malaysia, built-up areas have been 
increasingly significant in conflicts. Furthermore, urban or built-up areas are likely 
environments for Malaysian SOF missions abroad. Operations in littoral or riverine areas 
that align with the military defense strategy should also be trained for, especially since 
most nations in the Far East, including Malaysia, have maritime borders. In sum, 
Malaysian SOF must extend its expertise to a variety of environments that are relevant to 
regional and global deployment.  
There is also an opportunity to improve SOF logistics, especially concerning 
transportation. SOF units must be delivered forward, close to the area of operations. This 
imperative came up during the Malayan Emergency and the Indonesian Confrontation, 
where Malaysian and British troops were deployed from the Peninsula to Sarawak and 
Sabah. This lesson has been important to the Malaysian Armed Forces and SOF 
commanders need not repeat it. For regional and global special operations, the Malaysian 
Armed Forces should consider acquiring amphibious force support ships, small STOL 
aircraft, and more helicopters capable of close air support, medical evacuation, insertion, 
and extraction. However, with Malaysia’s trend towards reducing its defense budget 
every year, those systems, although necessary to the armed forces in general and SOF in 
particular, might simply remain on the “wish list.”311  
                                                 
311 Bunn Nagara, “Need to spend on defense,” The Sunday Star, March 6, 2011. 
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D. MALAYSIAN SOF AS ONE FOREIGN POLICY OPTION 
 
Figure 20.  Unconventional warfare is one of the choices in foreign policy.312 
As James Kiras, an academic and expert in defense policy says, SOF remains the 
“force of choice” against irregular threats such as terrorist, insurgents, and armed groups 
within a state.313 But what if the threats to Malaysia’s national interest were in Africa or 
the Middle East, or perhaps involved safeguarding the entrance to the Straits of Malacca. 
Due to Malaysia’s foreign policy, which emphasizes peaceful diplomacy and 
nonintervention, the use of SOF abroad is rare and almost impossible. So the question 
arises whether Malaysian policymakers know about and understand another option in 
their pocket—the SOF’s unconventional option—to support Malaysia’s stand. The Straits 
                                                 
312 Abigail T. Linnington, “Unconventional Warfare as a strategic foreign policy tool: The Clinton 
administration in Iraq and Afghanistan,” (master’s thesis, Tufts University, 2004). 
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of Malacca is one example of an unconventional option in a simulated scenario in which 
Malaysian policymakers could utilize SOF capabilities. Malaysia is concerned with the 
security of the Straits of Malacca, which is among its primary national interests. The 
stability of country X is important for Malaysia and ASEAN in various ways. For 
Malaysia, X’s instability could create tensions and insecurity at the entry to the Straits of 
Malacca, such as an increase in armed robbery or piracy within the vicinity of this small 
and chokepoint of the world. Furthermore, thousands of X’s refuges migrating into 
Malaysian would create a crisis in Malaysia. According to the Human Rights Watch 
Organization’s assessment, country X’s internal security, economy, and society remain 
unstable, although some lights for democracy have begun to shine. Thousands of people 
from R ethnicity died in X’s ethnic civil war, and interethnic conflict has escalated. 
Country X’s security forces continue to use forced labor and commit extrajudicial 
killings, sexual violence, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, among other abuses. 
After an analysis using various theories such as prospect theory,314 one of the options for 
foreign policy is to use unconventional warfare, using Malaysian SOF capabilities as 
illustrated in Figure 20, whether covertly, clandestinely, or even, at one stage, overtly, to 
shift X’s internal policy so that peace and security will be restored in X. Acting upon this 
option requires that Malaysian policymakers and premier leadership have a deeper 
understanding of unconventional warfare and SOF. Policymakers and SOF commanders 
should consider Christopher Lamb’s article during his tenure as the director of policy 
planning, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operation/Low 
Conflict, Intensity Conflict, in 1995. 
Given the sensitive political nature of covert paramilitary 
operations, the elaborate legal and oversight requirements that they 
entail and, most importantly, the additional specialized trade craft 
that they require, SOF would have to significantly expand their 
portfolio of capabilities in order to successfully execute such 
responsibilities.315 
                                                 
314 Barbara Farnham, Avoiding Losses/taking risks; Prospect Theory and International Conflicts (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). 




Malaysia’s SOF are not yet fully optimized for extending Malaysian foreign 
policy regionally or globally, except under the United Nation’s flag in peacekeeping 
operations. Malaysian leaders and policymakers should consider SOF capabilities and 
limitations as a tool for advancing Malaysia’s foreign policy and preventing threats and 
challenges to the national interest. This all depends on how much the Malaysian 
government comprehends its strategic situation and views its options. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD 
From 1941 until 1990, Malaysia and Malaya were involved in four violent 
conflicts. During WWII, British Special Operations Executives (SOE) organized, trained, 
and equipped Europeans and Malayan volunteers to form a guerrilla group called Force 
136 (Malaya) to fight against the Japanese Imperial Army, operating deep in the 
inhospitable jungles in preparation for the British reoccupation mission, Operation 
Zipper. Force 136 had to operate under many difficulties that were not experienced by the 
SOE in Europe, besides being far from its base in Ceylon (Sri Lanka). Although Force 
136 conducted many daring operations, they did not produce a significant change in the 
war. When the war ended unexpectedly, Force 136 and MPAJA guerrillas paraded 
victoriously before the Malayans, celebrating the Japanese surrender.  
Britain’s “most trusted friends,” the Communist Party of Malaya, took advantage 
of the unsettled situation in Malaya after WWII and continued to oppress the Malayan 
people and the British. In mid-1948, the Malayan Emergency began (1948–1960). The 
British administration organized special units, such as the Ferret Forces and Malayan 
Scouts (SAS), to fight the MRLA unconventionally. They reorganized the Malayan 
intelligence organization, the Police Special Branch, and trained and equipped the 
aborigines and Iban to act as paramilitary forces (e.g., the Senoi Praaq and Sarawak 
Rangers). When Malaya gained its independence in August 1957, the CPM’s political 
objective was retarded, and they agreed to cease fire.  
Malaysia was created in September 1963, uniting with Singapore, Sarawak, and 
Sabah. This unification was unacceptable to Indonesia, and they declared a Confrontation 
against the Malaysian government. The Indonesian Confrontation (1963–1966) was 
countered by the Malaysians, British, and Commonwealth forces, especially in North 
Borneo. This precipitated Operation Claret, a “most secret” SAS (plus other SOF) cross-
border operation designed to penetrate deep in Kalimantan areas, looking for the 
Indonesian army and its proxy. The Confrontation was terminated when the situation in 
Jakarta changed in favor of Malaysia.  
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Later, in 1968, the CPM and its army, the MRLA, resurfaced from their strategic 
withdrawal, with a new spirit, new weapons, and Vietcong tactics. A second armed 
struggle ensued. The government declared the Malaysian Second Emergency (1968–
1989). With its legacy of British SOF units, the government continued to confide in SOF 
capabilities and commissioned a few other units, such as the Malaysian Special Service 
Unit (MSSU) and Police Commando Very Able Troopers (VAT) 69 to fight the 
communist terrorists until they surrendered on December 2, 1989. Previous experience in 
WW II and the Malayan Emergency helped the Malaysian Armed Forces in general, and 
SOF in particular, in the Indonesian Confrontation and the Second Emergency. There are 
many lessons gained by the SOF that remain relevant in present situations and threats and 
should be studied, especially by Malaysian SOF communities. Table 2 presents this 
timeline in brief.  
This thesis highlights the development and capabilities of selected Malaysian SOF 
units in the post-conflict era (1990–present) and follows with a brief analysis of future 
requirements. The Defense Lines of Development (TEPID OIL + L) analysis, although 
brief, indicates various strong points, especially those involving people, leadership, 
organization, and training. Malaysian SOF units have improved their infrastructure and 
become better organized. They are better informed through professional intelligence and 
information operations units. Nevertheless, there are several factors that could be further 
improved, such as current doctrine, which concentrates on inward rather than outward 
defense, and towards regional or global defense, as laid out in defense and foreign 
policies. Another factor is equipment capabilities and acquisition procedures: the 
bureaucracy should be streamlined to improve equipment and efficiency. It is highly 
desirable that the SOF become involved in equipment and system research and 
development, so that that equipment provided is really suited to SOF roles and operating 
environments in Malaysia, and not just what may be available on-the-shelf. In the matter 
of logistics, the main problem was inadequate transportation for special units, which is 
especially critical if Malaysian SOF units are to operate regionally and globally in 
securing the national interest. Special vehicles, whether land, maritime, or air, should be 
dedicated to the SOF units.  
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Although Malaysian defense policy has shifted towards conventional forces, the 
SOF continue to train in jungle warfare, concentrating on men and equipment for 
unconventional warfare, COIN, CT, and other specialties. The GGK continuously 
realigns with army reformations because the SOF will remain suitable in a spectrum of 
conflicts. Though Malaysia’s foreign policy relies, in its fundamental principles, on soft 
diplomacy, Malaysian policymakers and politicians should also consider unconventional 
options as well. With small enhancement, present SOF capabilities can conduct various 
unconventional warfare operations in support of Malaysian foreign and defense policies, 
deploying forward for deterrence and forward defense. In defending the Malaysian 
homeland, SOF units must be absolutely ready to support the total defense concept, 
together with the Royal Malaysian Police units. The police units were still relevant to 
maintain Malaysia internal security and public order and to support the armed forces 
when necessary.  
This thesis covers only a small slice of Malaysian military and security studies. 
Knowledge regarding special operations forces in Malaysia should be pursued further, so 
that a better understanding of SOF strategic utility among policymakers, politicians and 
the armed forces may be achieved. Because the Malaysian Armed Forces are small, with 
a limited budget, SOF is one key option in strengthening Malaysia’s defense and securing 
its national interests. At the same time, Malaysia should learn from others’ mistakes in 
the employment of SOF units. It is recommended that further research be conducted on 
the uses and advantages of the Malaysian SOF, for the edification of policymakers, 
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